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FOREWORD
It is with great pleasure that I write the foreword to this e-book “Gov-
ernance for the Eurozone: Integration or Disintegration?” – above all 
because it is the second publication in this series, following last year’s 
“Life in the Eurozone: With or Without Default?”. 
In the foreword to last year’s publication, I referred to the sovereign 
debt crisis and its implications as not only a severe economic prob-
lem, but also a major challenge to European society that has stark 
impacts on the broader European integration process. Furthermore, 
I put into question the claim that European political leaders have 
obtained a “successful grand bargain” and I hinted to the fact that 
numerous commentators have instead accused the decision-makers 
of only dangerously “muddling through” and “kicking the can down 
the road”. Unfortunately, these accusations still hold true, and one 
year after the workshop “Life in the Eurozone: With or Without De-
fault?”, which was held at the European University Institute (EUI) in 
April 2011, we are still far from having found a substantial solution 
to the crisis. 
The 2012 edition of the workshop and this e-book very appropri-
ately raise the question “Governance for the Eurozone: Integration 
or Disintegration?” The survival of the Eurozone in its current form 
is as much at stake as it was a year ago and the publication of this 
e-book comes at a very timely moment. Once again, the individual 
chapters cover topics that dominate the political, economic and aca-
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demic discussion in and on Europe and I think this e-book has the 
potential to make a significant contribution to the current debates – 
as much as last year’s e-book did, which was a great success.
While many important changes in the economic governance of the 
Euro and regarding bail-out mechanisms have been made in the 
last two years (such as the European semester, the European Finan-
cial Stability Facility, the European Stability Mechanism, the Euro 
Plus Pact and lately the Fiscal pact), we still seem far away from 
reaching a proper and sustainable solution. The markets were not 
to be convinced, and while the heavy interventions of the European 
Central Bank were able to calm the markets for a short while, the 
crisis is now back in full force. And as much as the markets are not 
convinced, European citizens and politicians are increasingly uncer-
tain about the benefits the common currency brings and about how 
far they are willing to reach for a proper design of the Eurozone that 
tackles the current crisis and prevents future crises. From an eco-
nomic and political point of view, it seems clear to me that the only 
way out of this severe crisis is through proper economic governance 
with a proper fiscal union, but member states seem unable or unwill-
ing to make the needed steps towards this direction.
This e-book describes how such steps and proper economic gover-
nance of the Eurozone and its institutions could look. In three sec-
tions, the individual chapters consider the role of public financial 
institutions in dealing with the crisis and discuss the possibilities and 
limits of fiscal policy support. Furthermore, the various authors re-
flect on the reform of the political and economic architecture and 
on the crucial question of how to reform the growth and stability 
pact and how to construct sound mechanisms for providing liquidity 
to governments and financial institutions. Finally, the contributions 
analyse how the European Union and the EU can coexist, whether 
Europe is developing towards a two-speed Europe and what the con-
sequence of such a development would entail for the governance of 
the Eurozone. Overall, I think the chapters and their topics con-
centrate on some of the most crucial elements of the sovereign debt 
crisis, the future of the Euro and the Union.
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At the time of writing this foreword, the future looks rather grim 
and the probability of “disintegration” seems to be growing. Unable 
to form a government after the Parliamentary elections in May, the 
Greeks are being called to the polling stations again and the prospects 
of a dramatic exit from the Eurozone are openly discussed. Although 
Germany and France have repeated - at the first meeting between the 
new President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel - their willingness 
to keep Greece in the Euro, words and affirmations are no longer 
enough and convincing action is needed. At the same time, the suc-
cessive increases of the public deficit, the ever-growing banking crisis 
and the rising spreads in Spain, make it increasingly probable that a 
European intervention will be required to at least recapitalise parts of 
the Spanish banking system. These events and other problematic on-
going developments make it very difficult to imagine what the situa-
tion will be when this e-book is published. However, this publication 
will certainly provide a very important intellectual contribution to 
the problems we are facing and to the analysis of the crisis’ implica-
tions and the different ways out of the Eurozone crisis.
To conclude, I would like to thank and congratulate the editors of 
this e-book. The workshop that Professors Elena Carletti, Franklin 
Allen and Saverio Simonelli organised, and on which this e-book is 
based, was a huge success in several regards and I can speak for all 
participants when I say that it was a pleasure to attend this event. 
The workshop, which was held in the framework of the PEGGED 
project (Politics, Economics and Global Governance: The European 
Dimensions) and which was co-organised with the Wharton Finan-
cial Institutions Center, brought together leading academics from 
various disciplines and policymakers and I am very satisfied that the 
workshop’s presentations and results are being published in this e-
book. 
Finally, as much as I hope the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone 
will be contained soon, I think the tradition of this workshop should 
be continued to annually discuss the state and the challenges of the 
Eurozone. The EUI is certainly the right place to hold such an event. 
The Institute was created to study the problems of European societ-
ies and the construction of Europe at the highest intellectual level. 
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And without any doubt, the current Eurozone crisis is one of the 
biggest problems that Europe and its societies are facing today. This 
means that these past and future workshops contribute to one of the 
EUI’s core missions by being an excellent example for the European 
focus of the Institute’s research activities.
May 2012
Josep Borrell Fontelles
President of the European University Institute
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PREFACE
The European University Institute (EUI) and the Wharton Financial 
Institutions Center (FIC) organized a conference entitled “Gover-
nance for the Eurozone: Integration or Disintegration?” The event, 
which was held at the EUI in Florence, Italy, on 26 April 2012, was 
financed by the PEGGED project (Politics, Economics and Global 
Governance: The European Dimension). The conference brought 
together leading economists, lawyers, political scientists and policy-
makers to discuss the current situation in the Eurozone with particu-
lar emphasis on its governance. The goal was to have an open and 
multidisciplinary discussion on this important topic to understand 
better where the Eurozone is going and what is needed to preserve it. 
The President of the European University Institute, Josep Borrell 
Fontelles, opened the event, which consisted of three panels, a key-
note speech and a dinner speech. 
The first panel considered the role of public financial institutions. 
Antonio Borges (Catolica-Lisbon School of Business and Econom-
ics) discussed the various responses  of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in dealing with 
the European sovereign debt crisis; and the structure of the Euro-
pean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial 
Stability Mechanism (EFSM). Paul De Grauwe (London School of 
Economics) discussed the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
during the crisis, and argued in favor of the ECB acting as the lender 
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of last resort also in the government bond market. Friedrich Kübler 
(Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe University & University of Pennsylvania) 
discussed different scenarios of integration/disintegration for the 
Eurozone, stressing the responsibility of the public institutions de-
signed to provide additional financial support for needy Euro Mem-
ber States. Frank Smets (European Central Bank) focused on the role 
of the ECB as market maker of last resort to alleviate the risk that 
funding problems translate into a deep credit crunch and a systemic 
collapse. 
In the keynote address, Richard Portes (London Business School) fo-
cused on the choice of the international reserve currency in the inter-
national monetary system. He stressed that markets normally choose 
the dominant currency, except for the Bretton Woods exchange-rate 
system in the period 1944-1971, and had to adjust to the creation 
of the Euro as a major new international currency. The role of the 
Euro may change now in light of the recent crisis and following the 
emergence of China with its currency RMB as a powerful nation. 
 
The second panel discussed the reform of the political and economic 
architecture. Leszek Balcerowicz (Warsaw School of Economics) 
pointed out the importance of structural reforms to manage and pre-
vent the Euro crisis. Russell Cooper (EUI) analyzed the exit from 
a monetary union as a punishment for an unsuccessful reform and 
thus as incentive mechanism for the reform to be implemented. 
Pietro Carlo Padoan (OECD) discussed the contribution of struc-
tural reforms to solving the Euro area crisis together with the need to 
progress in fiscal consolidation. Jacques Ziller (University of Pavia) 
presented a legal perspective on the most recent reforms of the Eu-
rozone architecture. 
The third panel analyzed whether the Eurozone is diverging into two 
groups and the potential consequence of a two tier Europe for the 
governance of the Eurozone. Bruno De Witte (Maastricht Univer-
sity) focused on the function of treaties as an attempt of the EU insti-
tutions and governments to deal with the sovereign debt crisis during 
the past two years. Charles Goodhart (London School of Econom-
ics) discussed the role of the UK under three possible scenarios for 
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the future of the Eurozone: (i) more political, fiscal and financial 
centralisation; (ii) Eurozone break-up; (iii) Eurozone and the EU 
collapse. Brigid Laffan (University College Dublin) discussed the im-
plications of the policy responses to the Euro crisis for the dynamics 
of European integration. Guntram Wolff (Bruegel) pointed out that 
solving the Euro area crisis would require more integration steps, in 
particular in the financial and banking field.
At dinner, Wolfgang Münchau (Eurointelligence) presented his view 
on the German approach of fighting the crisis through a combina-
tion of fiscal discipline and structural reforms. He suggested that this 
approach is flawed because it does not take into account the interac-
tion between austerity and growth. He argued that the likely suc-
cess of Francois Hollande will change the crisis “narratives,” in that 
eurobonds or bank resolution regimes, for example, may no longer 
be a taboo subject.
The book ends with a postscript entitled “Europe’s Tragedy Nears 
the End of Act One, but the Drama Continues,” written by Janet 
Kersnar as an article for Knowledge@Wharton. This summarizes the 
various views expressed at the conference.
The book contains also an appendix including a piece written by 
Victor Ngai (University of Pennsylvania) on the history of the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact and the conference program.
The conference follows last year’s event entitled “Life in the Eurozone 
With or Without Sovereign Default?” As on the previous occasion, 
the debate at the conference was very lively and many different views 
on the need of further reforms were presented. Again, we prefer not 
to take a stance but rather present all of them in this book and let the 
readers draw their own conclusions. 
A color e-book is available for free download at the following links:
http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Carletti/
http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Economics/Seminar-
sEvents/Conferences/GovernancefortheEurozoneIntegrationorDis-
integration.aspx 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/FIC/FICPress/goveuro.pdf
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Last year’s e-book is available for free download at the following links:
http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Carletti/ 
http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Economics/Re-
searchTeaching/Conferences/Lifeinthe Eurozone/Index.aspx
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/FIC/FICPress/eurozone.pdf
Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti and Saverio Simonelli
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The Role of Public Financial  
Institutions
Antonio Borges
1. Foundations of Monetary Union
When the project of European monetary union was conceived and 
agreed to, there was little dissent with respect to its model: Europe-
ans agreed to the German approach to monetary and financial stabil-
ity. We were all going to behave like the Germans, adopt price stabil-
ity as a fundamental pillar of prosperity and put in place a central 
bank that would be single-mindedly focused on that goal. For this 
purpose, the central bank had to be fully independent from politi-
cians, have a clear cut mandate with only one objective in mind and 
never engage in monetary financing of governments, let alone bail 
out any country. 
It is most likely that, in the absence of agreement along these lines, 
the Germans would not have considered abandoning their beloved 
Deutschmark. But that was not the real issue: Europeans – or at least 
those who opted to join – were fully convinced of the merits of the 
German model of monetary policy, and embraced it without hesita-
tion. And indeed it is a fact that the countries of the Eurozone started 
behaving more like the Germans, in the sense that they eliminated 
their propensity to let inflation flare up, and quickly converged on 
the German definition of price stability across the Eurozone.
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Apart from the focus on price stability, this model was extremely 
specific about the separation between fiscal and monetary policy: 
governments would never be allowed to use central bank funding – 
monetary financing – irrespective of any crisis or emergencies they 
might face; furthermore, anything that might look like a bailout of 
a government by the monetary authorities was specifically ruled out, 
in a form that could be enforced by the courts.
The model also included a strict definition of the modus operandi 
of the central bank: funding to the banks within the union had to 
be based on sound collateral; banks should not be too dependent on 
the central bank for their funding needs; and any excessive growth 
of monetary aggregates should be a source of concern, to be fought 
with all the weapons of the central monetary authority.
Today, these conditions might be considered too rigid. There are 
many appeals to change the mandate of the European Central Bank, 
many demands that these restrictions be relaxed. Under the current 
emergency, many find it hard to believe that the central bank has 
to limit its action because of some rules devised at a time when no 
emergency existed or was foreseen. Furthermore, many well-known 
and highly reputed economists defend the view that Europe, and es-
pecially Germany, should accept a relatively high rate of inflation, as 
the simplest way to sort out the Eurozone crisis. This is, of course, in 
complete contradiction with the whole spirit under which monetary 
union was created and is certainly contrary to Germany’s tradition of 
price stability as a fundamental pillar of prosperity.
This is a more serious problem than most commentators tend to 
admit. First, the single-minded focus on price stability is enshrined 
in the Maastricht Treaty, which was ratified by all member states and 
cannot be overlooked. Not only a deviation from the Treaty may be 
challenged in the courts, but, more importantly, the political legiti-
macy of such a break would be seriously questioned. It is not difficult 
to argue that the various countries agreed to a project of monetary 
union which was well defined and subject to political ratification; a 
material change in the rules of the game would be a rather dramatic 
violation of democratic principles.
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Secondly, this is not simply a matter of disagreement among econo-
mists. In Germany – and to a certain extent in other neighboring 
countries - the principles of monetary stability, fiscal rectitude and 
robust financial policies are regarded as absolutely fundamental. 
Given their post-war experience, the Germans consider that their 
economic and financial success is due to the adherence to those prin-
ciples and will not easily tolerate substantial deviations from them. 
Therefore, a change of policy, away from the principles enshrined in 
the Treaty, is not something that the German political leadership can 
accommodate as a matter of expediency. They would most likely face 
a real backlash from German public opinion. In this sense, it is fair 
to predict that the project of monetary union – however important 
for Germany – may very well not survive a demand for a change in 
the mandate of the European Central Bank. 
2. The Need for Coherent Policies
The current crisis brings to broad daylight the consequences of inco-
herent economic policies across the Eurozone. From the beginning, 
it was clear that monetary union required some degree of restraint 
on the part of the member states, because of serious externalities in 
the conduct of their economic policies. But this restraint was ini-
tially limited to fiscal discipline. The stability and growth pact was 
designed to prevent what was perceived as free-riding temptation: 
the incentive to adopt lax fiscal policies because the cost would be 
diluted across the union, since interest rates would not rise nearly as 
much as if monetary policy remained a domestic affair. 
What the current crisis showed is that the externalities went far be-
yond what was initially expected. Since the framework did not al-
low for any kind of bailout of countries with financial difficulties, 
governments were expected to adopt responsible fiscal policies. But 
not enough attention was paid to other perverse effects of incon-
sistent policies, beyond fiscal recklessness. In fact, without bailouts, 
debt sustainability was bound to become a central concern, simply 
because, if a government ever became insolvent, it might have no 
option but to leave the union and return to its own currency. Debt 
sustainability is not only a question of fiscal deficits, but also of inter-
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est rates and growth rates. This became only too apparent went the 
Greek crisis exploded in early 2010, proving that doubts about debt 
sustainability called into question the integrity of the Eurozone.
The first decade of monetary union went too well. Monetary integra-
tion proceeded at a fast pace, credit began flowing in larger and larger 
amounts across borders, interest rates converged almost perfectly and 
it seemed that the Eurozone had become like the United States of 
America: monetary conditions were pretty much the same, credit 
went to where it was in demand, exchange rate risk was eliminated, 
and the future looked very bright.
With large credit inflows, some countries on the periphery of the 
Eurozone seemed to be booming. Access to very cheap credit led to a 
spectacular increase in spending, both private and public. The most 
important consequence of this was a dramatic reduction in savings 
rates. These countries – Greece, Portugal, Spain and even Ireland – 
moved towards large current account deficits, funded through credit 
inflows, and reflecting a level of domestic demand far in excess of 
GDP. For a while, this looked like a new phase of prosperity, entirely 
justified by the need to catch up, relative to other members of the 
Eurozone. There were even some positive elements to this process: 
Spain had budget surpluses for quite a few years, Greece had sig-
nificant productivity increases, and Ireland kept expanding its ex-
port base. But the negative components became dominant: most of 
the growth in spending benefited essentially the non-tradable sector, 
whose prices kept rising steadily, relative to tradables. This is exactly 
equivalent to real exchange rate appreciation and made these coun-
tries less and less competitive. Their current account deficits became 
not just a matter of excessive spending, but a more structural and 
permanent reality.
In Ireland and Spain, the wave of excessive credit and spending turned 
into a massive real estate bubble, with huge implications for their 
banking sectors. In Portugal and Greece, where the real estate prob-
lem was far less severe, the excessive level of indebtedness, coupled 
with a bloated non-tradable sector, also put the banks in a vulnerable 
position. As a result, when the process finally came to an end – that 
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is, when credit stopped flowing to these countries, as the financial 
world realized that after all they were not as financially sound as Ger-
many – it became clear that the situation was unsustainable. Saddled 
with too much foreign debt, having lost competitiveness and now 
facing a deadly serious banking situation, these countries became 
very problematic, because the sustainability of their public debt was 
no longer convincing. The particular situation of each country was 
not exactly the same; but all of them found it very difficult to attract 
investor interest, because the structural problems that had developed 
raised very serious questions about growth prospects, which made it 
impossible to convince investors that they would ever be able to pay 
back.
Thus, the real cause of the Eurozone crisis became not so much an 
issue of fiscal profligacy, but rather a much more serious issue of 
competitiveness and growth. Fiscal deficits can be cut rather quickly; 
restoring growth is much more difficult if the obstacles to growth are 
structural, that is, are caused by a misallocation of resources, with 
excessive growth in the non-tradable sector, an overvalued real ex-
change rate and a very fragile situation in the banking sector.
As investors became more and more aware of the dimension of the 
problem and of its long term implications, policymakers also real-
ized that the challenge they faced was huge. Adjustment programs, 
funded by the European countries and the IMF became inevitable; 
but those programs could not simply adopt the typical IMF recipe 
of restoring fiscal discipline and regaining competitiveness through 
devaluation. Under fixed exchange rates, rebalancing the economy 
by transferring resources from non-tradables to tradables was much 
more difficult to do. Serious resistance from all those vested interests 
which had benefited from the previous policy was going to prove 
quite strong, and the financial sector was not in a position to finance 
in attractive conditions the investments necessary to restore the trad-
able sector back to a healthier and more competitive situation.
Policymakers realized that monetary union required much more 
than fiscal discipline. It became clear that systematic losses of com-
petitiveness, massive foreign borrowing to finance consumer spend-
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ing and real estate investment, and illusory growth based on non-
tradables were all elements of an incoherent policy stance, which 
created very deeply entrenched obstacles to growth, justified serious 
doubts about debt sustainability and spooked investors who moved 
away from these countries. It dawned on all of them that monetary 
union would only be sustainable if policies were brought back in 
line, not only in fiscal terms, but also in regard to what concerned 
competitiveness, openness and potential growth.
3. Financial Support and Policy Conditionality
To avoid catastrophic outcomes that would put monetary union 
at risk, financial support became crucial. Taking Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal out of the markets, in order to provide them with the 
breathing space necessary to put their economies back on track, was 
inevitable. But the programs had, above all, to restore credibility; in 
other words, it was fundamental that investors recovered their confi-
dence in the prospects of these countries, so that they would be ready 
to finance them again, when the programs were over.
Financial support may be needed even when the policies a country is 
following are not out of line in terms of long term debt sustainability. 
If an acute crisis of confidence raises fears about the prospects of a 
particular country, investors will demand a premium to hold that 
country’s debt. If the premium is high enough, that may be sufficient 
to make the situation unsustainable. In other words, even a coun-
try where debt would normally be sustainable may find itself in a 
situation of insolvency, because a decline in investor confidence may 
make its debt too expensive. This is what is called a bad equilibrium, 
generated by a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy: if markets think debt 
is unsustainable, then debt will become unsustainable, irrespective 
of what would otherwise be relatively benign conditions in terms of 
the fiscal situation.
Thus, financial assistance has to restore confidence in the prospects 
of a country to regain debt sustainability, which most of the time 
requires confidence that economic growth will return. And therefore, 
the policy conditionality associated with assistance programs has to 
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emphasize structural reforms and financial strengthening, in order to 
create the conditions to make growth possible. Much of the debate 
about the success or failure of these adjustment programs reflects 
controversy around the issue of growth. Since there is a need for fiscal 
consolidation, given the inability to keep on borrowing in the mar-
kets, many economists believe that these programs will only generate 
economic decline.  But the fundamental goal of the programs has to 
be economic recovery, so that debt can be paid back and investors 
come back to the market for these countries’ debt.
The last two years show that an obsessive focus on fiscal accounts 
is clearly not sufficient. The authorities have sometimes put too 
much emphasis on the immediate achievement of the standards of 
the Stability and Growth Pact, in particular through front loaded 
corrections of budget imbalances. Restoring the credibility of public 
finances is a requirement to recover investor confidence; but it is 
not sufficient. If there are no prospects for economic growth, debt 
will most likely never be sustainable again. And the programs fail in 
their ultimate goal of restoring credibility. Since growth requires the 
removal of deeply entrenched obstacles to growth, their nature has to 
be quite different from previous programs of adjustment, and their 
political component also becomes far more decisive.
This situation also creates a difficult dilemma: if the right policies 
are not adopted, the programs will fail. If there is a perception that 
programs fail, then financial assistance makes no sense. Not only will 
political opposition increase – both from taxpayers in Europe, but 
also at the IMF – but also countries at risk may resist asking for a 
program. This is now the case in Spain and Italy, where any kind of 
assistance from outside is seen as counterproductive because it is per-
ceived as a step down a path of no return, with limited or no impact 
on market credibility.
4. Cooperation Between EFSF, ESM and IMF
The adjustment programs negotiated with the so-called Troika – the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF – 
require a convergence of approaches and an understanding of the role 
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of each of these institutions, which is hard to put in place. The three 
institutions have different perspectives and priorities: the European 
Commission attaches enormous priority to the fiscal adjustment 
process, with a focus on the Maastricht criteria; it prefers frontloaded 
adjustment and monitors closely budget execution, on the assump-
tion that, if the fiscal problem is solved, everything else will fall in 
place. The European Central Bank also insists on frontloaded fiscal 
adjustment but adds to it a concern with the health of the banking 
sector. Beyond fiscal austerity, the ECB typically requires substan-
tial deleveraging of the banking system, higher capital ratios and no 
losses imposed on holders of bank debt. The IMF is traditionally less 
focused on speedy fiscal consolidation and puts more emphasis on 
structural policies, designed to restore economic growth; but, given 
the Fund’s previous focus on more straightforward stabilization pro-
grams, its experience in the area of structural reforms in advanced 
economies is rather limited.
Where the IMF plays a crucial role, which actually makes it indis-
pensable, is in the credibility it has acquired over decades with re-
spect to its ability to negotiate with the countries involved, and also 
to monitor rigorously the execution of the programs, their funding 
requirements and their impact on debt sustainability. European gov-
ernments have repeatedly toyed with the idea that they could run 
the whole process themselves, relying only on the Commission and 
the ECB. But this has proven politically impossible. All governments 
have found that their tax-payers have serious doubts about the ap-
proach of throwing more money at the countries in trouble; and so, 
even the most hard line of them have realized that the support of the 
IMF had become crucial, not because of the amounts of money the 
Fund could contribute – which were always going to be small, rela-
tive to the total – but because they could convince their tax-payers 
that the money was going to be well spent, thanks to the kind of 
conditionality which the Fund could impose better than anyone else.
As the Greek program unfolded and began running into problems 
– during roughly the first half of 2011 – the position of the IMF 
became more and more uncomfortable. Since the program was not 
being properly executed, the whole credibility effect was losing its 
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value, with considerable implications for the rest of the IMF’s ac-
tivity. But many throughout Europe were not prepared to accept 
the natural consequence of these developments, which was that the 
program should be terminated and no further disbursements should 
be authorized. Greek politicians skillfully exploited this divergence, 
by always promising to correct their slippage in program execution; 
and, with the financing guarantees provided by the European gov-
ernments, it was possible to keep the program running and to main-
tain the myth that Greek debt was sustainable.
Another very difficult area for cooperation within the Troika related 
to debt restructuring. Based on  their long experience with less devel-
oped economies, many at the IMF started early in 2011 proposing 
some kind of debt restructuring, certainly for Greece, perhaps also 
for Ireland and Portugal. This was strongly resisted by the European 
Commission and the ECB, who feared that the precedent would 
prove devastating for the cohesion of the Eurozone. The ECB, in par-
ticular, always argued that debt restructuring would place the coun-
tries in default, which prevented the Central Bank from continuing 
lending to banks in those countries and lead to a collapse of their 
banking sectors. As these discussions went on, the Greek Govern-
ment obviously followed them with great interest, which led it to put 
much less emphasis on program execution.
The debate around debt restructuring eventually led to the concept 
of Private Sector Involvement, or PSI, which was essentially politi-
cally driven. Many countries, starting with but not limited to Ger-
many, found it impossible to admit to their tax-payers that they were 
pouring money into Greece only to see private sector investors bailed 
out. Given that the program was proving to be less likely to succeed, 
it looked like the only benefit from foreign assistance was captured 
by private sector investors. Keeping them involved became a political 
necessity, so much so that the European Commission and especially 
the ECB, had to swallow their reservations and accept the idea, al-
though dressing it up under the pretense of a voluntary negotiation, 
which was to have only a minor and temporary impact on ratings.
Over time, the PSI project became closer and closer to full blown 
debt restructuring. But, all things considered, it actually has only a 
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very limited impact on Greek debt sustainability. It provides some li-
quidity relief, since the cash payments to investors were substantially 
delayed. But debt sustainability still depends crucially on the ability 
to get some degree of economic growth in Greece. Without it, the 
losses imposed on private investors will be only a down-payment for 
what is to come.
As everyone became more and more worried about the absence of 
progress in the Greek program, and as fears began spreading to Italy, 
the position of the IMF also changed and the differences of opinion 
with the European authorities became more pronounced. The Fund 
began putting more emphasis on decisive action to put an end to the 
catastrophic risk of a Eurozone collapse. In this new approach, the 
Fund began defending a change in the stance of the ECB, a more 
generalized adoption of debt restructuring and the creation of a huge 
firewall, designed to scare markets and restore a good equilibrium. 
This was bound to create tensions with the European authorities, or 
with those within Europe who had fundamental reservations about 
this plan. The level of tension increased steadily, leading the Fund 
to adopt a more reserved position with respect to support for the 
Eurozone. In the second Greek program, the Fund reduced its level 
of financial commitment to a minimum, in a gesture that many in-
terpreted as an indication that the Fund was not happy to see its 
positions rejected.
In the end, the European authorities moved partially in the direction 
of what the Fund wanted. The ECB adopted a policy of large scale 
liquidity injections into the European banking system, designed to 
facilitate the purchase of sovereign debt by European banks, while 
also trying to eliminate liquidity risks across the European economy. 
The European governments agreed to provide additional funding to 
the IMF, to help shore up the financial resources required by a fire-
wall. But the adoption of more radical measures – such as changing 
the EFSF or the ESM so that they could lend to banks, or asking the 
ECB to impose a ceiling on the yields of Italian debt – were firmly 
resisted.
Apart from the issue of fundamental differences of views on the 
model of monetary union, as described above, there is also a techni-
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cal reason for the European resistance to the concept of a huge fire-
wall. The European experience of 1992, at the time of the great cur-
rency crisis which almost destroyed the European Monetary System, 
shows that markets will always beat the authorities, if the issue is who 
can mobilize more money. The attempt to win a battle on a position 
which the market believes is untenable simply by displaying a large 
war chest will usually fail. The resources the authorities can mobilize 
for a firewall, no matter how large, will always be limited. And there 
is general consensus that they will never be sufficient to take Italy or 
Spain out of the markets. Therefore, if the issue becomes whether the 
firewall is large enough to deter the markets, the answer will always 
be negative, since markets can mobilize for all practical purposes an 
unlimited amount of funds. In other words, in the case of Italy and 
Spain, either the credibility battle is won, or a firewall, no matter 
how large, will never solve the problem. In fact, it can be argued that 
a large firewall is actually destabilizing, because it only makes the bet 
larger – this is exactly how George Soros and others looked at the UK 
defense of the Pound Sterling in the fall of 1992. 
Of course, the proponents of a large firewall will always argue that it 
can be made all powerful if it is financed by the ECB. But this would 
require quite a change in the role and mandate of the ECB, which, 
as argued above, is not very likely.
5. The Limited Role of the ECB
The fact that the ECB has substantial constraints in its action does 
not mean that it has no possible contribution to helping to solve 
the Eurozone crisis. The Central Bank has been experimenting with 
several types of initiatives, with mixed results. A certain consensus 
seems to be emerging, even though this is a rather controversial area.
The key concern relates to the fact that every type of intervention 
has to have a certain degree of policy conditionality. Every expres-
sion of support must be based on the conviction that the country in 
question is moving in the right direction. And if that movement is 
not serious, whatever support is provided must be stopped. This is a 
simple principle, but very difficult to enforce by the ECB.
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First, the very fact that the ECB has unlimited weaponry reduces the 
credibility of conditionality. The IMF may say that, if programs are 
not executed, the Fund must interrupt them, because otherwise it 
risks very large losses, since its money is at stake and a failed program 
makes repayment very unlikely. In the case of the ECB, it is easy to 
argue that, if the program is not working well, more money from the 
Central Bank will always allow the country to gain time and provide 
it with the means to overcome short term difficulties and get back on 
track. Since the ECB, unlike the IMF, can create unlimited amounts 
of money, it is easy to give credence to this argument, which obvi-
ously undermines the whole idea of conditionality.
Put more simply, when the ECB was intervening in Italian debt mar-
kets in the fall of 2011, Silvio Berlusconi could always argue that a 
little more money from the ECB would be enough to deal with mar-
ket pressures; and if the ECB had accepted the argument, Berlusconi 
would still be Prime Minister of Italy, independently of the policies 
he would or would not put in place. 
A second problem has to do with the kind of intervention the ECB 
can conduct and the way it is influenced by the attempt to impose 
conditionality. The same episode of intervention in Italian debt mar-
kets illustrates this point. The ECB was trying to limit the yields 
in Italian sovereign bonds, restore confidence, and bring investors 
back into the market. As the discussions with the Italian govern-
ment became more and more difficult, the ECB found it necessary 
to condition its purchases of Italian bonds on the willingness of the 
Government to adopt the right policies. Given the Italian hesitations 
and frequent reversals of agreed policies, the ECB found itself in the 
uncomfortable position of intervening intermittently in the market. 
This created huge uncertainty and very high volatility, in fact scaring 
investors away, instead of bringing them back to the market. The 
ECB must have found this episode extremely frustrating.
This does not mean that there are no circumstances under which 
ECB intervention would be helpful and stabilizing. The Securities 
Market Program remains in the armory of the ECB and can and 
should have a role in stabilizing monetary conditions across the 
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Eurozone. There are occasions when erratic events or acute crises lead 
to very destabilizing effects in the markets for government bonds. It 
is quite appropriate that the SMP be used to control those situations 
and provide a degree of stability that leads investors to consider the 
markets for government bonds as stable, mature and reliable, some-
thing of enormous importance in every economy. But keeping this 
kind of intervention separate and distinct from a bail-out or a form 
of monetary financing is not always simple. The stabilizing role of 
the ECB in moments of crisis depends very much on its ability to 
work around this dilemma.
6. Financial Regulation, Incomplete Monetary Union and the 
     Prisoner’s Dilemma
Two more issues deserve a great deal of attention, when discussing 
the role of financial institutions in the unfolding of the Eurozone 
crisis. One is the fact that monetary union is still a work in progress 
across Europe. The other one deals with the incongruence of trying 
to put in place monetary union and maintaining a nationally regu-
lated banking sector.
When compared with a proper monetary union, as in the case of the 
United States of America, the European project shows how incom-
plete it is. In Europe, the only form of capital that flows freely across 
borders is credit. Monetary integration has led to very large – even 
excessive – flows of credit across borders, but other forms of capital 
are not so easy to invest in other countries. This is particularly the 
case with equity, when it involves changes of control. In reality, in 
spite of monetary union and of several decades of freedom of capital 
flows, many European countries still resist the idea that foreign capi-
tal can buy their assets and can gain control of their large corpora-
tions. This is especially acute in the case of banks.
The main consequence of this restriction, which is essentially politi-
cal, is that one of the most important mechanisms of self-correction 
of problems within the union is eliminated. In a proper monetary 
union, if, because of reckless policies in certain parts of the union, 
resulting in high levels of indebtedness, assets are discounted, then 
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investors from other parts of the union will quickly step in and take 
advantage of the arbitrage opportunities to grab those assets. This 
allows conversion of debt into equity, with considerable mitigation 
of the excessive indebtedness problem. If cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions are not allowed, monetary union will be unbalanced, 
because credit flows cannot be compensated by equity flows when 
necessary. As long as corporate control remains protected and change 
of control is not allowed or seriously discouraged, excessive credit 
flows will be more destabilizing than otherwise.
A similar, but even more serious argument can be made with re-
spect to the imprudence of trying to run monetary union without a 
central approach to banking regulation. As banking systems remain 
regulated at the national level, with resolution schemes and finan-
cial backstops also national, whenever a large scale banking problem 
emerges, monetary union becomes very unstable. This was evidently 
the problem in Ireland, but potentially could still happen in many 
other countries in the Eurozone. First, banks are typically very sub-
stantial investors in sovereign debt, so they become the first victims 
of any impairments related to the credibility of sovereign debt. But if 
in trouble, they can only turn to their own government for support. 
This creates the infamous vicious circle of excessive sovereign debt, 
which leads to solvency problems in the banking system, which in 
turn drives the public sector further into bankruptcy.
Furthermore, when these developments take place, monetary union 
tends to unravel. Regulators will insist that the banks they are re-
sponsible for must abandon exposure to the countries in difficulty, 
which only makes the problems of these countries worse. As the cri-
sis advances, banking systems become more and more focused on 
domestic markets, and monetary conditions diverge more and more 
across Europe. 
This then develops into a typical prisoner’s dilemma. Under uncer-
tain conditions for sovereign debt sustainability and bank solvency, 
every national regulator and every large bank will only think of solv-
ing its own problem. In the process they generate a final outcome 
which is a collective disaster. Only a cooperative solution creates the 
15Antonio Borges
conditions to overcome the dilemma, and yet European institutions 
– national regulators – as well as the Commission, the ECB, and 
even the IMF will not be prepared to lead such a cooperative process, 
because it is outside of their traditional mandate.
The problem of retrenchment on the part of European banks, as a 
reaction to the inability of the European authorities and the IMF 
to find a solution to this prisoner’s dilemma, is one of the biggest 
obstacles to economic recovery in Europe, since credit is not flow-
ing and monetary conditions are extremely onerous in the countries 
which most need more relaxed access to credit. And yet, no solution 
seems to be in sight or is even being studied.
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The European Central Bank: 
Lender of Last Resort  
in the Government Bond 
Markets?*
Paul De Grauwe
Introduction
In October 2008, the ECB discovered that there is more to central 
banking than price stability. This discovery occurred when the ECB 
was forced to massively increase liquidity to save the banking system. 
The ECB did not hesitate to exert its function of lender of last resort 
to the banking system, setting aside all fears of moral hazard and 
inflation, and concerns about the fiscal implications of its lending.
Things were very different when the sovereign debt crisis erupted 
in 2010. Then the ECB was gripped by hesitation. A stop-and-go 
policy ensued in which it provided liquidity in the government bond 
markets at some moments only to withdraw it at other times. When 
the crisis hit Spain and Italy in July 2011, the ECB was compelled 
again to provide liquidity in the government bond markets.  
Is there a role for the ECB as a lender of last resort in the government 
bond market? This is the question I want to analyze in this paper. 
 * Paper prepared for the conference “Governance for the Eurozone. Integration or 
Disintegration?” organized at the European University Institute, 26 April, 2012. 
I am grateful for the many comments formulated by the participants at the confer- 
ence, and more particularly by Frank Smets. 
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Fragility of a monetary union
It is useful to start by describing the weakness of government bond 
markets in a monetary union. National governments in a monetary 
union issue debt in a “foreign” currency, i.e., one over which they 
have no control. As a result, they cannot guarantee to the bondhold-
ers that they will always have the necessary liquidity to pay out the 
bond at maturity. This contrasts with “stand-alone” countries that 
issue sovereign bonds in their own currencies. This feature allows 
these countries to guarantee that the cash will always be available to 
pay out the bondholders. Thus, in a stand-alone country there is an 
implicit guarantee that the central bank is a lender of last resort in 
the government bond market. 
The absence of such a guarantee makes the sovereign bond markets 
in a monetary union prone to liquidity crises and forces of conta-
gion, very much like banking systems that lack a lender of last resort. 
In such banking systems, solvency problems in one bank may lead 
deposit holders of other banks to withdraw their deposits. When ev-
erybody does this at the same time, the banks will not have enough 
cash. This sets in motion a liquidity crisis in many sound banks, and 
degenerates into a solvency crisis as banks try to cash in their as-
sets, thereby pulling down their prices. As asset prices collapse, many 
banks find out that they are insolvent. This banking system instabil-
ity was solved by mandating the central bank to be a lender of last 
resort – and the neat thing about this solution is that, when deposit 
holders are confident that it exists, it rarely has to be used.
The government bond markets in a monetary union have the same 
structure as the banking system. When solvency problems arise in 
one country (Greece), bondholders, fearing the worst, sell bonds 
in other bond markets. This triggers a liquidity crisis in these other 
markets, only because there is a fear that cash may not be available 
to pay out to bondholders. But this selling activity leads to an in-
crease in government bond rates and turns the liquidity crisis into a 
solvency crisis. There is an interest rate high enough that will make 
any country insolvent. The characteristic feature of these dynamics 
is that distrust can push a country in a self-fulfilling way into a bad 
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equilibrium.1 The latter is characterized by high interest rates, re-
cessionary forces, increasing budgetary problems, and an increased 
probability of insolvency. In a bad equilibrium, it is also likely that 
domestic banks will experience funding problems that can degener-
ate into solvency problems.
The single most important argument for mandating the ECB to be 
a lender of last resort in the government bond markets is to prevent 
countries from being pushed into a bad equilibrium. In a way, it can 
be said that the self-fulfilling nature of expectations creates a coordi-
nation failure, i.e., the fear of insufficient liquidity pushes countries 
into a situation in which there will be insufficient liquidity for both 
the government and the banking sector. The central bank can solve 
this coordination failure by providing lending of last resort. 
 
Failure to provide lending of last resort in the government bond mar-
kets of the monetary union carries the risk of forcing the central bank 
into providing lending of last resort to the banks of the countries hit 
by a sovereign debt crisis. In fact, this happened in December 2011 
and February 2012 when the ECB was forced to pour a total of one 
trillion Euros into the banking system that had become infected by 
the sovereign debt crises. And this lending of last resort is almost 
certainly more expensive. The reason is that most often the liabilities 
of the banking sector of a country are many times larger than the 
liabilities of the national government. This is shown in Figure 1. We 
observe that the bank liabilities in the Eurozone represented about 
250% of GDP in 2008. This compares to a government debt to 
GDP ratio in the Eurozone of approximately 80% in the same year. 
1 See De Grauwe (2011) where this point is elaborated further. See also Kopf 
(2011). For formal theoretical models see Calvo (1988) and Gros (2011).  This 
problem also exists with emerging countries that issue debt in a foreign currency. 
See Eichengreen, et al. (2005).  The problem is also similar to self-fulfilling foreign 
exchange crises (Obstfeld(1994)). 
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Figure 1: Bank liabilities as percent GDP (2008)
While the argument for mandating the ECB to be a lender of last re-
sort in the government bond markets is a strong one, the opposition 
to giving the ECB this mandate is equally intense. Let me review the 
main arguments that have been formulated against giving a lender of 
last resort role to the ECB. 
Risk of infl ation
A popular argument against an active role of the ECB as a lender of 
last resort in the sovereign bond market is that this would lead to 
infl ation. By buying government bonds, it is said, the ECB increases 
the money stock thereby leading to a risk of infl ation. Does an in-
crease in the money stock not always lead to more infl ation as Milton 
Friedman taught us? Two points should be made here. 
First, a distinction should be introduced between the money base and 
the money stock. When the central bank buys government bonds (or 
other assets), it increases the money base (currency in circulation 
and banks’ deposits at the central bank). Th is does not mean that 
the money stock increases. In fact, during  periods of fi nancial crises, 
both monetary aggregates tend to become disconnected. An example 
of this is shown in Figure 2. One observes that, prior to the banking 
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report 2008
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crisis of October 2008, both aggregates were very much connected. 
From October 2008 on, however, the disconnect became quite spec-
tacular. In order to save the banking system, the ECB massively piled 
up assets on its balance sheets, the counterpart of which was a very 
large increase in the money base. This had no effect on the money 
stock (M3) (see Figure 2). In fact, the latter declined until the end 
of 2009. The reason why this happened is that banks piled up the 
liquidity provided by the ECB without using it to extend credit to 
the non-banking sector.  A similar phenomenon has been observed 
in the US and the UK. 
Another way to understand this phenomenon is to note that when a 
financial crisis erupts, agents want to hold cash for safety reasons. If 
the central bank decides not to supply the cash, it turns the financial 
crisis into an economic recession and possibly a depression, as agents 
sell assets in their scramble for cash. When instead the central bank 
exerts its function of lender of last resort and supplies more money 
base, it stops this deflationary process. That does not allow us to con-
clude that the central bank is likely to create inflation. 
All this was very well understood by Milton Friedman, the father of 
monetarism, who cannot be suspected of favoring inflationary poli-
cies. In his classic book co-authored with Anna Schwartz, A Mon-
etary History of the United States, he argued that the Great Depres-
sion was so intense because the Federal Reserve failed to perform 
its role of lender of last resort, and did not increase the US money 
base sufficiently (see Friedman and Schwartz (1961). In fact, on page 
333, Friedman and Schwartz produce a figure that is very similar to 
Figure 2, showing how, during the period 1929-33, the US money 
stock declined, while the money base (“high powered money”) in-
creased. Friedman and Schwartz argued forcefully that the money 
base should have increased much more and that the way to achieve 
this was by buying government securities. Much to the chagrin of 
Friedman and Schwartz, the Federal Reserve failed to do so. Those 
who today fear the inflationary risks of lender of last resort opera-
tions should do well to read Friedman and Schwartz (1961). 
This unfounded fear of inflationary consequences of lender of last 
resort activity continues to affect policymaking. For example, when 
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the ECB recently decided to start buying Spanish and Italian gov-
ernment bonds, it announced that it would sterilize the eff ect these 
purchases have on the money base by withdrawing liquidity from 
the market. Th is was an unfortunate decision. Th ere was absolutely 
no need to do so. Since the start of the banking crisis in October 
2008, the yearly growth rate of M3 in the Eurozone has only been 
1%, much below the growth rate of 4.5% the ECB has previously 
announced would stabilize the rate of infl ation at 2%. If Friedman 
were alive today, chances are that he would berate the ECB for mak-
ing the same mistakes as the US Fed during the Great Depression. 
Figure 2: Money Base and M3 in Eurozone (2007=100)
Fiscal consequences 
A second criticism is that lender of last resort operations in the gov-
ernment bond markets can have fi scal consequences. Th e reason is 
that if governments fail to service their debts, the ECB will make 
losses. Th ese will have to be borne by taxpayers. Th us, by interven-
ing in the government bond markets, the ECB is committing future 
taxpayers. Th e ECB should avoid operations that mix monetary and 
fi scal policies (see Goodfriend (2011)). 
All this sounds reasonable. Yet it fails to recognize that all open mar-
ket operations (including foreign exchange market operations) carry 
Source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse
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the risk of losses and thus have fiscal implications. When a central 
bank buys private paper in the context of its open market operation, 
there is a risk involved, because the issuer of the paper can default. 
This will then lead to losses for the central bank.2 These losses are 
in no way different from the losses the central bank can incur when 
buying government bonds. Thus, the argument really implies that 
a central bank should abstain from any open market operation. It 
should stop being a central bank. The truth is that a central bank 
should perform (risky) open market operations. The fact that these 
are potentially loss making should not deter the central bank. Losses 
can be necessary, even desirable, to guarantee financial stability.
There is another dimension to the problem that follows from the 
fragility of the government bond markets in a monetary union. I 
argued earlier that financial markets can, in a self-fulfilling way, drive 
countries into a bad equilibrium, where default becomes inevitable. 
The use of the lender of last resort can prevent countries from being 
pushed into such a bad equilibrium. If the intervention by the central 
banks is successful there will be no losses, and no fiscal consequences. 
Moral hazard
Like with all insurance mechanisms, there is a risk of moral hazard. 
By providing a lender of last resort insurance, the ECB gives an in-
centive to governments to issue too much debt. This is indeed a seri-
ous risk. But this risk of moral hazard is no different from the risk of 
moral hazard in the banking system. It would be a terrible mistake 
if the central bank were to abandon its role of lender of last resort 
in the banking sector because there is a risk of moral hazard. In the 
same way, it is wrong for the ECB to abandon its role of lender of 
last resort in the government bond market because there is a risk of 
moral hazard. 
The way to deal with moral hazard is to impose rules that will con-
strain governments in issuing debt, very much like moral hazard in 
the banking sector is tackled by imposing limits on risk-taking by 
banks. In general, it is better to separate liquidity provision from 
2 The same is true with foreign exchange market operations that can lead to large 
losses, as has been shown by the recent Swiss experience.
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moral hazard concerns. Liquidity provision should be performed 
by a central bank -- the governance of moral hazard by another in-
stitution, the supervisor. This has been the approach taken in the 
strategy towards the banking sector: the central bank assumes the 
responsibility of lender of last resort, thereby guaranteeing unlimited 
liquidity provision in times of crisis, irrespective of what this does to 
moral hazard; the supervisory authority takes over the responsibility 
of regulating and supervising the banks. 
This should also be the design of the governance within the Euro-
zone. The ECB assumes the responsibility of lender of last resort in 
the sovereign bond markets. A different and independent authority 
takes over the responsibility of regulating and supervising the cre-
ation of debt by national governments. To use a metaphor: When a 
house is burning, the fire department is responsible for extinguishing 
the fire. Another department (police and the justice system) is re-
sponsible for investigating wrongdoing and applying punishment if 
necessary. Both functions should be kept separate. A fire department 
that is responsible both for fire extinguishing and punishment is un-
likely to be a good fire department. The same is true for the ECB. If 
the latter tries to solve a moral hazard problem, it will fail in its duty 
to be a lender of last resort. 
The Bagehot doctrine
Ideally, the lender of last resort function should only be used when 
banks (or governments) experience liquidity problems. It should not 
be used when they are insolvent. This is the doctrine as formulated by 
Bagehot (1873). It is also very strongly felt by economists in North-
ern Europe (see Plenum der Ökonomen(2011)). The central bank 
should not bail out banks or governments that are insolvent. This is 
certainly correct. The problem with this doctrine, however, is that it 
is often difficult to distinguish between liquidity and solvency cri-
ses. Most economists today would agree that Greece is insolvent and 
therefore should not be bailed out by the European Central Bank. 
But what about Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Belgium? The best 
and the brightest economists do not agree on the question of whether 
these countries’ governments are just illiquid or whether they suffer 
from a deep solvency problem. How would markets know?
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As argued earlier, when sovereign debt crises erupt, these are very 
often a mix of liquidity and solvency problems. Liquidity crises raise 
the interest rate on the debt issued by governments and therefore 
quickly degenerate into solvency problems. Solvency problems often 
lead to liquidity crises that intensify the solvency problem. It is there-
fore easy to say that the central bank should only provide liquidity to 
governments or banks that are illiquid but solvent.  It is most often 
very difficult to implement this doctrine.
In fact it is even worse. The doctrine leads to a paradox. If it were 
easy to separate liquidity from solvency problems, the markets would 
also find it easy to do so. Thus if a government came under pressure, 
financial markets would be able to determine whether this govern-
ment suffered from a liquidity or solvency problem. If they deter-
mined it was a liquidity problem, they would be willing to provide 
credit to the government. The central bank would not have to step 
in. If they determined it is a solvency problem, they would not want 
to provide credit, and rightly so. The Bagehot doctrine would come 
to the same conclusion: the central bank should not bail out the in-
solvent government. The conclusion is that if solvency and liquidity 
crises can be separated, there is no need for a lender of last resort. 
Financial markets would take care of the problems. Who wants to 
believe this these days? 
There is one way in which the Bagehot doctrine could be used by 
the ECB. As will be remembered, Bagehot put forward the principle 
that, in times of crisis, the central bank should provide unlimited 
liquidity at a penalty rate. The latter was seen by Bagehot as a way 
to take care of the moral hazard problem. The ECB could apply this 
principle by committing itself to providing unlimited liquidity as 
soon as the government bond rate of country A exceeds the risk free 
rate (say the German bond rate) by more than, say, 200 basis points 
(it could also be another number). This could be a way in which the 
ECB takes care of moral hazard concerns. 
Legal objections
It is often said that the ECB’s decision to buy government bonds 
represents a violation of its statutes, which, it is claimed, forbid such 
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operations. A careful reading of the Treaty, however, makes clear that 
this is not the case.  Article 18 of the “Protocol on the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank” 
is very clear when it states that “the ECB and the national central 
banks may operate in financial markets by buying and selling (..) 
claims and marketable instruments.”  Government bonds are mar-
ketable instruments, and nowhere is it said that the ECB is forbidden 
to buy and sell these bonds in financial markets. 
What is prohibited is spelled out in article 21: the ECB is not al-
lowed to provide “overdrafts or any other type of credit facilities” 
to public entities, nor can the ECB purchase directly “debt instru-
ments” from these public entities. 
The distinction between these two types of operations is important 
and is often confused. According to its statute, the ECB is allowed 
to buy government bonds in the secondary markets in the context of 
its open market operations. In doing so, the ECB does not provide 
credit to governments. What it does is to provide liquidity to the 
holders of these government bonds. These holders are typically fi-
nancial institutions. In no way can this be interpreted as a monetary 
financing of government budget deficits. 
In contrast, the prohibition on buying debt instruments directly 
from national governments is based on the fact that such an op-
eration provides liquidity to these governments and thus implies a 
monetary financing of the government budget deficit. 
Conclusion 
The ECB has been unduly influenced by the theory that inflation 
should be the only concern of a central bank. Financial stability 
should also be on the radar screen of a central bank.  In fact, most 
central banks have been created to solve an endemic problem of fi-
nancial system instability. With their unlimited firing power, central 
banks are the only institutions capable of stabilizing the financial 
system. It is time that the ECB recognizes this old truth instead of 
fleeing from its responsibility.
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In order for the ECB to be successful in stabilizing the sovereign 
bond markets of the Eurozone, it will have to make it clear that it is 
fully committed to exerting its function of lender of last resort. By 
creating confidence, such a commitment will ensure that the ECB 
does not have to intervene in the government bond markets most of 
the time, very much like the commitment to be a lender of last resort 
in the banking system ensures that the central bank only rarely has 
to provide lender of last resort support. 
While the ECB’s lender of last resort support in the sovereign bond 
markets is a necessary feature of the governance of the Eurozone, it is 
not sufficient. In order to prevent future crises in the Eurozone, sig-
nificant steps towards further political unification will be necessary. 
Some steps in that direction were taken recently when the European 
Council decided to strengthen the control on national budgetary 
processes and on national macroeconomic policies. These decisions, 
however, are insufficient and more fundamental changes in the gov-
ernance of the Eurozone are called for.  These should be such that 
the central bank can trust that its lender of last resort responsibilities 
in the government bond markets will not lead to a never-ending 
dynamics of debt creation.
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Institutional Aspects of the 
Eurozone Crisis
Friedrich Kübler
In last year’s conference, Charles Calomiris started by saying that 
he would “place more stock in arithmetic than in the legalities of 
what countries  supposedly are or are not permitted to do.”1 This is 
an elegant way to claim the final say in what my German colleague 
Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker has called the “power struggle between 
the primacy of the economic and the primacy of the political,”2 
clearly leaning to the primacy of the economic. In my contribution, 
I should like to confront this position with some questions. The nor-
mative framework of our social compact is more than formal rules 
generated by politics; our basic institutions are deeply rooted in the 
beliefs and expectations of people who – as we know from behav-
ioural economics – often prefer fairness to maximizing their profits.
I should like to proceed in three parts. First, I wish to cast a closer 
look at what European integration or disintegration might be in the 
context of our discussions (A.). In the second part, I want to present 
some views on the system of the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the stability mechanisms called EFSF and ESM (B.). At the end, I 
should like to come back to some open questions (C.).
1 Exiting the Euro Crisis, in: Allen/Carletti/Corsetti (eds.), Life in the Eurozone 
With or Without Sovereign Default? p. 115. 
2 Der Schamfleck ist die Geldverachtung, FAZ vom 18. 11. 2011 (Nr. 269) p. 33. 
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A. Integration versus Disintegration
I. The notion of integration – at least in the present context – 
can have two different meanings. The first would be that we 
stay with the status quo in the Eurozone and in the European 
Union (EU); nobody leaves and the rules remain very much 
what they are. But we can equally look for more integration, 
in particular to a more federal, political, and fiscal union. Such 
an agenda raises two legal or institutional issues. The German 
Federal Constitutional Court has – in two lengthy opinions 
– rather narrowly defined the limits of European integration 
under the existing German constitution.3 There is no time to 
go into details, but I should like to mention that the Court so 
far has shied away from any big conflict with the European 
Union or the German Parliament, always showing consider-
able flexibility in specific cases. The second issue is related, but 
refers to the internal structure of the EU. Its major institutions 
–  Parliament, Council and Commission  –  are shaped by what 
is sometimes called “regressive proportionality.” This is to say 
that in all these institutions, the smaller Member States are 
overrepresented and the bigger ones underrepresented. In the 
Parliament, the vote of a citizen from Luxembourg has about 
15 times the weight given to the vote of a German citizen. This 
is explained as a device which should balance the power the big 
Member States are exercising outside the formal institutions. 
But this may cut both ways: as the formal institutions lack 
democratic legitimacy, more of the decisions are taken outside. 
In any case, the existing system would hardly be acceptable for 
a fiscal union or a fiscal pact which would empower the EU to 
raise taxes. The old adage, “no taxation without representation,” 
requires equal representation for all citizens. At this moment, it 
is an open question how far the European Fiscal Compact4 will 
confer taxing powers to the EU institutions and thus intensify 
the problems of “degressive proportionality.”
3 BVerfGE 89, 155 (Maastricht), 123, 267 (Lissabon). 
4 Adopted by 25 Member States January 30, 2012, to be ratified before January 1, 
2013. 
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II. Let me move to disintegration. In a very rough and certainly 
not exhaustive way,  I should like to distinguish five scenarios:
— a Member State is leaving the Eurozone;
— this Member State also leaves the EU;
— several Member States are leaving, splitting the 
Eurozone into a southern and a northern part (in early 
capital market regulation we used to call this Club Med 
versus North Sea Alliance);
— the Eurozone is falling apart;
— and finally: this is happening to the EU itself. 
III. At first sight, these appear to be events of very different 
significance. In fact, at the present time we do not have a clear 
idea how the exit of a Member State from the Eurozone will 
affect the other Member States. But the falling apart of the Eu-
rozone and, still much more so, of the EU itself, would be a 
disaster for Europe and a shock for other parts of the world. 
One of the problems here is that one event may trigger others. 
If a Member State leaves the Eurozone and returns to its own 
currency, it may have to impose a rigid capital control regime 
incompatible with the free movement of capital guarantees of 
the European treaty framework; therefore it may have to leave 
the EU as well.5 Or, the loss of one Member State will have a 
domino effect: others will have to follow and this could lead to 
the Club Med/North Sea Alliance scenario.
IV. Finally, we have to see that integration and disintegration are 
not mutually exclusive. It is at least conceivable that one Mem-
ber State could leave the Eurozone (and perhaps even the EU), 
and that the remaining Member States then form a closer fiscal 
or political union.
5 See Alphandéry, The Economic Consequences of the Euro Pact, in: Allen /
Carletti/Corsetti, p. 104. 
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B. Structure and Role of Public Institutions
I. The European Central Bank (ECB)
1. Under Articles 130 and 282 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU (TFEU), the ECB and the national central banks 
of the Eurozone countries are independent from the other 
EU institutions as well as from the Member State govern-
ments. This constitutional guarantee of independence is 
cut in stone; any amendment of the TFEU requires the 
consent of all 27 Member States. Germany could not agree 
with such an amendment without amending its own con-
stitution (the “Basic Law”). Even without these legal con-
straints, it is extremely unlikely that Germany would ever 
go along with any amendment weakening the indepen-
dence of the European System of Central Banks  (ESCB).
2. The ECB is in at least three ways involved in the present 
crisis:
a) It buys sovereign debt instruments which have been 
issued by the governments of heavily indebted Euro 
Member States. It is very controversial whether this ac-
tivity is compatible with the “no bailout” clause of Art. 
125 TFEU. With regard to this provision, the ECB 
never buys from the issuing Member States but from 
commercial banks. This has been nice for them, but 
they are much less pleased by the fact that the ECB 
has declined to participate in the restructuring of the 
Greek sovereign debt.
b) The second involvement of the ECB is Target2. This is 
a network designed to circulate liquidity in the Euro-
zone by allowing cross-border transfers of money be-
tween central banks of Euro Member States. The need 
for these transfers arises from cross-border payments 
executed by commercial banks. Normally it is assumed 
that these transfers will stay in balance. But as the in-
terbank market has been seriously affected by the loss 
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of trust between banks, Target2 has been and is being 
used as a substitute.  As a consequence, the positions 
have ceased to be balanced. The “periphery” Mem-
ber States have by now debt positions of 750 billion 
Euros.6  The biggest creditor is Germany with claims 
against the system of more than 500 billion Euro. This 
is normally no risk as repayment is guaranteed by the 
ESCB. But if a Member State were to leave the Euro-
zone, the others would have to bear its debt positions. 
If the Eurozone were to blow up,  Germany would 
completely lose its claims. Jens Weidmann, the new 
head of the Bundesbank, views this as unconceivable, 
but he still argues for ending the use of Target2 as an 
instrument of monetary state financing.
c) Finally, the ECB continues to provide huge amounts 
of liquidity to the European commercial banks; the 
sum appears to be well beyond a trillion Euro. This 
is – at least in part – again a consequence of the weak-
ness of the interbank market. This is confirmed by the 
fact that, at the same time, the banks maintain huge 
deposits with the ECB.
3. It is obvious that there are new challenges for the ECB, and 
it appears that they affect the self-understanding and the 
functioning of the institution. The Bundesbank and the 
ECB in its early years followed the rule that internal con-
flicts were never disclosed to the public. This has changed: 
Jürgen Stark, the former chief economist of the ECB, left 
the institution, as he strongly disagrees with the continuing 
acquisition of sovereign bonds issued by financially weak 
Member States. For the same reason, Axel Weber withdrew 
his application to become President of the ECB. And more 
recently, the media reported disagreements between Mario 
Draghi, the new President of the ECB, and Jens Weidmann 
from the Bundesbank regarding Target2. It can be assumed 
that these conflicts reflect some fundamental differences. 
6 The most recent figures are given by Weidmann, Was steckt hinter den Target2-
Salden? FAZ from 12. 3. 2012 (Nr. 62) p. 11. 
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Under Wim Duisenberg as President and Otmar Issing as 
Chief Economist, the ECB largely followed the philosophy 
of the Bundesbank that monetary stability was the primary 
responsibility of central banking. Today, many observers 
feel that the majority of the Governing Board thinks other 
objectives like growth, employment and the preservation of 
the Eurozone in its present shape are no less important.
II. Public institutions are not only the ECB but also the bodies 
designed to provide additional financial support for needy Euro 
Member States.
1. We have to distinguish the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism (EFSM), organized in the European Finan-
cial Stability Facility (EFSF), from the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM).
a) EFSM was started in May 2010 as a preliminary mea-
sure. EFSF is a stock corporation under the laws of 
Luxemburg; shareholders are the Euro Member States. 
The program will end in June 2013. EFSM has a vol-
ume of 750 billion Euros, divided into three parts (or 
“pots”). All three are designed to provide loans:
— 60 billion are contributions by Euro Member States;
— 440 billion are loans provided by the Euro Member States 
to EFSF;
— 250 billion are loans provided by the IMF.
b) ESM was agreed to and formed by the Euro Member 
States in June 2011. It will be based on a new para. 3 of 
Art. 136 TFEU. It will, however, not be a program of 
the EU but a joint venture formed by the Euro Mem-
ber States under the rules of international public law. 
ESM is designed to replace EFSM as a more long term 
facility. For the moment, it is unclear how far EFSM 
and ESM can both be used at the same time (this 
would considerably increase the amount of available 
funds).7 The most important organ of both is the 
7  Mussler, Unterschiedliche Berechnungen der Brandmauer, FAZ from 29 March 
2012 (No. 76) p. 13. 
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Board of Governors where every Euro Member State 
is represented. Loans to needy Member States require 
the unanimous consent of the Board. German citizens 
brought constitutional complaints against EFSM and 
ESM that have been rejected by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court.
2. The structure and the volume of ESM is quite similar to 
EFSF; again we find the three “pots”:
— 80 billion are contributions from the Euro Member States; 
these funds can be lent to needy countries;
— 420 billion are authorized debt capital. The ESM Fund can 
issue bonds; the repayment is guaranteed by the participat-
ing Member States. These guarantees cover 120% of the 
face value of the loans. This is designed to allow a triple A 
rating of the bonds. At the same time, the ESM can buy 
sovereign bonds from issuing Euro Member States; this is 
not allowed to the EFSM.  
— 250 billion are again loans from the IMF.
 The claims of ESM against borrowing Euro Member States 
enjoy priority over all other creditors, but they are subor-
dinated to the claims of the IMF. The EFSF and ESM have 
been characterized as “bad banks in Luxemburg.”8 
III. It is obvious that the ESM increases financial risks for the Euro 
Member States; but it is much less clear to what extent this will 
happen. The following chart is designed to present a summary 
of the figures for all Euro Member States and for Germany. It 
is based on the assumption that 200 billion Euro of the EFSF 
funds which have already been allocated will be added to ESM. 
The figures indicate billions of Euro.
8 Jakobs, Deutschland wird erpressbar, Südd. Zeitung from 31 March/ April 2012 
(No. 77) p. 25. 
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I am unable to check how far these figures are accurate and up to 
date. In any case, they look staggering. But they represent very dif-
ferent degrees of risk. This is particularly true for Target2. For the 
reasons explained, it is very unlikely that these accounts will not be 
settled, even if this will take some time. Time may be an important 
factor for other items, too. When several of the risks on the list ma-
ture, it is assumed that this will not happen at the same time.
C. Some Open Questions 
In the last part of my presentation, I should like to address some 
open questions.
I.  I should like to start with the critical reactions to ESM. We can 
distinguish objections to substance and to procedure.
1. As to substance, the Bundesbank, in an official state-
ment, has expressed concerns with regard to the extension 
of the safety measures introduced by ESM.9 This is seen 
as a big step towards a regime of common liability of the 
Euro Member States for national debt. The Bundesbank is 
afraid that this will further weaken market discipline with-
9 Bundesbank.de: Stellungnahme von Dr. Jens Weidmann, Präsident der 
Bundesbank (http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/DE/Pressemitteilungen/
BBK/2011/2011_09_19_stellungnahme_weidmann_haushaltsausschuss.html?nsc
=true&templateQueryString=stellungnahme&searchIssued=0&searchArchive=0&
view=render[Druckversion]). 
Source of Financial Risk    for all Euro MS  for Germany 
IMF       250       15 
ESM (cash)       80       22 
ESM (guarantees)     620      168 
EFSF (already allocated)    200        50  
IMF (direct aid to Greece)     30         2 
EU (direct support for Greece)    80       27 
ECB (buying sovereign debt)    96       32 
Target2       500      466 
   
Sum     1,856      782 
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out providing effective tools of control and supervision of 
the financial behaviour of the Euro Member States. At the 
same time, there are concerns that the burden accepted 
by the creditor Member States will exhaust their financial 
capacity and produce a general recession.10 And there are 
fears that the situation will deteriorate even more by the 
decline of monetary stability.11 So far, the Euro has shown 
considerable strength; the recent increase of the inflation 
rate to 2.7 % appears to be primarily due to rising prices 
for energy. But, so far, the stabilizing facilities have hardly 
been used; there will be more stress in the future.
2. As to procedure, the German Council of Economic Advis-
ers thinks that the process is not sufficiently controlled by 
economic events; sovereign insolvency will still be triggered 
by political decisions.12 At the same time,  there is criticism 
that the ESM is neither subject to parliamentary control 
nor to the supervision of any official accounting institu-
tion.13 
II. On the other hand, there is no clear perception and still much 
less agreement as to the costs of disintegration.
1. Let us assume that a Member State is persuaded or forced 
to leave the Eurozone and to return to its own currency. 
What does this mean in technical terms? How much time 
will it take to replace the Euro with a new national cur-
rency? Will the Member State be able to achieve this by its 
own administrative resources or will it need the assistance 
of the EU, in particular the ECB, and/or of other Mem-
ber States? In order to improve its competitiveness and to 
maintain its essential functions, this country will have to 
10 Handelsblatt, May 20 2010: “Fehlentscheidung”: Ifo-Institut verdammt Euro-
Rettungsschirm (http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/konjunktur/nachrichten/
fehlentscheidung-ifo-institut-verdammt-euro-rettungsschirm/3440846.html). 
11 see Mestmäcker (FN 2). 
12 Sachverständigenrat, “Verantwortung für Europa wahrnehmen”, p. 144(2) 
(http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/an2011/
ga11_ges.pdf ). 
13 Die Pressse: Euroschirm: Der nächste problematische Vertrag (http://diepresse.
com/home/wirtschaft/international/694692/Euroschirm_Der-naechste-problem-
atische-Vertrag). 
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devalue its currency step by step and to print money for 
paying its teachers and policemen and for maintaining at 
least a fraction of its social security system. This is very 
likely to trigger heavy inflation; and this will affect people 
even more. How will they react? Will we experience a wave 
of migration to other Member States? Will we see undesir-
able changes in the political system, moving it away from 
the democratic model? Could or should this be a reason for 
the EU to suspend membership rights under Art. 7 of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU)? Could this be a reason 
for the country to leave the EU?
2. A final question is how this might affect the political sub-
stance of the EU. It is true that it started as the European 
Economic Community (EEC), and we normally discuss 
the benefits of the Internal Market and of Monetary Union 
in economic terms: how much has the union contributed 
to growth and to the improvement of the living standard in 
the old and the new Member States? But this is only a part 
of the story. The European Community (EC) has had an 
enormous impact on bringing down the fascist regimes in 
Spain and Portugal, the military government in Greece and 
the Soviet system in Eastern Europe. In spite of huge prob-
lems, the institutional setting so far has proved to be able 
to peacefully mitigate conflicts between Member States, 
to balance differing interests of peoples, and to present 
common European positions in global affairs. This might 
be still more important in the future as other parts of the 
globe, e. g. the BRIC-States, gain economic strength and 
political power. And, the EU may be important in other 
parts of the world – e.g., the Near East or Southeast Asia – 
as the example of an organisation which is able to success-
fully deal with regional conflicts. And finally: the philoso-
pher Jürgen Habermas has recently expressed the hope that 
the complex setting of the EU may serve as a blueprint for 
the emergence of more cooperative and democratic forms 
of interaction and organisation in international politics.14 
If it is true that the exit of any country from the Eurozone 
14 Zur Verfassung Europas (2011) S. 39 ff.
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and/or the EU could trigger a chain reaction, we have to 
balance the huge costs of stabilizing financially weak Mem-
ber States against the equally huge benefits of the existing 
European institutions.
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4
Imbalances In The Euro Area 
and the ECB’s Response
Frank Smets1
“When the tide goes out, you can see the rocks”
Blinder (2010) used the above saying to make the point that the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 has revealed fundamental weaknesses 
of the financial system and the need for regulatory and supervisory 
reform.2 One can use the same image to argue that the sovereign debt 
crisis that broke out in the Euro area in May 2010 has laid bare some 
of the fault lines in the construction of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). In particular, it has made it very clear that the E of 
EMU, the economic governance of the monetary union, needs to be 
strengthened to avoid a recurrence of the growing intra-Euro-area 
imbalances and the subsequent systemic crisis that we have observed 
over the past decade.3 This realisation has accelerated a broad Euro-
pean reform agenda which includes strengthening the fiscal policy 
1 The views expressed are my own and should not be attributed to the ECB. This 
presentation was prepared for the workshop “Governance for the Eurozone: Inte-
gration or Disintegration,” organised by Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti and Save-
rio Simonelli at the European University Institute in Florence on 26 April 2012. I 
would like to thank Rasmus Rüffer and many other ECB colleagues for their help 
and input. 
2 See Blinder (2010), “It’s broke, let’s fix it: Rethinking financial regulation,” Inter-
national Journal of Central Banking, December 2010, 277-330. 
3 Jean-Claude Trichet, former President of the ECB, repeatedly called for a “quan-
tum leap” in economic governance.  See, for example, Trichet (2011), “Reforming 
EMU: Time for Bold Decisions,” Speech at the conference of the Group of the 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, “What 
Future for the Euro?”, Frankfurt, 18 March 2011. 
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framework, establishing a new European financial supervisory archi-
tecture, putting in place a crisis management framework, accelerat-
ing growth and adjustment, enhancing structural reforms in labour 
and goods markets, and creating a procedure for identifying and ad-
dressing newly emerging imbalances. In this contribution, I focus 
on the emergence of the intra-Euro-area imbalances, how their un-
ravelling affected the core of the Euro area financial system, and the 
ECB’s policy response. The ECB’s response is not a solution to the 
underlying adjustment problem, but it has created breathing room 
for governments and supervisors to continue the necessary imple-
mentation of the restructuring and reform process. 
In the new regulation governing the Excessive Imbalances Procedure 
(EIP), imbalances are defined as “any trend giving rise to macro-
economic developments which are adversely affecting, or have the 
potential to adversely affect, the proper functioning of the economy 
of a Member State or of economic and monetary union, or of the 
Union as a whole”.4 This is not a very precise definition. Are we 
talking about financial imbalances as witnessed by the excessive accu-
mulation of debt and leverage in financial and non-financial sectors 
leading up to the start of the financial crisis in 2007? Or does one 
have fiscal imbalances in mind, as many governments failed to build 
up sufficient buffers to deal with adverse macro-economic shocks 
and some of them hid a substantial deterioration in their explicit and 
implicit liabilities. Should the focus be on external imbalances as a 
number of countries experienced large current account deficits and 
built up a large net foreign debt which made them vulnerable to a 
sudden stop? Or does one need to look at imbalances in dual labour 
markets, where some segments of the workers are heavily protect-
ed and drive generous wage developments, whereas others, such as 
many young workers, are in a much more precarious situation. The 
scoreboard developed by the European Commission to help identify 
macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro area and the EU contains 
indicators in each of the fields mentioned above. This reflects the fact 
that excessive imbalances typically pop up in a number of sectors at 
the same time. 
4 See Article 2 of the Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances.  
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In the first section of this contribution, I describe the emergence of 
intra-Euro-area imbalances and how their unravelling affected not 
only government finances but also the core of the Euro area finan-
cial system. The imbalances took the form of a classic credit-fueled 
bubble in housing markets in a number of Euro area countries (most 
strongly in Ireland, Spain and Greece). It is well-known that finan-
cial crises following a combination of excessive growth in credit and 
real estate prices are particularly costly both in terms of the depth 
and persistence of the recession that accompanies the bust and the 
fiscal costs of dealing with the resulting banking crisis.5 Indeed, the 
big financial crises in advanced economies over the last thirty years 
(such as the Nordic banking crises and the bursting of the Japanese 
bubble in the early 1990s) all featured such a combination. What 
was less appreciated is that these real estate booms, fueled by a com-
bination of relatively low real interest rates and easy financing within 
the integrated European money and bond market, could ultimately 
put the proper working of the monetary union in danger. The crucial 
role of financial stability and a properly working, integrated finan-
cial system in a well-functioning monetary union has become crystal 
clear during the current crisis.
In the second part, I will describe the response of the ECB to the 
impairment of the transmission process and the threat of a credit 
crunch following renewed tensions in the sovereign debt and inter-
bank money markets, and discuss some of the risks and criticisms as-
sociated with the non-standard measures that were taken. The ECB’s 
actions as a market maker of last resort have prevented a systemic 
collapse, but can not address some of the more fundamental weak-
nesses in the construction of EMU now that the sovereign debt crisis 
has been unveiled. While the patient may have been removed from 
intensive care, the healing process has just started. It is therefore im-
portant that the breathing room provided by the ECB’s actions is 
used for further implementing the necessary restructuring and re-
form process. Only in this way can the loss of confidence in banks’ 
5 See, for example, Borio, Claudio and Philip Lowe (2002), “Asset Prices, Financial 
and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus,” BIS Working Paper 114, July 2002; 
and Detken, Carsten and Frank Smets (2004), “Asset Price Booms and Monetary 
Policy,” in Siebert, H. (ed), Macroeconomic Policies in the World Economy, Spring-
er, for two early references.  
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and governments’ finances and the doubts about the ability of coun-
tries to gradually adjust be addressed. 
The unravelling of imbalances and systemic risk
The story of the emergence of intra-Euro-area imbalances is very vis-
ible in the heterogeneous developments in housing and credit mar-
kets across the Euro area. While in Spain, Ireland and Greece (and to 
a lesser extent Portugal), a house price bubble developed, the housing 
market remained very subdued in Germany and Austria. For each of 
the Euro area countries, Figure 1 shows the average annual growth 
of loans to the private sector and the average growth of residential 
investment in two sub periods since the start of EMU: the period 
leading up to the crisis from 1999 to 2007 and the period 2008-
2010. Figure 2 shows the average increase in house prices. In Greece, 
Ireland and Spain, the picture of a classic house price boom and bust 
clearly emerges. The average growth of loans to the private sector 
exceeded 15 percent on an annual basis in the run-up to the crisis. 
This was accompanied by a big increase in residential investment 
and house prices. On average, house prices each year increased by 
more than 10 percent in the boom period in those countries. With 
the outbreak of the subprime crisis in the United States, this then 
turned into an enormous bust in 2007. Residential investment fell 
on average by more than 30 percent in Ireland, more than 20 percent 
in Greece and more than 15 percent in Spain in the period 2008-
2010, triggering a deep recession. In contrast, during most of the 
EMU period, the German housing market was still recovering from 
the post-reunification boom, with real house prices actually falling 
on average.
Note: Color versions of all graphs in this publication are available for download at:
http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Carletti/
http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Economics/SeminarsEvents/Conferences/
GovernancefortheEurozoneIntegrationorDisintegration.aspx 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/FIC/FICPress/goveuro.pdf
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Figure 1: Credit growth and residential investment in Euro area countries
Figure 2: Nominal house price growth in Euro area countries
Th e real estate boom was mostly fi nanced through a widening cur-
rent account defi cit, which in 2007 reached more than 10 percent 
of GDP in Spain, Greece and Portugal, and more than 5 percent in 
Ireland (Figure 3). As a result, the net foreign debt position of those 
countries reached around 100 percent of GDP in 2009 (Table 1). 
Until 2008, most of the foreign debt was fi nanced by private capital 
infl ows, often through the short-term interbank debt market.6 As 
6 See, for example, Merler, Silvia and Jean Pisani-Ferry (2012), “Sudden Stops in 
the Euro Area,” Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/06, March 2012.
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domestic resources were reallocated to the real estate sector, a non-
traded sector, these countries also experienced a loss of competitive-
ness and a rising deficit on the trade balance. Figure 4 shows that the 
average inflation rate was persistently higher in those countries than 
the average level of 2 percent in the Euro area. Also, the increase in 
unit labour costs in the bubble economies was more than double that 
of Germany (not shown). As a result, when the bubble burst, it left 
these countries not only with an internal and external debt overhang, 
but also with reduced competitiveness, an overvalued real exchange 
rate, and a need to reallocate resources back from the non-traded to 
the traded sector.
Figure 3: Current account balances in Euro area countries (% of GDP)
Figure 4: Inflation rates in Euro area countries (average annual percentage)
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Table 1
The bursting of the house price bubble and the sudden stop in private 
capital inflows led to a deep recession, sharply rising unemployment, 
and an exposed and fragile banking sector. As a result of automatic 
stabilisers, additional discretionary fiscal easing and government sup-
port measures for the financial sector, government finances in those 
countries quickly deteriorated. Figure 5 shows that in Ireland and 
Spain, a small surplus in 2007 rapidly turned into a large deficit 
of more than 10 and 6 percent of GDP, respectively, in 2011. As a 
result, the government debt to GDP ratio has skyrocketed over the 
past four years and has reached more than 100 percent of GDP in 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece. In Spain, the government debt almost 
doubled over the same period (Figure 6).
 Net foreign investment position, % of GDP
1999 2009
Belgium 44.6
Germany 4.5 37.3
Ireland 51.7 -98.4
Greece -32.6 -85.7
Spain -28.4 -92.1
France -7.0 -13.2
Italy 4.4 -19.3
Netherlands -8.2 17.4
Portugal -31.6 -109.3
Slovenia -11.7 -35.5
Slovakia -68.0
Finland -177.0 -5.4
Euro area -6.1 -16.3
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Figure 5: General government balance (% of GDP)
Figure 6: General government gross debt (% of GDP)
Triggered by fiscal profligacy in Greece and the news that the Greek 
fiscal deficit and debt were much larger than originally announced, 
the rapidly rising government debt as well as the uncertainty regard-
ing implicit government liabilities from guaranteeing the banking 
sector led to a confidence crisis in government finances and rising 
sovereign spreads in a number of the periphery countries (Figure 7). 
This set in motion a mutually reinforcing negative spiral between 
sovereign and banking risks all over the Euro area. On the one hand, 
weak banking sectors in a number of countries undermined the cred-
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ibility of planned consolidation programmes, in particular in those 
countries with weak fi scal fundamentals. On the other hand, un-
certainty about the involvement of the private sector in a possible 
restructuring of the Greek debt and the exposure of European banks 
to the sovereign risks led to rising costs of bank fi nance and banking 
risks across Europe. Th is tight link between sovereign and banking 
risks has been refl ected in a large positive correlation between sover-
eign and bank bond premia in the Euro area.
Figure 7: Sovereign bond spreads in the Euro area (basis points)
Th e self-fulfi lling nature of the twin funding problems of the bank-
ing sector and the government became particularly acute towards 
the end of 2011, when it became obvious that both governments 
and banks were facing large refi nancing needs in 2012. Against the 
background of an already weakened fi nancial sector following the 
Lehman collapse, confi dence in the banking sector evaporated as, 
for example, indicated by the widely used euribor/OIS spread indi-
cator, a measure of the perceived credit risk in the banking sector. 
By the end of 2011, the 3-month euribor/OIS spread again reached 
100 basis points, a level that had not been seen since the heat of the 
banking crisis following the Lehman collapse in early 2009 (Figure 
8). While the stress in the banking sector following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in October 2008 was mostly related to the expo-
sure of banks to the subprime crisis and toxic assets in the United 
States, the epicentre had moved to Europe in the Summer of 2011, 
as uncertainty regarding the exposure to European sovereign risks 
dominated. Th e systemic character of the sovereign debt crisis can 
Source: Bloomberg, Reuters and ECB calculations
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also be seen in Figure 9, which shows the Composite Index of Sys-
temic Stress (CISS) indicator, developed by Holló, Kremer and Lo 
Duca (2012).7 The CISS covers stress in five different European fi-
nancial markets and, in contrast to many other indicators, also takes 
into account the degree of correlation between those five markets, 
making it a particularly useful indicator of systemic stress. Also from 
this indicator, it is clear that the systemic stress in European finan-
cial markets breached its crisis threshold of 0.35 in early Summer 
of 2010 as the Greek debt crisis intensified and reached a new high 
towards the end of 2011.
Figure 8: Euribor/OIS spread
Figure 9: Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS)
7 Holló, Dániel, Manfred Kremer and Marco Lo Duca (2012), CISS - a Composite 
Indicator of Systemic Stress in the Financial System, ECB Working Paper 1426, 
March 2012. 
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In the second half of 2011, the rising spreads on government yields 
and bank funding costs started to aff ect the outlook for economic ac-
tivity and price stability as the cost of fi nance of non-fi nancial sectors 
increased and credit standards tightened. Also, actual monetary and 
credit developments in the private sector were exceptionally weak. It 
was clear that the intensifi cation of the sovereign crisis was hamper-
ing the ability of banks to support the real economy. Moreover, quite 
a bit of heterogeneity in the pass-through of monetary policy across 
weak and stronger countries was observed.
Price stability and the ECB as a market maker of last resort 
What has been the ECB’s response? In line with its mandate of main-
taining price stability over the medium term, the ECB has used both 
standard and non-standard monetary policy measures to alleviate the 
risk that bank funding problems translate into a credit crunch and 
endanger the gradual recovery and price stability. At the same time, 
these measures also prevented a systemic collapse.
Figure 10: ECB policy rates and EONIA (in percent)
As depicted in Figure 10, in response to the increasing risk of a dou-
ble-dip recession in the fourth quarter of 2011, standard monetary 
policy was eased by lowering the policy-controlled interest rates back 
to their previous low levels. Th e main refi nancing rate was lowered 
Source: ECB. 
Note: The upper and lower band are respectively the ECB’s marginal lending facility 
and deposit facility rates.
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to 1 percent, whereas the EONIA, the overnight interbank money 
market rate, dropped to close to the ECB’s deposit rate of 25 basis 
points. Orphanides and Wieland (2012) have recently shown that 
this easing is consistent with the prescriptions of a simple policy rule 
whereby interest rates change in response to deviation of expected 
one-year ahead annual inflation from the inflation objective and the 
deviation of expected one-year ahead annual growth rate from esti-
mated potential growth rate.8   
 
In addition, in order to avoid bank funding problems mutating into 
excessive deleveraging, solvency problems, and a collapse of the fi-
nancial system, the ECB also eased its non-standard policy measures. 
In line with the enhanced credit support measures taken since the 
start of the crisis in October 2008, the ECB changed the conditions 
of its refinancing operations to alleviate these funding problems. 
First, it announced two long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) 
with a maturity of three years (and the option to pay back after one 
year) to provide longer-term funding security and help banks with 
the maturity mismatch they were facing. Second, it broadened the 
eligible collateral base for those refinancing operations to ensure a 
wide set of banks would have access to these operations. Third, it 
reduced the reserve requirements for monetary and financial institu-
tions from two to one percent to release some of the required reserves 
for bank funding. These measures aimed at improving confidence in 
the banking sector and thereby avoiding a credit crunch and neutral-
ising the heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy that 
resulted from the fact that the weaker countries were much more af-
fected by the negative confidence spiral between sovereign and bank 
risks.
Figure 12 gives a colourful picture of the most important elements 
of the monetary operations on the balance sheet of the ECB. Under 
the full allotment procedure, the expansion of the balance sheet (in 
net terms by about 530 billion Euros over the two three-year opera-
tions) reflects the increased demand for longer-term liquidity due to 
the tensions in the money market. The elastic supply of liquidity at a 
8 See Orphanides, Athanasios and Volker Wieland (2012), “Complexity and Mone-
tary Policy,” paper presented at the conference on “Central Banking: Before, During 
and After the Crisis,” sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and the International 
Journal of Central Banking on March 23-24, 2012.
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fi xed interest rate and against collateral is a typical feature of central 
bank support during fi nancial crises. In addition, the ECB had pre-
viously announced a second covered bonds purchasing programme 
and maintained its Securities Market Programme (SMP) geared at 
addressing malfunctioning in specifi c bond markets. Overall, the 
ECB has used its balance sheet to function as a market maker of last 
resort, taking up the intermediation role in the segmented money 
market. Th is way, it avoided an incipient credit crunch and a further 
deterioration of the economic outlook and the risks to price stability.
Figure 11: Monetary policy operations of the ECB
Figure 12: Euro-area corporate bond spreads (in basis points)
Source: ECB.
u
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
Note: Bonds of maturities of over one year are included in the indices. 
Benchmark is EMU AAA government bond index calculated by Merrill Lynch 
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Figure 13: Corporate bond spread indices of non-fi nancial corporations in 
selected Euro area countries
Figures 8 and 9 show that the ECB’s actions, as well as decisions to 
move towards a stronger economic union announced by the Heads 
of State and Government on 9 December 2011, have led to an easing 
of tensions in the interbank money market and in fi nancial markets 
more generally. Nevertheless, the state of the fi nancial sector is still 
very fragile as indicated by the fact that the level of the CISS still 
hovers around the critical level of 0.35. Figure 12 shows that corpo-
rate bond spreads have generally fallen since the announcement of 
the three-year LTROs. Figure 13 illustrates how the LTROs have also 
led to a more homogenous transmission of standard monetary policy 
in the Eurozone. Moreover, the incipient tightening of bank credit 
standards in the second half of 2011, as indicated in the ECB’s bank 
lending survey, was reversed in the fi rst quarter of 2012. Finally, the 
incipient drop in broad money growth was halted and gave rise to a 
moderate increase in the fi rst quarter of 2012. Loan growth to the 
private sector, on the other hand, remained quite subdued partly due 
to continuing low demand.
Source: Merrill Lynch Global Index and ECB calculations.
Note: Aggregated investment grade bonds by countries are displayed as unweighted averages.  
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Figure 14: Infl ation and infl ation expectations in the Euro area (in percent)
Th ere have been various criticisms of the ECB’s actions. Let me ad-
dress some of them.9 A fi rst criticism is that the large expansion of 
the ECB’s balance sheet and the associated big increase in the use of 
the deposit facility may hamper the ability of the ECB to contain 
infl ationary pressures. In my view, in the short run, such infl ation-
ary risks are unlikely to materialise. Th e implications of higher cen-
tral bank money for infl ation very much depend on the underlying 
source of the monetary expansion. As in the simple framework of 
Poole (1970)10, changes in the demand for liquidity, for example 
because of increased risk aversion, should be accommodated from 
a stabilisation perspective. Failing to do so would lead to a rise in 
money market interest rates and spreads, falling economic activity, 
and disinfl ation. In other words, rather than creating infl ation risks, 
the ECB’s liquidity accommodation avoided defl ationary risks as dis-
cussed above. Figure 14 illustrates the stability of Euro area infl ation 
expectations in bond markets and in surveys. It is also striking that 
the large increase in base money has not translated into an increase 
in broad money growth, which has been very subdued all through 
9 See also the speech by Benoit Coeuré, member of the ECB’s Executive Board, 
“Financing the Economy of the Euro Area: the ECB’s Role,” Association Française 
des Tresoriers d’Entreprises (AFTE), Paris, 11 April 2012. 
10 Poole, William (1970), “Optimal Choice of Monetary Instruments in a Simple 
Stochastic Macro Model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (May): 197-216.
Note: BEIR is Break-Even Inflation Rate from comparison of inflation indexed to 
conventional sovereign bonds.   
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the crisis. Does the expansion in the size of the balance sheet make a 
timely exit to counteract future incipient inflationary pressures less 
likely? Not necessarily -- both standard and non-standard policy eas-
ing can be easily reversed. First, the interest rate on the 3-year LTROs 
is at a variable interest rate, so the cost of central bank financing 
will automatically increase if policy rates increase. Second, the ECB 
has various instruments such as the issuance of debt certificates or 
increasing the reserve requirement, which can be used to mop up 
liquidity if that became an issue.
  
A second criticism is that generous liquidity provision to banks may 
reduce the incentives of national governments to restructure their 
banking sector and may lead banks to evergreen their non-perform-
ing loans and avoid (from a private perspective) costly recapitalisa-
tion. This may, first, further undermine an improvement of mar-
ket confidence in the financial system and therefore generate higher 
spreads and, second, backfire when the central bank needs to in-
crease interest rates to counteract risks to price stability as borrowers 
may go bankrupt and the risk of financial instability may return. To 
avoid this risk, it is essential for banks to strengthen their resilience 
by retaining earnings and further building up capital and for govern-
ments and supervisors to improve the transparency in the banking 
sector by removing bad assets and restructuring the banking sector 
where needed. The soundness of banks’ balance sheets is a key fac-
tor in facilitating an appropriate provision of credit to the economy. 
On the other hand, central bank liquidity provision, while avoiding 
a disorderly deleveraging of the banking sector, will in itself not ad-
dress the underlying weakness of the banking sector. It is therefore 
important that the process of bank restructuring and recapitalisation 
is completed as quickly as possible. 
A third and related criticism is that the generous liquidity provision 
by the ECB may delay the necessary macro-economic adjustment 
to the external imbalances that we have described above. In addi-
tion, to the extent that banks have used central bank liquidity to 
buy sovereign debt, it may ease market pressure on governments to 
consolidate government finances. Indeed, as described in Merler and 
Pisani-Ferry (2012),11 the intermediation through the ECB’s balance 
11 op. cit. 
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sheet has avoided that the sudden stop in private capital flows has 
further resulted in an abrupt closing of the current account defi-
cit, and avoided an even larger recession in the weak countries. As 
originally pointed out by Sinn and Wollmershaeuser (2011), this has 
contributed to an explosion of  Target 2 balances within the Eurosys-
tem with a large positive asset position of the Bundesbank and some 
other northern NCBs and large deficit positions of the central banks 
of Spain, Ireland, Greece and Italy.12 While the risks associated with 
these Target 2 balances are limited, given that they reflect the collat-
eralised lending of the ECB, they do reflect the balance of payments 
problems faced by the weaker countries and the fact that banking 
markets are still segmented along national lines. This does not imply, 
however, that adjustment is not taking place. Over the last couple of 
years, the current account deficit has narrowed substantially in most 
of the deficit countries, and relative unit labour costs are gradually 
adjusting to improve the competitiveness of those countries. It is, 
however, also fair to say that this process is unduly slow, often reflect-
ing rigidities in goods and labour markets with large costs in terms 
of high unemployment. It is therefore of utmost importance that 
the labour market reforms that have been agreed to in countries like 
Spain and Italy are implemented as quickly as possible to facilitate 
this adjustment process. Gains in competitiveness and a return of 
market confidence will then automatically also imply a reduced role 
for non-standard policy measures. 
Finally, a fourth and somewhat separate source of criticism of the 
ECB’s actions is that the ECB should address the liquidity prob-
lem where it arises, i.e., in the government bond markets. Accord-
ing to this view, the lack of a lender of last resort to governments 
(rather than to banks) in the monetary union creates the possibility 
of self-fulfilling speculative attacks, whereby expectations of future 
default lead to rising sovereign spreads, which in turn undermine 
the sustainability of the government debt, confirming those default 
expectations. An unconditional commitment to cap interest rates on 
government bonds would prevent such self-fulfilling attacks. This 
view is in contrast to the view mentioned above that central bank 
12 See, for example, Sinn, Hans-Werner and Timo Wollmershaeuser (2011), “Tar-
get Loans, Current Account Balances and Capital Flows: The ECB’s Rescue Facil-
ity,” NBER Working Paper 17626, November 2011. 
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intervention in government bond markets may reduce the incen-
tives of governments to consolidate and increase the risk of infla-
tionary pressures arising from fiscal dominance. A number of argu-
ments hold against direct unconditional intervention in government 
debt markets of this sort. First and foremost, such unconditional 
support would contradict the Treaty provisions on the prohibition 
of monetary financing to the extent that they provide the govern-
ment with financing “on tap.” This would undermine a cornerstone 
of the stability-oriented monetary and fiscal policy framework in the 
Euro area and may thereby backfire by creating instability in infla-
tion expectations. The analogy between the lender of last resort func-
tion for banks and governments is misleading in a number of ways. 
First, banks are inherently susceptible to bank runs because of their 
explicit role in liquidity and maturity transformation. This explains 
the existence of deposit insurance and the historic role of central 
banks as lenders of last resort to the banking sector. This is not the 
case for governments which, in the European Union, typically have 
an average maturity of liabilities that lies between 4 and 12 years. 
Governments have become susceptible to speculative attacks because 
of weak fiscal fundamentals, which leads to questioning the notion 
that such episodes are only about liquidity.
Second, because banks are refinanced against collateral, such opera-
tions provide a double layer of protection for the central bank. Third, 
addressing liquidity provision through the banking system maintains 
a form of market discipline on governments, as the private sector will 
adjust its lending depending on the outlook for fiscal sustainability. 
Fourth, because of their shorter maturity structure, refinancing op-
erations with the banking sector can more easily be unwound when 
needed. On the other hand, through its SMP, the ECB has directly 
intervened in specific government bond markets in order to allevi-
ate the impairment of the transmission mechanism associated with 
malfunctioning bond markets. However, the ECB has frequently 
stressed that these interventions are both limited and temporary. 
They are commensurate with the degree of malfunctioning and con-
ditional on governments taking the necessary actions to ensure debt 
sustainability, and thereby financial stability.  
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In sum, the ECB has acted forcefully with both standard and non-
standard policies in accordance with its mandate given by the Treaty 
on Monetary Union. The ECB’s actions are, however, no panacea. 
They do not directly address the need for adjustment that must take 
place following the unravelling of the imbalances. Stability in the 
monetary union will only return when confidence in the banking 
sector, government finances, and the ability of countries to adjust 
to imbalances is re-established. When that happens, the ECB’s non-
standard measures will automatically become superfluous and disap-
pear. In this sense, the non-standard measures are temporary and 
limited. 
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Governance of the International 
Monetary System1
Richard Portes
Introduction
This essay will focus on the choice of the international reserve cur-
rency, the ‘key currency’ (or currencies) in the international mon-
etary system. Whereas national governments typically impose the 
currency of legal tender, internationally the dominant currency is 
‘chosen’ by the markets, except for the period of the Bretton Woods 
exchange-rate system, 1944-1971. 
The level of development of domestic financial markets and institu-
tions has always been central to this choice (Portes and Rey, 1998; 
Papaioannou and Portes, 2010; Chitu et al., 2012). With network 
1 This essay is an extended version of my presentation on ‘Governance of the in-
ternational monetary system’, given at the conference on ‘Governance for the Euro 
Zone’, held at the European University Institute on 26 April 2012. It draws exten-
sively on my paper, ‘The Triffin Dilemma and a Multipolar International Reserve 
System’, forthcoming  in J.-C. Koeune, ed., In Search of a New World Monetary 
Order, P.I.E. Peter Lang SA - Editions Scientifiques Internationales, Proceedings of 
a conference held in Brussels on 3-4 October 2011, to commemorate the 100th 
anniversary of the birth of Robert Triffin. I am grateful for comments from Maurice 
Obstfeld. I am also indebted to Tommaso Padoa Schioppa for many discussions of 
these issues over 25 years and to Hélène Rey for more recent extended discussions – 
even though, in both cases, we sometimes had to agree to disagree, as will be evident 
from the text. 
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externalities, there are multiple equilibria (Portes and Rey, 1998), 
and in such circumstances, history (inertia) matters. But shocks – 
e.g., the two world wars in the 20th century – and major policy 
changes by key actors in the system can nevertheless overcome inertia 
and provoke a move from one equilibrium to another. Sterling was 
the dominant (but not exclusive) international currency pre-1914, 
then sterling and the dollar alternated during the interwar period, 
then the Bretton Woods agreement enshrined the dollar from 1944 
onwards. Subsequently, policy actions by the United States in the 
early 1970s clearly affected the international currency status of the 
dollar – both US monetary policies and the decision to break the link 
with gold were important here. And, at this point, the ‘governance’ 
of the system broke down, at least for exchange rates. All the efforts 
of the major countries and the IMF could not construct a new re-
gime.
Many thought this was foreseen by Robert Triffin (1960). Some now 
agree with the Governor of the Peoples Bank of China that we cur-
rently face a version of the Triffin Dilemma (Zhou, 2009). There is 
an alternative hypothesis, that the gradual erosion of capital controls 
in the 1960s was incompatible with fixed exchange rates and mon-
etary policy (the ‘trilemma’), and the major countries were unwilling 
to sacrifice autonomy in monetary policy. We shall not elaborate on 
this (our preferred) view. 
It is important to note, however, that some countries were either un-
willing or unable to take on the key currency role. The Deutschmark 
and the yen seemed contenders, especially when reserve holders 
shifted away from dollars in the late 1970s, because of US inflation 
and dollar depreciation. But Germany (in particular, the Bundes-
bank) did not want what they perceived as the burdens associated 
with a key currency, and the Japanese financial system crashed, so 
that Japan’s domestic financial markets and institutions could not 
support the international currency role.
The creation of the Euro in 1999 brought a major new international 
currency onto the scene. Until the current crisis, the Euro’s share of 
international reserves was rising, along with its share in the issuance 
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of international bonds, invoicing, and other international currency 
functions. This trend has now reversed somewhat, and meanwhile 
China is pushing for a greater international role for the RMB. But 
that development will be very slow indeed, limited again by the pace 
of development of China’s financial markets. Again, markets will 
determine the outcome, and the dollar will not fall in importance 
necessarily because of a new, contemporary version of the Triffin Di-
lemma. 
Recently, proposals for a multipolar reserve system have invoked such 
a supposed new form of the Triffin Dilemma (Farhi et al., 2011), as 
a reason for moving towards a multipolar reserve system. But the 
Triffin Dilemma did not describe the problems of the international 
monetary system in the late 1960s, and it does not describe the pres-
ent day problems of that system. The world will move towards a 
multipolar reserve system, but for reasons unrelated to the Triffin 
Dilemma.
Triffin Dilemma Definitions
There are at least two rather different formulations of the Triffin Di-
lemma in recent discussions. The definition that is perhaps closer to 
what Triffin had in mind is that increasing demand for reserve assets 
strains the ability of the issuer to supply sufficient amounts while 
still credibly guaranteeing or stabilising the asset’s value in terms of 
an acceptable numéraire (see Obstfeld, 2011, as well as Farhi et al., 
2011). An alternative perspective from a policymaker is that the di-
lemma is founded on a tension between short-run policy incentives 
in reserve-issuing and reserve-holding countries, on the one hand, 
and the long-run stability of the international financial system on the 
other hand (Bini Smaghi, 2011).
The Triffin Dilemma of the 1960s
A dilemma is a difficult choice between alternatives. The first posited 
that the United States would stop providing more dollar balances for 
international finance. In that case, trade would stagnate and there 
would be a deflationary bias in the global economy – a global liquid-
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ity shortage. The second was that the United States would continue 
to provide more of the international reserve currency, leading ulti-
mately to a loss of confidence in the dollar, as US obligations to ‘re-
deem’ foreign holdings with gold would be seen to be unsustainable.
Some writers have identified the second alternative with continued 
US current account deficits. But this is not correct, either empirically 
or conceptually.
Another interpretation of the 1960s
The US current account was actually in surplus throughout the 
1960s. Moreover, much of the growth of dollar reserves from 1955 
onwards was driven by foreign demand for money (recall the ‘dollar 
shortage’ of the late 1940s and early 1950s) and posed no threat to 
US liquidity (Obstfeld, 1993). 
One analysis at the time took a different line (Despres et al., 1966) 
– a ‘minority view’– as the authors put it. They argued that the US 
‘deficit’ arose from its role as the world banker (see also Gourinchas 
and Rey, 2007). It borrowed short (issuing riskless assets) and lent 
long (buying risky assets). The source of the dollar balances accumu-
lated abroad was net capital outflows, not current account deficits.
More generally, ‘current accounts tell us little about the role a coun-
try plays in international borrowing, lending, and financial inter-
mediation…’ (Borio and Disyatat, 2011). Moreover, Despres et al., 
(1966) argued that the key issue was not external (global) liquidity 
but rather internal liquidity in Europe. That is, the United States 
was supplying financial intermediation to a Europe whose financial 
system was still incapable of providing that intermediation itself. The 
lack of ‘confidence’, they suggested, reflected a failure to understand 
this intermediary role. Hence, they argued, there was a straightfor-
ward policy response: develop and integrate foreign capital markets, 
while seeking to moderate foreign asset holders’ insistence on liquid-
ity. This minority view of 1966 was the correct one. It was put for-
ward in the same year in which Valery Giscard d’Estaing spoke of the 
‘exorbitant privilege’. It resonates with today’s policy discussions of 
global imbalances (Portes, 2009).
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In sum, the ‘dollar problem’ of the 1960s was not founded on the 
Triffin Dilemma. Rather, it was simply a result of the US inability to 
convince dollar holders that the US would maintain a stable value 
of the dollar with appropriate monetary and fiscal policies. If the US 
had done that, then dollar holders would have had no incentive to 
demand gold. (Obstfeld, 1993) – unless it were to destroy the exor-
bitant privilege, as perhaps was the main French objective. 
Is there a Triffin Dilemma now?
The leading current version of the Triffin Dilemma starts from the 
hypothesis that the global economy faces a chronic, severe shortage 
of reserve assets, which are identified with ‘safe assets’ (Caballero, 
2006). The empirical evidence cited for this shortage is the persis-
tently low level of real interest rates (Farhi et al., 2011, IMF, 2012). 
There are several formulations of the problem which is supposed to 
be raised by the assumed shortage of safe assets. First, excess demand 
for safe assets is an incentive to create more. But this leads to a dete-
rioration of the creditworthiness of the safe asset pool – in the period 
just before the 2008 financial crisis, we saw a wide range of assets 
rated at AAA that subsequently were revealed as very unsafe indeed. 
Second, the supply of truly safe dollar assets – US Treasuries – rests 
on the backing of the US ‘fiscal capacity’. But that grows only as US 
GDP grows, and US GDP grows slower than world GDP, which 
determines the growth of demand for those assets. Hence there must 
be a growing excess demand for safe assets.
Third, it is the ‘ability to provide liquidity in times of global eco-
nomic stress [that] defines the issuer of the reserve currency’ (Farhi et 
al., 2011). This again rests on US fiscal capacity. 
Fourth, global reserve growth requires an ongoing issuance of gross 
US government debt, which requires either fiscal deficits or issuing 
debt to buy riskier assets. Global reserve growth is therefore driven 
by fiscal deficits, not balance of payments deficits, and the resulting 
government debt will eventually outrun US fiscal capacity. 
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Farhi et al. do not define fiscal capacity, but they seem to mean the 
sustainability of government domestic debt or the solvency of a gov-
ernment. What debt level is ‘sustainable’ is a matter of considerable 
controversy, whether it applies to domestic or international debt 
(e.g., Mendoza and Ostry, 2008, Alogoskoufis et al., 1991), and it 
is not straightforward to make the intertemporal budget constraint 
operational in order to investigate this. In the sovereign debt and 
default literature, these are old issues, concerning the difficulties of 
distinguishing between a sovereign ‘can’t pay’ from ‘won’t pay’ or il-
liquidity from insolvency (Eichengreen and Portes, 1995). 
Moreover, even setting these problems aside, the empirical evidence 
for this version of the Triffin Dilemma seems weak. We see no global 
liquidity shortage, no deflationary bias from that source. Even dur-
ing the financial crisis of 2008-09, the only manifestation of inad-
equate global liquidity (as opposed to particular securities markets) 
was a short-run lack of dollars to finance dollar positions. This was 
met by short-term currency swaps, which briefly rose to high levels 
but were quickly wound down. 
The main evidence cited for the shortage of safe assets is low real 
interest rates. It is indeed correct that real interest rates fell steadily 
from the 1980s and early 1990s to levels that seemed historically low 
in the 2000s. But they were not historically low – real interest rates 
were lower in the 1960s and 1970s (the average real interest rate on 
the sovereign borrowing of the 1970s was significantly negative). Are 
we supposed to believe that there was a shortage of safe assets both 
pre- and post-1971? Finally, the US is not the only source of safe 
assets – the government bonds of Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Norway, and Switzerland are also held in substantial amounts by for-
eign investors. A further critique of the ‘safe asset shortage view’ can 
be found in Borio and Disyatat (2011).
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Source: Author’s calculations, based on nominal interest rates and ex post CPI 
inflation rates.
Source: Credit Suisse, Market Focus, ‘When collateral is king’, 15 March 2012
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Current real interest rates are not clearly negative. For example, the 
Bund yield has moved in the range 1.40-2.20 % over the past several 
months, with 10-year inflation expectations in the range 1.90-2.05 
%. Similar real rates are indicated by US TIPS. Moreover, the cur-
rent low nominal rates on US Treasuries, Bunds, gilts and Japanese 
Government Bonds are likely due to aggressively loose monetary 
policies driving short rates close to zero with the prospect that short 
rates will stay there for an extended period of time. A standard ex-
pectations theory of the interest rate indicates that the long rate will 
then be low.
There was clearly a shortage of safe assets in late 2008, going into 
early 2009. No counterparty appeared trustworthy, all market partic-
ipants were looking for ‘safe havens’. But this was not a secular trend. 
And it is the private sector that seeks safe havens, rather than official 
sector reserve holders. Private sector capital flows in normal periods 
do not go into safe assets – e.g., flows from Germany and France to 
the ‘periphery’ countries in the Eurozone from 1999 to 2007, as well 
as US private investment in risky foreign assets (Gourinchas and Rey, 
2007, Gourinchas et al., 2012). 
Now suppose the United States had maintained the fiscal balance it 
achieved in 1999-2000. The net supply of US Treasuries was stable 
or falling, but private investment exceeded savings, so there was a 
current account deficit, with a rising foreign demand for reserves. 
What would the foreigners have bought? If the dominant source of 
safe assets was US Treasuries, then the constraint on the supply of 
these (reserve) assets would not have been US fiscal capacity, but US 
fiscal rectitude – no Triffin Dilemma, as set out by Farhi et al.
And finally, note that it is not clear that the US current account defi-
cits of the 2000s were due to a demand for additional reserve assets 
from the rest of the world. That demand could have been met by net 
private capital outflows, as in the 1960s (with net private savings bal-
ancing any government deficits, and hence a zero current account).
All this is related to the ‘global savings glut’ hypothesis (Bernan-
ke, 2005) and the ‘global imbalances’ controversies (Portes, 2009, 
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Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2010, Bernanke et al., 2011, Shin, 2011, Ob-
stfeld, 2012). There is another relevant theme – that in a crisis, the 
‘world banker’ offers insurance to other countries (Gourinchas et al, 
2012). But pursuing these issues would take us too far away from our 
‘governance’ theme. 
The policy implications
The world will move towards a multipolar reserve system. But this 
will happen not because of the Triffin Dilemma and a shortage of 
safe assets in the current dollar-dominated system. It will happen be-
cause official reserve holders want to diversify their portfolios (see Pa-
paioannou et al., 2006), especially in the light of trend dollar depre-
ciation. And the correction of global imbalances will promote this.
For policymakers, the message is to try to convince surplus countries 
that reserve assets are not as safe as they think, so that they reduce 
their demand for these assets (China has already suffered a large capi-
tal loss because of dollar depreciation in the 2000s). The asymmetry 
between pressures on surplus and on deficit countries might be met 
by doing the opposite of creating more ‘safe assets’ – that is, by rais-
ing the risk premium on the supposedly safe assets, so that coun-
tries accumulating reserves cut their demand for them, shifting their 
portfolios towards other assets (for example sovereign wealth funds). 
(Goodhart, 2011, appears to be advocating policies that would have 
this effect.)  
As the world moves towards a multipolar reserve system, emerging 
market countries will develop their domestic financial markets and 
will have less need for foreign financial intermediation (cf. Despres et 
al., 1966). Some emerging market countries may themselves become 
reserve suppliers. And the development of more international facili-
ties centred on the IMF could reduce the demand for reserves for 
self-insurance (Farhi et al., 2011). All but the last can and will hap-
pen without major changes in the governance of the international 
monetary system. And this is just as well, because such changes are 
unlikely. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, the huge shock of the global financial crisis 
has not significantly changed the relative status of international 
currencies. It seems that only a true ‘dollar crisis’ or the disintegra-
tion of the Euro could do that. In any case, there is not now, nor is 
there a likely governance of the international monetary system that 
would manage the transition. National policymakers too can have 
little more effect on the process than can the IMF or the G20. The 
markets choose the international currency.
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On the Prevention of Crises in the 
Eurozone
Leszek Balcerowicz
This paper focuses on crisis prevention in the Eurozone.  I start, 
however, with the management of the current crisis focusing on its 
main weaknesses and on its potential conflicts with crisis prevention. 
I distinguish then between two types of crises: the financial-fiscal 
and the fiscal-financial, and discuss their proximate and underlying 
causes. Based on this analysis,  I discuss to what extent the initiatives 
taken so far have removed the root causes of both types of crisis.
Crisis Management Versus Crisis Prevention
The huge and ongoing debate on the crisis in the Eurozone is usually 
divided into two parts:
1. The discussion on how to cope with the current problems 
(“crisis management”);
2. The discussion on how to prevent the occurrence of similar 
problems in the future, once – hopefully – the present ones 
are eliminated (“crisis prevention”). One can add to this cat-
egory or treat as a separate issue the question of how to make 
the economies of the Eurozone better able to cope with future 
shocks.
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In the next sections, I will focus on crisis prevention. In this sec-
tion, I would like to mention certain weaknesses of the prevailing ap-
proach to crisis management in the Eurozone (if not more broadly). 
It is usually assumed that the fiscal and structural reforms which aim 
at strengthening longer-term economic growth, improving the fiscal 
health of a country or making its economy more flexible, are neces-
sary or desirable, but can only produce these benefits in the long-
run. What about, then, in the short-run? What is left are various 
kinds of official crisis lending (the official bail-out). The convention-
al discussion on short-run measures is then reduced to the question 
of what institutions are the best qualified in providing crisis lending 
and what size bail-out is sufficient to produce the “big bazooka” ef-
fect or to provide a large enough “firewall.” Underlying these military 
or firefighting metaphors are some other metaphors like “contagion” 
or “domino effect.” They express the view that once the financial 
markets are disturbed by a crisis in one country, they will act as a 
blind, violent and undiscriminating force, “attacking” other coun-
tries, regardless of their macroeconomic situation. On this basis it 
must follow that only a formidable countervailing power – massive 
official interventions (“the big bazooka”) can break the presumed dy-
namics of the financial markets.
But the financial markets, even though disturbed, are not blind. 
They are capable of distinguishing, however imperfectly and belat-
edly, between the macroeconomic situations of various countries. 
That’s why we can see the widening spreads on government bonds 
between Germany and other northern countries and those of the 
“problem” governments in the Eurozone. 
Furthermore, the dynamics of yields on government bonds reflect to 
some extent the expected effects of the policies of countries affected 
by the crisis. One does not need, for example, to wait for the comple-
tion of a pension reform to see short-term benefits in the shape of 
reduced yields on government bonds. Markets react to the credible 
announcement of reforms and their implementation. A brief look at 
the countries that have been especially affected by the financial crisis, 
and that suffered a huge increase in the yields on their government 
bonds in 2009, is very illuminating. One group – Bulgaria, Estonia, 
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Latvia and Lithuania (the BELL group) – saw a surge in these yields 
in 2009, followed by a sharp decline. Another group – Portugal, Ire-
land, Italy, Greece and Spain (the PIIGS) – registered divergent de-
velopments: the yields on Greece’s and Portugal’s bonds have surged 
and so far have not declined, while those of Ireland have displayed, 
at least until recently, downward dynamics. These differences can be 
largely explained by the differences in the extent and structure of 
reforms in all these countries.
It is an important empirical question how the financial markets as-
sess the expected effect of various packages of reforms under vari-
ous initial conditions. However, there should be little doubt that the 
popular view, according to which reforms, however necessary, can 
produce the benefits only in the longer-run, thus leaving bail-outs as 
the only solution, should be rejected. Instead, one can propose that 
properly structured and implemented reforms produce two kinds of 
benefits:
1. The confidence effects, which appear in the short-run and take 
the form of reduced yields on government bonds (and on pri-
vate agents’ bonds, too).
2. The structural effects, which start appearing over a longer time 
frame and take the shape of strengthened economic growth 
(due to increased employment and/or productivity), reduced 
budget deficits, or a more flexible economy.
In the discussion of crisis management, one should not overlook a 
potential conflict between the availability and magnitude of official 
crisis lending and crisis prevention. There is a huge literature on this 
topic with respect to the IMF’s lending: Lerrick and Meltzer (2001); 
Report of the International Financial Institutional Advisory Com-
mission (2000); Dell’ariccia,  Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer (2002); 
Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2004); Roubini and Setser (2004); and 
Manasse and Roubini (2005). However, the problem is potential-
ly present in any kind of official bail-out: the very prospect of easy 
availability of crisis lending can make countries’ policies less prudent, 
thus increasing the number of policy-induced crises – and bail-outs 
(the moral hazard).
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The easy availability of crisis lending may also prolong the crisis 
which has already started, by reducing politicians’ incentives to en-
gage in politically unpleasant but economically necessary reforms. 
Even if a country is blessed with a reformist prime minister who is 
immune to this danger, his political base may not be. The easy avail-
ability of crisis lending can, therefore, weaken political support for 
reformist leaders.
Both these risks – of increasing the frequency of policy-induced crisis 
and of crowding-out reforms once a crisis has already started – are 
especially severe in the case of bail-outs provided by central banks, 
as they can produce potentially unlimited funds. There are other 
longer-term risks and costs in this type of bail-out, which include 
the risks of asset bubbles and inflation, undercutting the credibility 
of a central bank and exposing it to the danger of politicization (see 
Balcerowicz, 2012).
Finally, official crisis lending to some extent replaces pressure from 
financial markets with pressure from experts and politicians of credi-
tor nations. It is not difficult to see that the latter form of pressure is 
likely to have some unpleasant consequences for European cohesion, 
both in creditor and debtor countries. The bail-outs in the Eurozone, 
officially justified by European “solidarity” may, in fact, weaken Eu-
ropean “solidarity”! This is especially likely if crisis lending turns into 
cross-country fiscal transfers or if such transfers, justified by the slo-
gan of the “fiscal union,” became prematurely institutionalized. Po-
litical tensions, partly generated by the inter-regional fiscal transfers 
in some EU countries (Italy, Spain, Belgium) should serve here as a 
warning. Fiscal union in the sense of a large common budget can only 
follow the process of the gradual build-up of a common identity. If 
fiscal transfers are rushed ahead of this process, they will undermine 
it. This is especially true in the case of fiscal transfers to countries 
affected by the crises caused by their own policies, as distinct from 
transfers whose aim is to help accelerate the real convergence of the 
poorer countries of the EU (the cohesion funds). However, the first 
type of transfers, if instituted, would tend to crowd-out the second 
type, thus generating another kind of political tension in the EU, 
this time between richer and poorer (i.e., new) members. 
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Crisis Prevention: the two types of crises which include fi scal 
distress
As a starting point in the discussion on crisis prevention, it is useful 
to distinguish two types of crises which include fi scal distress:
1. Th e fi nancial (banking) crisis    fi scal crisis. 
2. Th e fi scal crisis   the fi nancial (banking) crisis.
In both cases, the proximate reason for the crisis (the “bust”) is the 
previous spending boom, i.e., the positive demand shock, fuelled by 
the excessive growth of credit, extended to private actors (the fi nan-
cial-fi scal crises) or to governments (the fi scal-fi nancial crises). Th ere 
is not much disagreement about this. Th e true and much contested 
problems are the root causes of spending booms. And without a 
proper diagnosis of this problem, there is little hope for proper crisis 
prevention and great risk that the proposed measures would be inef-
fective or – even worse – counterproductive or capable of producing 
various negative side-eff ects. 
Th e fi nancial-fi scal crisis is currently exemplifi ed by the develop-
ments in Spain and Ireland, and outside the Eurozone – by those in 
the U.S. and in Britain. Th e fi scal-fi nancial crisis can be best illus-
trated by the situations in Greece and Portugal. Italy’s fi scal problems 
stem not so much from expansionary fi scal policies during recent 
years but from high public debt in the presence of economic stagna-
tion (due to the neglect of supply-side reforms) and external shocks. 
Figure 1. The dynamics of the fi nancial-fi scal crisis
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As indicated in Figure 1, there is a fundamental debate about the 
root causes of private sector credit booms – which are the proximate 
reason for the ensuing busts and the financial crises. Many observers 
blame what they consider to be an inherent instability of the “un-
regulated” financial sector – and call for more regulations. This is, 
however, a misguided view, as the most serious problems occurred 
in the most regulated parts of the financial sector (i.e., banks) and 
empirical research points to policy errors as important root causes of 
private sector booms (for more on this see: Balcerowicz, 2010; Calo-
miris, 2009; Taylor, 2009). Here is a list of some of these policies:
1. Politicized (or state-directed) credit allocation: it is usually 
driven by political considerations which dominate the eco-
nomic risk assessment and, thus, leads to large banking losses 
and/or to sovereign debt distress. The activities of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac in the US are recent examples. 
2. Monetary policy, which occasionally leans “with the wind, 
i.e., fuels asset bubbles (the Fed’s policy in the 2000s being 
the main recent example). It has been linked to a doctrine of 
monetary policy which narrows its goal to the short-term CPI 
inflation, and excludes from its purview asset price develop-
ments and related factors (e.g., the growth of monetary and 
credit aggregates). 
3. Tax regulations which favor debt financing relative to equity 
finance. 
4. Subsidies to mortgage borrowing. 
5. Financial regulations which encouraged excessive securitiza-
tion, e.g,. the risk-weights contained in Basel 1 and the man-
datory use of credit rating by financial investors. 
6. Generous deposit insurance which eliminates an important 
source of market discipline. 
7. Regulations that limit shareholder concentration in large 
banks and thus increase agency problems and weaken mar-
ket discipline (Calomiris, 2009).  This may be an important 
source of managerial compensation schemes that favor short-
term gains and disregard longer-term risks. 
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8. Policies which have resulted in the “too big to fail” syndrome, 
i.e,. fi nancial markets’ subsidization – via reduced risk premi-
ums – of large fi nancial conglomerates. Th is is another im-
portant instance of public interventions that weaken market 
discipline. Th e resulting concentration, in the face of fi nancial 
crisis, exerts an enormous pressure upon decision makers to 
bail-out large fi nancial companies again, thus creating a sort 
of vicious circle. Th e policies in question included an easy ac-
ceptance of the mergers of already huge fi nancial companies 
and an easy-money policy that fueled the growth of already 
large fi nancial conglomerates. 
Let us now turn to the fi scal-fi nancial crises.
Th e fi scal problems typically generated by systematic budgetary over-
spending spill over to the fi nancial sector because fi nancial institu-
tions are big buyers of government bonds. And the domestic fi nan-
cial institutions own a disproportionally large part of their “own” 
Sovereign’s  debt – witness the present problems of the Greek banks. 
Th is home bias strengthens the link between the fi nancial and fi scal 
crises in these countries. 
Figure 2. The dynamics of the fi scal–fi nancial  crises
As shown in Figure 2, the windfall gains, or – more broadly – the 
easy money, are likely to fuel overspending and thus contribute to 
fi scal crises. Th e sharply lowered interest rates obtained by Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy upon their entry in the EMU belonged in 
the category of windfall gains. 
Th e fundamental question is: what are the driving forces behind 
modern political systems’ systematic overspending. Th is issue be-
Windfall gains
overspending
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longs to political economy or public choice. Casual observation and 
empirical research point out the destructive nature of political com-
petition (i.e., competing for votes with spending promises) and to 
the weak, if any, constraints on the expansion of budgetary spending. 
This diagnosis should not suggest that the right solution is to abolish 
open political competition, i.e., democracy, for rulers in non-dem-
ocratic regimes tend to pacify the population with increased spend-
ing, not to mention various negative consequences of the lack of an 
open society. The solutions should be sought within a democratic 
system and aim at making the political competition economically 
more responsible, and at strengthening fiscal constraints on govern-
ments. On the first issue, there is no good substitute for the more 
active, more systematic and more professional engagement of these 
parts of civil society that understand that individual freedom and 
economic growth require keeping the size of government in check. 
Political leaders, both at the national and EU levels, should – at the 
minimum – stop equating the “European model” with a large (and 
usually badly structured) welfare state. On the second issue, consti-
tutional constraints limiting the public debt/GDP ratio and other 
fiscal rules are necessary. However, in order to introduce and main-
tain them, a strong engagement of the appropriate parts of civil soci-
ety is again required. This engagement is especially important in the 
larger EU countries, as they are less susceptible than the smaller ones 
to European pressures; instead they are largely behind these pres-
sures. The European rhetoric should not mask the “Realpolitik” in 
the European Union. The sad story of the de facto emasculating of 
the Stability and Growth Pact in 2005 by Germany and France is a 
case in point.
Crisis prevention: what measures?
As spending booms, fueled by excessive growth of credit, are the 
proximate causes of the ensuing busts and crises, effective prevention 
must correctly address the root causes of these booms. This task goes 
beyond the Eurozone problems, but includes some issues that are 
specific to the Eurozone. 
With respect to the private sector credit booms, I have presented 
an incomplete but long list of policies which have contributed to 
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these booms in the past, by generating excessive credit growth and/
or reducing the perception of private risks. The natural question is 
then, to what extent have the post-crisis initiatives of national and 
institutional public bodies removed the danger of similar policies 
being adopted in the future. This would obviously require a more ex-
tensive discussion for which there is no place here. My short response 
would be that most of the indicated policies are still in place. They 
include tax regulations that favor debt financing relative to equity 
finance, subsidies to mortgage borrowing, generous deposit insur-
ance that crowds out an important source of market discipline, and 
regulations that limit shareholders’ concentration in large banks and 
thus increase agency problems. On a more positive note, I will note 
the Basel 3 initiative that increases the minimum capital ratios in 
banks and the ongoing work on the efficient insolvency procedures 
for big banks that would eliminate the “too big to fail” policies. On 
the latter, however, it is too early to say whether this work will yield 
practical results, especially with respect to large, international finan-
cial conglomerates. 
There is very little debate on how to change the monetary policy doc-
trine so as to reduce the risk that monetary policy will occasionally 
lean “with the wind,” i.e., fuel bubbles, as appears to have been the 
case with the Federal Reserves’s and ECB’s policies before the recent 
crisis (see Taylor, 2009). What is more, after this crisis the monetary 
policy of the main central banks has shifted for a long time period 
to very low interest rates, disregarding the potential negative impact 
of this policy on longer-run growth (for more on this see Cizkowicz 
and Rzonca, 2012).
There is one specific issue related to monetary policy in the Euro-
zone. By its very nature, there is only one level of the ECB inter-
est rates, which cannot perfectly fit the conditions of all the various 
members. This problem has two aspects: temporal and structural. 
The first one is related to the different business cycle situations in the 
respective countries, due, for example, to asymmetric shocks. So far, 
the temporal problem has not been very serious due to the growing 
synchronization of the business cycle in the Eurozone. The structural 
aspect, which is widely ignored, results from different levels of natu-
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ral interest rates in the different member countries that would make 
the ECB’s rates too low for some members most of the time, thus 
fueling boom – bust cycles. (Ireland and Spain seem to belong to this 
group). The question is then what instruments of macroprudential 
regulation (e.g., varying the loan to value ratio), and to what extent, 
can neutralize this risk. This is one of the important open technical 
questions related to the prevention of future financial-fiscal crises in 
the Eurozone.
Let us now move to the prevention of the fiscal-financial crises that 
are driven by systematic fiscal overspending, leading to the accumu-
lation of large public debt. This problem, again, goes well beyond the 
Eurozone, but has some aspects that are specific to the EMU. 
In response to the crisis in the Eurozone, a number of European 
initiatives have been adopted that aim at preventing fiscal-financial 
crises: the European Semester, the Six Pack, and the Fiscal Treaty. 
There is no point in discussing them separately, as successive docu-
ments largely incorporate the previous ones. The main changes are 
the following ones:
1. The ex ante monitoring (by peer pressure) of budgets proposed 
by the respective countries;
2. Monitoring of medium term objectives regarding structural 
deficits;
3. More focus on reducing the public debt/GDP ratio;
4. The obligation to introduce fiscal rules (the debt brakes) into 
the national constitutions.
From a technical point of view, these changes, especially the last one, 
go in the right direction. However, one should remember that the 
main reason for the current crisis of the Eurozone was not the lack 
of constraints contained in the treaties but the fact that – due to the 
political forces in the respective member states – the treaties were not 
respected. Would the future be different, especially when the current 
crisis is – hopefully – over? A worrisome sign has been the strong and 
effective opposition of France against making sanctions for violating 
the Stability and Growth Pact more automatic. More fundamentally, 
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there is no good substitute, I think, for the strong shift in public 
opinion, especially in the large countries of the Eurozone, in the 
direction of fiscal conservatism. 
Besides, there are some important omissions regarding the technical 
changes that appear to be necessary to make the future fiscal-finan-
cial crises less likely.  For example:
•	 Fiscal overspending and the related accumulation of public 
debt have been facilitated by easy financing provided by do-
mestic banks, and this in turn was partly due to the Basel regu-
lation that treats such lending as non risky (i.e., not absorbing 
the regulatory capital of the banks). This perverse regulation 
still remains in place and is contained in the proposed EU 
directive. 
•	 The ECB has lowered the collateral standards in its cheap 
lending to banks which, in turn, lend to its own governments. 
What would be the best exit from this policy, and would it 
leave any lasting traces?
•	 The accounting rules for the governments in the EU leave 
much to be desired and so far have not been harmonized.
Concluding remarks
The prevailing approach to the current crisis in the Eurozone places 
an excessive emphasis on bail-outs to the detriment of attempts to 
prevent crises. It neglects the confidence effects of properly struc-
tured and implemented reforms and overlooks the potential detri-
mental impact of an easy availability of large crisis lending on poli-
cies of the affected countries, thus creating risks that the number 
of future crises will be increased, and the crises which have already 
started will be prolonged. It may also create increasing political ten-
sions in the EMU.
Contrary to popular perception, the financial crises (that spill over 
into the fiscal sphere) are not a pure market phenomenon, as one can 
point to a number of policies that have contributed to them. Most 
of these policies are still in place. One challenge specific to the Euro-
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zone is to work out and introduce macroprudential regulations that 
would reduce the risk of asset bubbles in countries with higher than 
average natural interest rates, i.e., those for which the ECB’s interest 
rates will be too low most of the time. This is an argument against the 
proposed harmonization of macroprudential regulation in the EU.
The proximate cause of the fiscal crises that spill over from the fi-
nancial sector is the systematic fiscal overspending ultimately driven 
by destructive political competition in the presence of weak or non-
existent constraints on the fiscal activity of states. To prevent serious 
fiscal-financial crises one has, then, to effectively address their root 
causes. The recent initiatives in the EU appear to go in the right 
direction but can’t substitute for a more active engagement of those 
parts of civil society in the respective countries that understand that 
individual freedom and economic growth require keeping the size of 
government in check.
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Exit from a Monetary Union *
Russell Cooper
This paper studies the role of exit from a monetary union. The paper 
argues that Euroization, a monetary regime in which a country uses 
the Euro but is not part of the policy setting process, is an effective 
and credible punishment in response to the inability of a country to 
successfully reform.
1 Motivation
This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion of the potential 
disintegration of a monetary union. It focuses on a particular form: 
the role of exit from a monetary union. The role of exit is studied 
here in response to a country’s failure to successfully implement re-
form policies. Here, reform is interpreted broadly to include: fiscal 
consolidation, the relaxation of regulation, repayment of debt, etc. 
The tension arises from the fact that the country is inside of a mon-
etary union with an objective of reform in the country. The point of 
the analysis is to understand the role of exit as a punishment for an 
unsuccessful reform, thus providing an incentive for the reform to 
be implemented.
*  I thank Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti and Saverio Simonelli for inviting this 
contribution.
90 Exit from a Monetary Union
A leading example is the role of the exit option during a debt crisis, as 
studied in Cooper (2012). In the event a country defaults on its debt 
obligation, which might include a bailout from other countries to 
partially cover its obligations, some form of exit should be an option 
for punishment. As recent events have made clear, existing mecha-
nisms with the European Monetary Union (EMU) are insufficient 
to prevent excessive debt buildups and the consequent pressures for 
bail-out. It will be argued that in many cases, bailouts of countries 
are unavoidable: it is in the self-interest of existing countries to pro-
vide this assistance.
This paper argues in favor of a punishment mechanism that is 
credible. It involves a form of exit in which a country would remain 
within the Eurozone but not be part of the decision making process. 
This would exclude that country from receiving any favorable mon-
etary interventions and from involvement in the debate on monetary 
policy.
This paper argues that Euroization is more credible than complete 
exit from a monetary union and provides incentives for repayment 
that do not exist if a country in default is allowed to continue within 
the monetary union.
This paper is complementary to Cooper (2012). That paper focuses 
on a debt crisis with particular attention on the incentives for bail-
out. This paper highlights the Euroization dimension by providing 
further details about this option and exploring its robustness.
2 The Reform Game
We look at the strategic interaction between two players. The first is 
a single country, denoted country 1, which is in a reform process. A 
leading example would be a country in the midst of a debt crisis un-
dertaking a fiscal reform. The reform might also include changes in 
regulations of labor and financial markets, removal of trade barriers, 
etc. As we see in the current situation in Greece, Italy and Spain, the 
choice of whether to reform or not has important political dimen-
sions as well.
91Russell Cooper
The second entity is a Central Authority representing the joint inter-
ests of a group of countries. As the paper proceeds, the identity of this 
central authority will be made clearer. At this point, it is sufficient to 
understand that this authority has the means to determine the status 
of country 1 within the monetary union.
The following events occur in each period of time. The country 1 
government, representing its households (agents), chooses to reform 
or not. Cooper (2012) studies country 1 in a debt crisis in which 
“reform” entails a decision on default followed by a bailout decision 
by the Central Authority. Here we study reform more generally.
The game also includes two exit options. The first is the continued 
use of the common currency of the union without the ability to 
influence monetary policy. This regime is Euroization. The second 
possible form of exit is to force a country to adopt and create its own 
currency. In addition, the country could be allowed to remain in the 
monetary union without any additional actions taken against it.
This central authority includes the central bank as well as a represen-
tation of the countries in the federation. The game builds upon the 
one studied in Cooper, Kempf, and Peled (2010) to allow other op-
tions, including Euroization and exit from a monetary union, which 
form the basis of this essay.
In the next section, we present a model of a monetary union. This 
model is used to explain the options of Euroization as well as com-
plete exit from a monetary union. Once these two options are delin-
eated, we return to the key question of this essay: what is the role of 
exit in a monetary union?
3 A Two Country Model
In order to characterize the equilibrium of the “Reform Game,” we 
need a model of a monetary union as well as the other options. With-
out such a model, it is impossible to be precise about incentives for 
exit. We build upon the model of Cooper and Kempf (2003). Once 
these options are set out, we return to the “Reform Game” and in-
clude the choice of reforming or not in the analysis.
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Figure 1: The Game
3.1 Environment
Th e diff erent types of monetary arrangements share a common eco-
nomic structure. Th e economy is composed of two regions, indexed 
i=1,2. To be clear, a region can be a state within a country or a coun-
try within a federation, such as a monetary union.
Th e model has overlapping generations. Agents live for two periods. 
Th ey produce a good in their youth, sell it and then consume goods 
produced in each of the two countries in old age. Th us there is trade 
across the countries. What types of currency demands arise from this 
trade will depend on the underlying monetary structure.
Th ere are also central banks, which determine the stocks of money 
in the two countries. In the case of a monetary union, the country 
banks operate according to the rules set by a central monetary au-
thority.
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3.2 Multi-currency Outcome
We start with a multi-currency world economy. Th is serves as a 
benchmark to appreciate the potential gains from monetary union 
and to value the outcome in the event there is exit from a monetary 
union.
3.2.1 Household Optimization
Agents born in period t in the “home” country produce good h when 
young, and consume both the home and foreign good when old. A 
key component of the Cooper and Kempf (2003) model is that tastes 
over the consumption goods are not known to agents at the time 
of their labor supply choice when young. Moreover, agents face a 
cash in advance constraint which means that they must hold money 
specifi c to the countries before being able to make a purchase. Th is 
choice of currency portfolio is also made prior to knowing the tastes 
for fi nal goods.
Th is abstraction serves two purposes. First, it generates a demand 
for the multiple currencies. Second, the timing implies a mismatch 
between agent tastes and their portfolio of currencies. It is a simple 
device to model illiquidity.
Formally, a generation t home household solves:
(1)
subject to
(2)
and
(3)
Th e taste shocks are represented by the random variable θ in (1). 
Th ese shocks are iid across agents and have a mean of .
94 Exit from a Monetary Union
3.2.2 Central Banks Constraints
In the multi-currency setting, there are two central banks represent-
ing the two countries. Th e home and foreign central banks each in-
dependently control the growth rate of the money supply. Newly cre-
ated money is provided as lump sum transfers to private households 
in each period: these transfers to home agents of generation t are 
represented as τt+1 in (3).
Note that transfers by the home (foreign) central bank are given to 
home (foreign) agents. Th us transfers by the home central bank in-
crease the nominal wealth of home agents, relative to foreign agents.
If the home country sets its money growth at σ, then the evolution 
of the money supply is given by (4) along with the transfers. Note 
that a constant growth rate gives rise to increasing nominal transfers.
(4)
3.2.3 Steady State Equilibria
Cooper and Kempf (2003) study steady state equilibria. Given the 
money growth rates of the home and foreign central banks, denoted 
(σ,σ* ) respectively, a steady state equilibrium satisfi es the conditions 
for household optimization. Further, in each period, the markets for 
goods and monies clear.
Given the growth rate of money of the foreign central bank, the 
home central bank selects  to maximize the lifetime expected utility 
of a representative home household. Th e home central bank recog-
nizes the eff ect of home money growth on the consumption and 
labor supply choices of all agents, both home and foreign. Th e same 
is true for the foreign central bank.
In an equilibrium, the two central banks have chosen their respec-
tive money supply growth levels optimally, given the choice of the 
other central bank. Given these choices of money growth rates, the 
actions of the private agents determine the equilibrium outcome. 
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Th e equilibrium rate of infl ation is characterized in this proposition 
from Cooper and Kempf (2003) where  is a constant.
Proposition 1 Th e symmetric equilibrium of the game between govern-
ments entails positive money growth rates:  σ = σ* = Z.
Proof. See Cooper and Kempf (2003).
Th e proposition implies that there is positive infl ation in equilib-
rium. One interpretation is that each of the central banks imposes 
an infl ation tax on the currency held by households outside of the 
country. A second interpretation is that the infl ation is a means of 
reducing output and thus infl uencing terms of trade.
Th e level of infl ation depends on the openness of the economies. A 
lower  means that home agents spend on average more of their in-
come on goods produced in the foreign country. From Proposition 1, 
the lower  also translates into higher inflation in the two countries.
For later reference, let the lifetime expected utility of a household 
in the multiple currency case be given by WLC. Note that this is an 
expected utility as it accounts for uncertainty in tastes. Further, this 
utility is independent of the country of birth given the focus on sym-
metric equilibria.
3.3 Model of a Monetary Union
An alternative monetary structure entails a single currency, the Euro, 
within a monetary union. In this case, there is a single currency and 
thus the constraint that households hold currency in advance of pur-
chasing goods is not binding. Instead, households produce goods 
when young and make consumption decisions in old age, given their 
realized tastes.
In addition, there are no longer multiple central banks. Instead, the 
money supply is controlled by a single central bank.
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3.3.1 Optimization
In a monetary union, the optimization problem of a household 
becomes:
(5)
Here the household chooses how much to work in youth, saves all 
the income in the form of money and then purchases goods in old 
age once θ is known. Th e budget constraint is
(6)
To distinguish this from the multiple currency cases, the prices of 
goods in country i on period t are denoted  . Note that (6) is given 
in money terms.
3.3.2 Central Bank
In a monetary union, there is a single central bank that prints money 
at a rate σMU and transfers the newly created money to old agents. 
Th e evolution of the money supply is given by
(7)
As before, the transfers are part of the household budget constraint (6).
3.3.3 Steady State Equilibrium
As in the multiple currency case, all markets must clear and all agents 
act in an optimally fashion in a steady state. But, unlike the multiple 
currency case, in the monetary union regime there is a single central
bank representing the interests of all agents in the federation. As 
a consequence, the infl ation created in the multiple currency case 
coming from attempts of each country to tax money holdings is 
gone. Cooper and Kempf (2003) fi nd
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Proposition 2 Th e optimal monetary policy in a common currency area 
is σCC = 0.
Proof. See Cooper and Kempf (2003).
Let WMU represent the lifetime expected utility of an agent in the 
monetary union regime. Compared to the outcome with multiple 
currencies, WMU > WLC. Th ese gains from a monetary union come 
from two sources: the ability of the households to respond to varia-
tions in tastes and the absence of an infl ation tax.
3.4 Euroization
Th ere is a third monetary design to consider. It arises when one 
country (a proxy for a group of countries) sets monetary policy with-
out regard to the welfare of the agents in the other country. Yet, there 
is a common currency. Th is is of course not just a abstract idea but 
one that has been used in a number of instances around the world.1
Th is is termed "Euroization" here since the Euro is the common cur-
rency of the two countries.
Here, country 1 is using the Euro without being part of the decision 
process. Th e Central Bank is then acting in the interest of country 2. 
Of course, it is possible to think of country 2 as itself a coalition of
countries within the Eurozone.
Th e analysis of the household problem is similar to that in the 
monetary union regime except that only a subset of households re-
ceive the money transfer in (6). To be concrete, we set, 
for residents in country 1 so that all money created by the single 
central bank is transferred to country 2 residents.
Further, we assume that monetary policy is set with the interests of 
country 2 only. Th at is, the single central bank sets money growth, 
denoted σEuro, to maximize the lifetime expected utility of a country 
2 household.
1 Berg and Borensztein (2003) contains a lengthy presentation of a number of 
cases of dollarization. 
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Following the logic of the multi-currency case, the central bank rep-
resenting the households in country 2 will have an incentive to create 
positive infl ation as a means of increasing the real wealth of country 
2 households relative to country 1. Th is is shown formally in Cooper 
and Kempf (2001).
Let be the lifetime expected utility of a household in country i
in the Euroization regime. As a consequence of the positive infl a-
tion in the Euroization regime, since the outcome 
with zero infl ation would be the same as the outcome in a monetary 
union. By the same argument, : the positive infl ation 
reduces the welfare of country 1 agents relative to a monetary union.
4.1 Incentives for Exit
Here we are taking the failure of reform as a given. Cooper (2012) 
studies a debt crisis, a leading example of a crisis situation that 
would lead to reform, where a bailout and an exit option through 
Euroization arise jointly. Here we focus more on the Euroization 
dimension of the game, building on the foundations provided in 
section 3.
A key point of the analysis is the credibility of the Euroization 
option. It was argued that country 2 agents favored Euroization 
over continuation of the monetary union: , with a 
strict inequality if the optimal monetary policy in the Euroization 
regime entailed an infl ation tax on country 1 agents. Further, since 
the outcome under a monetary union is more favorable than the 
outcome with multiple currencies, , it is clear from the 
perspective of country 2, Euroization is the best outcome. Th at is, 
faced with a choice between forcing country 1 out of the monetary 
union, allowing country 1 to remain a full partner in the monetary 
union and Euroization, country 2 will choose Euroization.
Th ough country 1 does not have a choice in the actual game over 
these options, it is useful to understand its ordering of them. Th e 
cost of this infl ation tax implies that country 1 agents prefer the 
monetary union outcome to Euroization. To this degree, pushing 
country 1 into Euroization is costly.
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Figure 2: An Equilibrium
What about opting out of the monetary union? As argued before, 
there are gains to joining a monetary union, WMU > WLC, for country 1 
as well. But the infl ation tax in the Euroization regime means that 
the welfare of country 1,  falls below WMU. So is it the case that 
 ? If not, then country 1 has an incentive to drop out 
of the Euroization regime and to adopt its own currency.
By continuity, if the infl ation rate under Euroization is not too 
large, then this will be preferred to the multiple currency regime by 
country 1. As argued earlier, the main determinant to the infl ation 
rate will be the openness of the countries. Th us, if country 1 does not 
trade too much with country 2, so that  is close to one, then the 
infl ation tax in the Euroization regime will not be too large and the 
outcome will be acceptable to country 1. Moreover, if the infl ation 
was excessive, then the participation condition of country 1, given by 
, would become a constraint on the choice of infl a-
tion in the Euroization regime.
Th ere is another benefi t to Euroization relative to a return to mul-
tiple currencies through complete exit. Th is game assumes that once 
a country is forced into a form of exit, there is no return. More 
generally, one might imagine that return to the monetary union is 
feasible and is more likely under Euroization than complete exit. 
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In addition, as emphasized in Cooper and Kempf (2001), size mat-
ters: if country 2 is large relative to country 1, then the inflation tax 
will not be very large. Finally, there are political costs of exit from a 
monetary union that could be reduced by accepting the Euroization 
regime. For these reasons, there is an added benefit to country 1 from 
accepting Euroization.
4.2 Reform Incentives
The reform stage of the game is not modeled explicitly. The point is 
that this "punishment" of Euroization is present following a number 
of different types of episodes of a failed reform. The analysis follows 
as long as the reform measures themselves do not directly impact the 
long-run values assigned to the various exit options.2
The incentive effects of exit come directly from its credibility. If coun-
try 1 understands that there is a credible punishment of Euroization, 
then this will alter its decisions regarding reform.
From the analysis, it seems as if the Euroization option is always open 
to existing members of a federation. What prevents its use outside of 
"crisis times"? The underlying assumption is that in the creation of a
federation, countries choosing to join the union do so with an 
understanding that these measures will be used to deal with extraor-
dinary events. Otherwise, countries may not have an incentive to 
join the monetary union in the first place.
5 Conclusion
In the absence of a device to commit to its choices, the member 
countries of a monetary union need to establish guidelines for deal-
ing with situations requiring large reforms, such as debt crises. The 
lack of a credible mechanism has been made clear by the ongoing 
dealings with, for example, Greece. The Eurozone nations are search-
ing for a mechanism to deal with debt crises and other failures of 
reform.
2 If there is an interaction, then the choices must be understood jointly in a more 
specific model setting. 
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The effects of a credible exit option should be clear: it creates an 
incentive for reform. In the current situation of Greece, a credible 
threat of exit will have an effect on the nature and pace of reforms. 
But if the talk of exit is not credible, then it has no economic effects. 
The value of the Euroization option is in its credibility and the result-
ing incentive effects.
The exit device through Euroization is partial: the country which 
exits retains the use of the common currency but is eliminated from 
policy determination. This approach avoids the need to renegotiate 
debt obligations in the face of a change in currencies following a 
complete exit.
To be clear, the punishment arises by exclusion from policy determi-
nation. This lack of representation leads to an inflation tax. While 
a country cannot be prevented from using the Euro, it can be pre-
vented from participating in monetary policy decisions.
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Is Austerity Going Too Far?  
Structural Reforms and The Debt 
Trap
Pier Carlo Padoan & Paul van den Noord 
Fiscal consolidation is ongoing in many countries, including in sev-
eral Euro area member states. There are increasing calls to ease the 
pace of consolidation on the grounds that too strong a pace of con-
solidation, rather than strengthening debt sustainability, by lowering 
risk premia, could be self defeating as its negative impact on growth 
(both actual and potential) would more than offset credibility ben-
efits. It could be argued that such a dilemma should be resolved 
empirically as whether and in which circumstances markets prefer 
discipline or growth. However this dilemma cannot be addressed ef-
fectively without expanding the discussion and looking more careful-
ly at growth in a high debt environment, such as the one that many 
advanced countries face today (and will face for some time to come). 
In such an environment, the role of debt in depressing growth (and 
affecting risk assessment) must be taken into consideration as well 
as the role that structural policy can play in boosting growth and 
contributing to debt sustainability.
“Good” and “bad” equilibria  
How should we identify the “right amount” of fiscal consolidation? 
One possible way is the following. Fiscal consolidation will go too far 
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if, in a world where multiple equilibria are possible, it will push the 
economy towards a bad equilibrium. A “bad equilibrium” is charac-
terized by the simultaneous occurrence, and adverse feedbacks be-
tween, high and growing fi scal defi cits and debt, high risk premia on 
sovereign debt, slumping economic activity and plummeting confi -
dence. Remedies to break the downward spiral are generally deemed 
to include fi nancial fi rewalls to prevent contagion and structural re-
forms to boost growth or expectations thereof. As mentioned, the 
role of fi scal policy is less clear. Consolidation may help to put debt 
on a sustainable path, but negative demand eff ects may generate off -
sets or could exacerbate the downturn, add to the risk premiums, 
and thus accelerate the fall towards a bad equilibrium.
As a preliminary step we need to identify what is such a “bad” equi-
librium and what distinguishes it from a “good” equilibrium. In an-
other paper (Padoan, Sila and Van den Noord, 2012) we defi ne these 
concepts with the help of a stylized economic stock-fl ow model. Th e 
simplest version of the model has two equations.1 Th e fi rst equation 
describes the negative relationship between public debt and econom-
ic growth (Y = output, D = real government debt and an over-dot 
indicates the change in the variable): 
Th is equation is depicted in Figure 1 as the downward-sloping 
straight line RR. RR stands for Reinhart and Rogoff  (2010) who were 
the fi rst to posit this relationship and to have tested it empirically.2
Th is negative relationship can be explained by, e.g., crowding-out 
eff ects on investment or adverse expectations with regard to future 
taxation associated with high public debt. Growth is positively af-
fected by the exogenous impact of structural reforms captured by 
parameter a. Th is growth equation can be augmented with the short-
to-medium run impact of fi nancial conditions proxied by the inter-
est rate r, and the fi scal policy stance proxied by the primary defi cit 
as a share of GDP p:
1 It is inspired by a model developed by Duesenberry (1958) to analyze the Great 
Depression.
2 See also Cecchetti et al. (2011) and Padoan, Sila and Van den Noord (2012).
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A higher interest rate depresses growth and a larger fi scal defi cit sup-
ports growth.
Figure 1. Good and bad equilibrium.
Th e horizontal axis measures the public debt to GDP ratio and the 
vertical axis the growth rates of public debt and output. RR is the re-
lationship between growth and debt and BR the government’s budget 
constraint. If the debt ratio is located right from the bad equilibrium 
B, it derails while output contracts at an accelerating pace.
Th e second equation is the budget constraint of the government and 
hence it is an identity. Th e budget constraint relates the primary defi -
cit as a per cent of GDP (p) to the real interest rate r and real public 
debt D:
Dividing the two sides of the equation by D yields:
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Th is is the hyperbolic relationship between real growth of debt and 
the debt ratio depicted as BR (as in budget restriction) in Figure 1. As 
the debt ratio increases, the real growth of debt approaches asymp-
totically the real interest rate.3 Th e intersections of the two curves 
correspond to, respectively, the “good” equilibrium (A) and the “bad” 
equilibrium (B). If the debt ratio is located in the interval between 
the intersections A and B (indicated by D0/Y0), output growth will 
exceed the growth of debt and hence the debt ratio is falling, until 
the good equilibrium A is attained: the good equilibrium is stable. 
However, if the debt ratio is located right of the intersection point B 
(e.g., if the debt ratio equals D1/Y1), the growth of debt exceeds out-
put growth. So the equilibrium B is unstable. Beyond B, without 
drastic corrective action the debt ratio keeps on growing and growth 
keeps falling.
 
Finally, we can assume that the interest rate r responds to the (ex-
pected) growth in the debt ratio and hence on the fi scal stance and 
(exogenous) contagion h. So:
Th is simple model allows us to consider the interaction of three pol-
icy variables: fi scal policy, fi nancial policy (fi rewall), and structural 
policy. 
For a given fi scal policy stance, a stabilizing policy (that moves the 
debt ratio to the left of the bad equilibrium) requires fi nancial action 
to dampen contagion (and lower the interest rate) and structural pol-
icy. Here the diff erent timing of policy is of the essence. Firewall ac-
tion can be very powerful in the short term but its eff ects can quickly 
fade away if not supported by further confi dence building measures 
as the interest rate grows with the debt ratio. In our description, a 
lower interest rate induced by fi nancial policy can temporarily boost 
3 Th e real interest rate is bound to increase if the debt ratio increases (see below), 
but this is not shown in this simple diagram. Also, the depicted hyperbolic relation-
ship is only valid in this form if the primary balance is in defi cit. If it is in surplus, 
the shape of the curve will change substantially, but will still yield a good and a bad 
equilibrium with similar properties as described above.
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growth and keep the economy away from the bad equilibrium. But 
its effect is likely to fade if the interest rate fall is not made per-
manent by a lower debt ratio. Structural reforms can provide confi-
dence but even more importantly can boost growth permanently. So 
it is essential that the window of opportunity generated by financial 
policy is fully exploited. It takes time for structural reform to have 
a full impact on growth and debt, while time is severely lacking in 
a sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, for structural reform to have this 
virtuous effect, confidence must be restored to induce the investment 
(in financial, physical, and human capital) needed to achieve higher 
growth. So the budget must be brought under control immediately 
through a combination of (credible) fiscal consolidation and finan-
cial backstops. The need to decrease debt is particularly relevant in 
the current circumstances, in which debt ratios for many advanced 
countries have grown significantly, and therefore the possibility that 
one or several countries fall into a bad equilibrium is also elevated.
A strategy that could lead to unambiguous results is to use structural 
reforms to boost growth and fiscal policy to pursue fiscal consoli-
dation while financial policy could provide the initial, yet possibly 
temporary, benefit in terms of a confidence bridge. A decline in the 
debt ratio, also prompted by higher growth, would allow for a per-
manently lower interest rate.  
This can be seen graphically. Changes in the policy variables shift the 
curves. Structural reforms, lower interest rates, higher fiscal deficits 
shift the RR schedule upwards and so the bad equilibrium debt to 
GDP ratio moves further to the right (hence a previously unsus-
tainable debt ratio becomes sustainable, the bad equilibrium is “less 
destabilizing”). 
Lower interest rates, lower fiscal deficits shift the BR downwards, 
also making the bad equilibrium less destabilizing. However, lower 
fiscal deficits also bring the RR downwards, partially offsetting the 
positive impact of lower interest rates. 
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Figure 2. The impact of fi scal consolidation and structural reform (fi gure revised).
Th e impact of the strategy suggested above can be described as fol-
lows using Figure 2. A fall in the primary defi cit and a lower inter-
est rate shift the budget constraint down from BR to BR’. However, 
this aff ects mostly the location of the good equilibrium (which shifts 
from A to A’) and much less so the bad equilibrium B (which shifts 
to B’). Th e intuition is straightforward: a sustained cut in the primary 
defi cit yields a lower debt ratio and higher economic growth in the 
long run, but the initial impact on debt is small. If the debt ratio 
turns out to be located right of the points B and B’,  fi scal consolida-
tion alone will not be an eff ective way to improve the debt dynamics 
in the short to medium run. 
However, the combination of structural reform, fi scal consolida-
tion and fi nancial policy will likely deliver higher economic growth. 
Structural reform and a lower interest rate shift to the right the 
Reinhart-Rogoff  relationship from RR to RR’, while the lower defi cit 
would shift it to the left, so we will have to assume that this growth 
depressing impact is more than compensated by the growth enhanc-
ing eff ect of structural reforms and fi nancial policy. Th e initial posi-
tive impact of a lower interest rate on growth is reinforced later by 
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the impact of structural reforms. In this case, the bad equilibrium 
shifts further to the right, from B’ to B’’. The debt ratio D1/Y1 is 
now located left of the equilibrium and has become sustainable. The 
economy now tends automatically towards the good equilibrium A’’.
How much can structural reforms actually help? 
It is often argued that growth effects of structural reform will only 
materialize with a lag, but recent research by the OECD (2012a) sug-
gests that this should not be exaggerated. Another counter-argument 
that is often heard is that the electorate dislikes structural reform 
and that therefore governments are unlikely to go for it. However, 
this reasoning underestimates the wisdom of voters and is not fully 
in line with the facts (Buti et al., 2010). Moreover, financial markets 
are likely to reward the increased growth potential of the economy 
which can yield positive wealth effects on demand even in the short 
run. 
OECD work provides some evidence of the implementation and im-
pact of structural reform. The following facts are worth mentioning. 
First, since the beginning of the crisis, reforms have accelerated, es-
pecially in low income countries (Figure 3), so they may be produc-
ing fruits earlier than expected. Second, structural reforms have been 
implemented alongside, and not as an alternative to, fiscal consolida-
tion (Figure 4). Third, structural reforms can deliver significant out-
put gains, especially in the Euro area (Figure 5). Fourth, reforms can 
have positive cross purpose impacts, e.g., product market reforms 
can boost labour market performance (Figure 6). Fifth, while the 
full benefits of structural reform materialize in the medium term, 
there are some short term benefits and the much feared short term 
adjustment costs could be overestimated (Figure 7). Sixth, structural 
reforms could boost growth in the Euro area also by helping current 
account rebalancing through their impact on savings and investment 
gaps in both deficit and surplus countries (Figure 8).      
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Figure 3. Reforms have accelerated
Figure 4. Reforms and fiscal consolidation
Variation in the underlying primary balance as a percentage of potential 
GDP from 2010 to 2012
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Figure 5. Potential gains from broad reform package 
(Ten years, levels in per cent)
Figure 6. Change in aggregate employment rate following a “typical” 
reduction in initial unemployment benefit replacement rate
Years after the reform
Figure 7. Change in aggregate labor force participation 
following a “typical” product market reform
Years after the reform
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Figure 8. Changes in saving investment gaps. 
Scenario 1 fiscal consolidation, 
Scenario 2 fiscal consolidation and structural reforms
Source: Kerdrain, C., et al. (2011), “Current Accounts Imbalances: Can Structural 
Reforms Help to Reduce Them?” in OECD Journal: Economic Studies, Vol. 2011, 
OECD Publishing, Paris.
Conclusion
The contribution of structural reforms to solving the Euro area crisis 
should be seen in the context of the need to progress in fiscal con-
solidation. While growth enhancing structural reforms can clearly 
benefit fiscal consolidation and debt sustainability, the issue arises of 
the role of timing and sequencing of a policy strategy that includes 
fiscal consolidation, structural reforms, and confidence enhancing 
financial measures. 
Empirical evidence indicates that, as widely expected, structural re-
forms bear their fruits in terms of higher output over the medium 
(and sometimes long) term. In addition, structural reforms become 
more effective when other policies are also implemented including 
confidence building measures. One example is product market re-
forms aimed at boosting investment by eliminating barriers to com-
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petition. More competition opens up new profit opportunities and 
thus investment, but if confidence is depressed, such as during a deep 
recession, even liquidity rich companies may choose the option to 
wait rather than kicking off investment. Also, in some cases the im-
pact of structural reforms may be low in the short term if activity 
remains weak. The implication is that, at times of depressed activity, 
confidence building measures not only prevent the economy from 
falling into a debt trap but also provide a bridge between the short 
and the long term by enhancing the impact of structural reforms and 
thus facilitating the escape from the debt trap. 
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The Reform of the Political and  
Economic Architecture of the  
Eurozone’s Governance  
A Legal Perspective
Jacques Ziller
This chapter presents to economists and political scientists a legal 
perspective on the most recent reform of the political and economic 
architecture of the Eurozone’s governance. The paper does not in-
clude any economic or political science perspectives; it has to be 
underlined that trying to conduct a “legal analysis” is something dif-
ferent from paraphrasing the content of legal documents. By “most 
recent reform,” we mean the decisions made at the EU summit of 
9 December 2011 and implemented by the Treaty on Stability, Co-
ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG) that has been negotiated from December 2011 to February 
2012.1 
1 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Mon-
etary Union (TSCG), available on the Internet Site of the Council: http://european-
council.europa.eu/eurozone-governance/treaty-on-stability 
116 The Reform of the Political and Economic Architecture of the Eurozone’s Governance A Legal Perspective
Therefore, the so-called ”Six-Pack”2 will not be analysed here – 
although it has entered into force on 1 January 2012 – as the related 
decisions have been made during the last months of 2010 and imple-
mented by the six regulations and directive that have been presented 
by the Commission in early 2011, and discussed and adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council in the last months of 2011. 
Some attention will be devoted only to one of the changes in gover-
nance introduced by the “Six-Pack,” which is very interesting from a 
legal perspective: the shift of burden of qualified majority voting in 
the functioning of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Three points will be developed in order to contribute to understand-
ing if significant changes have been introduced into the Eurozone’s 
governance with the decisions taken on 9 December 2011. In the 
first section, I will explain the reasons for, and consequences of, the 
need for an appropriate legal basis for EU actions which derives from 
the choices made by European governments since the early 1950s as 
far as the form and instruments of integration are concerned. With 
the second section, I will examine whether, due to the constraints 
imposed by the legal bases of the economic and monetary union 
(EMU), it was necessary from a legal point of view to adopt the con-
tent of the decisions taken on 9 December 2011 in the form of an 
international treaty, the so-called “Fiscal Compact,” i.e., the TSCG 
of 1 March 2012. In the third section, I briefly discuss the remain-
ing constraints for the Eurozone’s governance that derive from the 
2 Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in 
the Euro area; Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro area; Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies; 
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbal-
ances; Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementa-
tion of the excessive deficit procedure and Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 
November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, 
all available on http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/in-
dex_en.htm 
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constraints imposed by the legal bases of the EMU. The analysis is 
limited to EU law; it should, however, be borne in mind that im-
portant issues of national law are being raised under the motto of 
democratic accountability, which are starting to be addressed by legal 
scholars and courts, mainly in Germany until the present time, i.e., 
the beginning of 2012.
1. The Need for an Appropriate Legal Basis for EU Actions
From a strict legal perspective, the European Union is not a state, 
it is a grouping of states based upon an international treaty for 
the purpose of exercising a number of delimitated functions.
In international public law and in public law, the existence of a 
“state” is determined by the combination of a territory, a popula-
tion living on that territory, and a government that has effective and 
ultimate power over that territory and population. The EU does not 
have a territory of its own, as Art. 52 (2) of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) reminds. It says that “The territorial scope of the Treaties 
is specified in Art. 355 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union [TFEU]”; according to Art. 355, TFEU the EU treaties – 
and the law that derives from the treaties, in the form of directives, 
regulations, decisions, general principles of law and the case-law of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – apply to the territory of the 
member states, with a series of exceptions that are precisely delimi-
tated in Art. 355 or in some of the Accession Treaties – for some of 
the States that have become members of the European Communities 
/ European Union since 1973. The EU does not have a population of 
its own, as expressed in Arts. 9 TEU and 20 (1) TFEU: “Every person 
holding the nationality of a member state shall be a citizen of the Union. 
Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national 
citizenship”; it derives from such a definition of citizenship that the 
EU, as opposed to a state, does not have the power to lay down the 
conditions and procedures according to which its citizenship is being 
acquired – or lost. The EU does not have a government that has ef-
fective and ultimate power over that territory and population: there 
is without any doubt a government of the EU, made up of its institu-
tions, which have a number of powers to decide (competences), but 
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there are no EU-only instruments of constraint upon individuals, 
groups and businesses (physical and legal persons). 
Thus the EU Constitution – the founding treaties (TEU and 
TFEU3, as well as the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU, and 
the protocols which are annexed to the treaties4) – cannot be un-
derstood in the same way as a federal state’s constitution such as 
the Constitution of the United States of America of 1787 or the 
Fundamental Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949. The 
EU is based upon international agreements (i.e., treaties) that are 
binding upon sovereign states; as long as the treaties do not specify 
legal rules and principles applicable to the functioning of the EU, 
the international law of treaties is applicable – a set of principles and 
rules which has been to a large extent codified by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties of 1969. One of the funda-
mental principles of international law is the principle of specialty, 
according to which organizations or bodies set up by a treaty have 
only the powers which they have been provided by the treaty; on the 
contrary, a state, in international law, has no limitation to its powers, 
other than the limitations they have voluntarily accepted by agreeing 
to international treaties. The principle of specialty is also known as 
the “principle of conferral,” and has always been applicable to the 
European Communities.
The principles of conferral and of institutional balance set the 
boundaries that frame the actions of the European Union’s insti-
tutions.
While the principle of conferral has always been applicable to the 
EC/EU treaties, some member state governments have insisted, re-
ferring to the constitutional treaty of 2004 and the Lisbon Treaty of 
2007, that it be explicitly specified in the text of the TEU. According 
3 One should avoid referring to numbers of articles of the ‘Lisbon Treaty’; the 
latter was a treaty amending the existing Treaty on European Union and Treaty 
establishing the European Community; numbers of articles refer usually to the 
‘consolidated versions’ of the TEU and TFEU. 
4 The full coordinated text of the EU treaties, Charter and protocols is avail-
able as Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.
do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML 
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to Art. 5 (1) and (2) TEU: 
“1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of 
conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality.
2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within 
the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the member states 
in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences 
not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the mem-
ber states”. 
According to the principle of conferral, EU institutions may only 
take action in areas for which they have a competence – i.e., powers 
to act – and according to the rules set up. In the field of economic 
and monetary policy, the EU indeed has such competences. The sys-
tem of competences of the EU is organized in the TFEU, Art. 2 to 
6. The treaties make a distinction between “exclusive competences,” 
where only the EU may set rules, “shared competences,” where both 
the EU and member states may establish rules, provided the latter do 
not contradict EU rules, and areas where the EU sets up mechanisms 
and actions in order to coordinate, support or complement the ac-
tions of the member states. Amongst exclusive competences we find 
the “monetary policy for the member states whose currency is the Euro” 
(Art. 3 (1) letter c TFEU) – or also for instance “establishing” “the 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market” 
(Art. 3 (1) letter c TFEU). The internal market is the most typical 
area of shared competences (Art. 4 (2) letter b TFEU). A specific 
article is devoted to the competences in matters of coordination of 
economic policy (Art. 5 (1) TFEU), employment policies and social 
policies (Art. 5 (2) and (3) TFEU). It may be worthwhile to point 
to the fact that the European Convention, which drafted these pro-
visions in 2002-2003 as part of the future constitutional treaty of 
2004, was proposing the same kind of wording for all three areas, 
i.e., “the Union” coordinates, takes measures etc. On the insistence 
of some government representatives, the wording chosen for eco-
nomic policy is:  “[t]he member states shall coordinate their economic 
policies within the Union [not the Union shall coordinate]. To this 
end, the Council shall adopt measures, in particular broad guidelines for 
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these policies.” From a legal point of view, this difference in wording 
has no consequence, but it is highly indicative of the mood of many 
member states’ governments – be they part of the Eurozone or not – 
with regard to giving economic policy competence to the EU.
For the rest of the principles set up in Art. 2 to 6 TFEU, it suffices 
to quote Art. 2 (6) TFEU, according to which “The scope of and ar-
rangements for exercising the Union’s competences shall be determined by 
the provisions of the Treaties relating to each area.” The said provision 
basically means that one needs to look at the precise clauses of the 
Treaties which are devoted to a specific area.
A second principle that is highly relevant to the point which is be-
ing made in this section is the “principle of institutional balance.” 
This principle has been applied by the ECJ since the 1950s – first 
in the framework of the European Coal and Steel Community5  – 
when the Court has to decide on cases involving issues about which 
institutions can act and within which parameters. The principle of 
institutional balance has been written down in Art. 13 (2) TEU: 
“Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on 
it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and 
objectives set out in them.” The said provision means that it is not 
possible for an EU institution (for instance the Commission) to act 
where the treaties specify that another institution (for instance the 
Council) shall act; it also means that each institution is bound by the 
procedural rules which are set up for its functioning in the treaties, 
be it under general institutional rules or under the special rules that 
are indicated for a given area in specific treaty clauses.
The combination of the principles of conferral and of institution-
al balance finds its expression in the “legal bases” that determine 
whether and how EU institutions may act in a given area.
Correctly applying the relevant legal bases is indispensable in or-
der to allow the EU to act.
A legal basis is made of a clause or a series of clauses of the EU 
founding treaties; there are also further legal bases for action which 
5 Judgment of the Court of 6 April 1962, Meroni & Co. and others v High Au-
thority of the European Coal and Steel Community, Joined cases 21/61 to 26/61. 
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are set up by “secondary EU law,” i.e., in directives, regulations etc. 
Legal bases of secondary law have to comply with treaty legal bases. 
The analysis of this paper is limited to treaty legal bases, as this is the 
central issue. There are usually four components of a “legal basis” in 
EU Law. 
First, the clauses that constitute a legal basis indicate – with more or 
fewer details – the area in which the Union has a competence, i.e., 
may act (or sometimes has to act). According to Art. 119 (1) TFEU 
(emphasis added):
“For the purposes set out in Article 36 of the Treaty on European 
Union, the activities of the member states and the Union shall 
include, as provided in the Treaties, the adoption of an economic 
policy which is based on the close coordination of member 
states’ economic policies, on the internal market and on the 
definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance 
with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.”
According to Art. 119 (2) TFEU (emphasis added):
“Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in the Treaties and 
in accordance with the procedures set out therein, these activities 
shall include a single currency, the euro, and the definition 
and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate 
policy the primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain 
price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to support 
the general economic policies in the Union, in accordance with the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition.”
Second, the clauses that constitute a legal basis indicate – with more 
or fewer details – the legal instruments to be used by the EU. There 
may be a specific indication of which instruments may be used, i.e., 
directives, or regulations, or decisions; in such a case, the institutions 
may not resort to another instrument (i.e., a regulation instead of a 
directive). There may also be more general indications, the treaty re-
6 Art. 3 sets the objectives of the EU. The relevant clause is Art. 3 (4), according 
to which “The Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose cur-
rency is the euro.” 
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ferring very often to “measures”; this means that EU institutions may 
choose between directives, decisions or regulations according to their 
preferences. The binding character of an instrument, as well as the 
need for member states to transpose the EU rules into national law 
(for directives), or the absence of such a need (for regulations), are 
indicated in the applicable general provisions of the treaties – mainly 
in Art. 289 TFEU. There are only a few cases where the treaties limit 
the choice of instruments in the field of EMU. One may quote as 
particularly relevant Art. 121 TFEU, which provides for the use of 
regulations for the multilateral surveillance procedure. 
Third, the clauses that constitute a legal basis indicate the decision-
making procedure which applies. In many cases, the treaty refers to 
the “ordinary legislative procedure,” i.e., the procedure whereby the 
Commission presents a proposal to the European Parliament and the 
Council, which needs to be approved – if needed after amendments 
– both by the Parliament deciding by a majority of the votes cast, 
and by the Council deciding by qualified majority voting (QMV). 
If a legal basis does not refer to the ordinary legislative procedure, 
it always indicates exactly which institutions propose (usually the 
Commission) and/or decide upon an action (Council, or Council 
and Parliament, or Commission, or even exceptionally the European 
Council), and by which majority. It is particularly important to take 
into account whether the Parliament has a co-decision power (as in 
the ordinary legislative procedure) or not, and whether the Coun-
cil or European Council decides by QMV or by unanimity (or by 
consensus, as far as the European Council is concerned). While it is 
hardly worthwhile trying to memorise the details of QMV, it is indis-
pensable to understand two points: i) unanimity means that a single 
government has a veto power, which it may use to block a decision or 
to negotiate a specific advantage; and ii) QMV means that govern-
ments who want to oppose a proposal need to find allies in order to 
build a blocking minority which impedes the adoption of a decision.
Fourth, the clauses that constitute a legal basis indicate very often – 
but not always – sector specific objectives or parameters. A typical 
example is that of Art. 119 (2) TFEU which sets the objectives of 
the monetary and exchange-rate policy of the EU: “the primary objec-
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tive of both of which shall be to maintain price stability and, without 
prejudice to this objective, to support the general economic policies in 
the Union, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy 
with free competition.”
The consequences of disregarding a legal basis are a sufficient 
enough incentive for EU institutions to take those bases seriously. 
That is the main legal reason for reforms to be adopted by means 
of treaty change.
At the EU level, even if the Commission, Parliament and Council 
– i.e., at least a solid majority of member states – would agree on 
a distorted use of existing legal bases, there is always a possibility 
for minority member states to challenge the adopted instruments 
through a request for judicial review by the ECJ; and furthermore, 
businesses, associations and individuals may also request judicial re-
view if they can demonstrate a strong enough interest to be protected 
against the consequences of an EU act. The Court may declare the 
relevant decision, directive or regulation as being void, thus depriv-
ing the instrument from any impact. Furthermore, member states’ 
courts which have to give effect to an EU legal instrument in litiga-
tion may refer to the ECJ through a “question for preliminary rul-
ing” in order to know whether the relevant EU instrument is valid 
under UE law. If the ECJ responds that the instrument is invalid, 
the member state’s court will not apply the EU act to the litigation, 
thus depriving it of effect. This double track for judicial review has 
demonstrated in the past that it is a strong instrument in order to 
ensure compliance with the treaties, and it has greatly contributed 
to the functioning of the internal market. The fact that only a rather 
limited number of ECJ rulings declare an EU instrument to be void 
due to the absence of a legal basis or inadequacy of the existing bases 
does not mean that the remedies are ineffective; indeed, the legal 
services of the Commission and of the Council check the presence 
and adequacy of legal bases before the EU institutions adopt an in-
strument, and therefore only a limited number of cases, where there 
are different possibilities of interpretation, are left open to a chal-
lenge with courts. At member state level, there is a further possibility 
for individuals, businesses and groups to challenge an EU act, in 
those countries where a Supreme court or Constitutional court has 
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declared that it may check whether EU institutions – including the 
ECJ – act beyond the powers which have been given to them by the 
treaties (“ultra vires”), and that the Court might therefore declare the 
relevant instrument not applicable in their country; this is the case 
of the German constitutional court. Such an “ultra vires” declaration 
has never been pronounced until now, but the relevant Court rulings 
act as a “Sword of Damocles” upon the EU institutions and mem-
ber states’ governments; conversely such declarations by Courts are 
sometimes used by a member state’s government in order to impede 
EU action during negotiations.
If there is no appropriate legal basis in the treaties, the only possibil-
ity that remains in order to enable the EU to act is treaty amend-
ment. Treaty amendment is far from being impossible, as demon-
strated by the succession of reform treaties which have been adopted 
since the mid nineteen-eighties by the Single European Act signed 
early 1986, which entered into force on 1 July 1987; the Maastricht 
Treaty signed early 1992, which entered into force on 1 November 
1993; the Amsterdam Treaty signed in October 1997, which entered 
into force on 1 May 1999; the Nice Treaty signed early 2001, which 
entered into force on 1 March 2003; and the Lisbon Treaty, signed 
in December 2007, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
There are, however, two strong limitations to treaty reform. First, 
treaty reform always requires the unanimity of all member states – 
even if the reform only applies to some of them as is the case for the 
Eurozone. The unanimity rule gives a very strong veto position to 
any member state’s government that either does not agree with the 
content of the proposed reform or wants to use its vetoing power in 
order to bargain on any other topic of interest. Second, treaty reform 
always requires ratification according to member states’ constitu-
tional rules. This has several consequences: i) member state’s govern-
ments are never 100% sure that they will be supported by a majority 
of their Parliament, especially if a reinforced majority is required for 
the reform of EU treaties, as happens quite often; ii) some member 
states have a set of rules which may lead to the need for a referen-
dum, as happens for most treaty reforms with Denmark and Ireland, 
and as would happen with the United Kingdom since the European 
Union Act of 2011; iii) rules regarding the discretion of the Head 
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of State to ratify a treaty or not once having the required agreement 
from Parliament (or through referendum) are not totally clear, as has 
been demonstrated by the Czech Republic with the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009.  Ratification rules give strong arguments to those governments 
who do not want to be seen as directly opposing reform, in order to 
oppose it indirectly or to bargain on any other topic of interest. 
As a consequence of the aforesaid, from a legal perspective, it is easier 
for the EU to act within the boundaries set by existing legal bases, es-
pecially if the relevant legal bases only require QVM in the Council. 
This being said, other reasons may lead to treaty reform when it is 
not a necessary requirement, e.g., uncertainty about the exact limits 
of existing boundaries to EU action, or simply political reasons, e.g., 
governments wanting to send specific signals to their electorate or to 
the market7.
A whole series of treaty bases for economic and monetary policy 
are to be found in the EU treaties8.
The most relevant treaty legal bases for Eurozone governance are to 
be found in the TFEU Part III, Title VIII “Economic and Mon-
etary Policy”: Arts. 119 to 144 establish the system of governance of 
the Eurozone as well as the rules applying to non-Eurozone member 
states – i.e., a series of rules and principles relating to economic and 
monetary issues that apply to all EU member states, and the general 
principles according to which a member state which is not yet in the 
Eurozone may enter the EMU. As far as the UK and Denmark are 
concerned, they have obtained an opt-out of the EMU together with 
the Maastricht Treaty, and their procedures to enter the EMU are es-
tablished in separate protocols, which have the same value as the trea-
ties. Sweden, on the contrary, does not benefit in principle from an 
opt-out; its special position is due to the fact that – unlike other new 
member states – the Swedish government neglected to adhere to the 
exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System at the 
moment of its accession to the EU in 1995, and thus Sweden does 
7 See the chapter by Bruno de Witte, Treaty Games, in this book. 
8 See footnote 4 above. 
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not comply with one of the four conditions for entering the EMU9. 
Four very important protocols complement Part III, Title VIII of the 
TFEU; i.e., Protocol (n° 4) on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank; and Protocol (n° 
12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure; Protocol (n° 13) on the Con-
vergence Criteria; and Protocol (n° 14) on the Eurogroup. The rules 
and principles of these texts have all been drafted by the intergovern-
mental conference (IGC) on the economic and monetary union of 
1991 and were part of the Maastricht treaty, with the exception of 
the Protocol on the Eurogroup, which has codified existing practice 
in a protocol annexed to the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. It is important 
to take into account that the relevant IGC was composed mainly – 
at the technical level – by experts from the member states’ Central 
Banks and Treasuries; the clauses on the European Central Bank are 
due to the German Bundesbank’s experts.
Protocol n° 12 has a very specific feature: contrary to other protocols, 
it does not need to follow the usual treaty reform procedure with 
ratification for its amendment. According to Art. 126 (14) TFEU 
(emphasis added): 
“Further provisions relating to the implementation of the proce-
dure described in this article are set out in the Protocol on the 
excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaties.
“The Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with a 
special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Par-
liament and the European Central Bank, adopt the appropriate 
provisions which shall then replace the said Protocol.
“Subject to the other provisions of this paragraph, the Council 
shall, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, lay down detailed rules and definitions 
for the application of the provisions of the said Protocol.”
The quoted provisions of Protocol n° 12 are particularly important 
for the topic examined in this paper as they provide for the definition 
9 “The observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the 
exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two 
years,” see Art. 140 (1) for the formulation of the rule after the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty.
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of the “reference values” for the “excessive deficit procedure,” and of 
the concepts to be used in the application of this procedure, as well 
as the respective responsibilities of the Commission and of mem-
ber states. The authors of the Maastricht Treaty thus prepared the 
ground for reforms of one of the central features of the governance 
of the Eurozone’s economic policy: the excessive deficit control pro-
cedure, which details may be amended in the same way as a regula-
tion requiring unanimity of the Council, and not through Treaty 
amendment.
2. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union of 1 March 2012 and the EU 
Treaty. 
From the time of the preparations for the European summit of 9 
December 2011, there has been talk of a “Fiscal compact” for the 
rules and principles which have been embedded in title III of the 
TSCG signed on 1 March 2012, or even for the entire treaty. This 
has generated and still sometimes generates a number of misunder-
standings. Apart from the fact that the word “compact” is far from 
being precise and clear in legal terms – it may apply to a treaty as 
well as to any other kind of binding or even non binding instru-
ment – the expression “fiscal” generates misunderstandings in those 
member states where the word fiscal is not perceived as “involving 
financial matters” as in the English language, but as having to do with 
taxation. In French, for instance, “politique fiscale” has always meant 
“tax policy,” and indeed the Dutch, French, Italian, and Spanish ver-
sions of Title III “Fiscal Compact” of the TSCG of 1 March 2012 
rightly say “begrotingspact,” “pacte budgétaire,” “patto di bilancio,” or 
“pacto presupuestario;” there is no risk of misunderstanding with the 
German “Fiskalpolitischer Pakt” where the word Fiskal has the same 
meaning as the English fiscal.
The Treaty signed by 25 of the 27 EU member states contains four 
series of provisions. 
Title I “Purpose and Scope,” Title II “Consistency and Relationship with 
the Law of the Union,” as well as Title VI “General and final provisions” 
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contain either declaratory statements, underlining that the content 
of the Treaty is not in contradiction with EU law, or the usual techni-
cal clauses which one finds in a treaty. The mere fact that the treaty 
declares its consistency with EU law does not mean that it is indeed 
consistent with the obligations and limitations which the EU treaties 
put onto member states and EU institutions: further examination is 
needed and, in theory at least, nothing can impede a member state 
from bringing the matter to the ECJ on the basis of a procedure for 
EU treaty infringement. Art. 14 (2) provides for entry into force of 
the TSCG on 1 January 2013, provided that twelve member states of 
the Eurozone have ratified it; therefore, the vetoing powers embed-
ded in the EU treaty amendment procedure are set aside. It has to 
be underlined that the TSCG will only be binding for those member 
states that will have ratified it.
Title III contains the specific rules of the “fiscal compact,” Title IV 
those for “economic coordination and convergence,” and Title V those 
for “governance of the euro area.” From a legal perspective, only Title 
III contains innovations which are worth commenting on.
Compared to the existing EU treaty provisions, the “fiscal compact” 
provisions contain two innovations.
First, according to Art. 3 of the TSCG, budgetary deficits should be 
prohibited by member states’ laws, and an appropriate mechanism 
should be included in the relevant legal provisions in order to impede 
government from departing from this “golden rule.” Second, compe-
tence is given to the European Court of Justice to control whether a 
member state has infringed upon its obligation to set up and apply 
legislation for the “golden rule,” and eventually to impose financial 
sanctions upon a member state that persists in infringing upon the 
said obligations. The purpose of this paper is not to evaluate whether 
the “golden rule” system is useful or whether trying to apply it is 
realistic, but to understand if a treaty was needed in order to impose 
such a rule upon the member states.
The parameters to refer to in order to understand whether a treaty 
was necessary in order to establish the “golden rule” and related pro-
129Jacques Ziller
cedures are contained in the treaty clauses and protocols indicated in 
the previous section, i.e., Art. 126 TFEU and Protocol n° 12 on the 
excessive procedure deficit.
As a point of departure, it has to be stressed that according to Art. 
126 (1) TFEU “member states shall avoid excessive government defi-
cits,” whereas according to Art. 3 (1) (a) TSCG “the budgetary posi-
tion of the general government of a Contracting Party shall be balanced 
or in surplus.” At first sight, one might say that the TFEU allows 
a government deficit – as long as it is not excessive – whereas the 
TSCG prohibits any deficit; it is possible, therefore, to argue that a 
treaty reform was needed in order to impose more stringent duties 
upon member states than those foreseen by the EU treaties in their 
Maastricht-Lisbon version. However, this is by far too simplistic a 
way of reasoning. First, one needs to take into account the entire 
text of both the EU treaty provisions and the “fiscal compact” of the 
TSCG in order to understand them; and second, those provisions 
have to be interpreted in the light of the EU’s objective of establish-
ing “an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro.”
Comparing the details of both series of provisions shows that, more 
important than the principle – avoiding excessive government defi-
cits or prohibiting government deficits – the important point is to 
define what has to be understood under “deficit.” As a matter of fact, 
according to Art. 3 (1) (b) TSCG, the prohibition of government 
deficit “shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural 
balance of the general government is at its country-specific medi-
um-term objective, as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, 
with a lower limit of a structural deficit of 0.5% of the gross do-
mestic product at market prices” (emphasis added). According to Art. 
3 (1) (d), the structural deficit may go up to 1% “where the ratio of 
the general government debt to gross domestic product at market prices 
is significantly below 60% and where risks in terms of long-term 
sustainability of public finances are low” (emphasis added). On the 
other hand, according to Art. 126 (2) TFEU, “The Commission shall 
monitor the development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of 
government debt” with regard to “reference values” set out in Protocol 
n° 12. As is well known, the “reference values” chosen by the authors 
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of the Maastricht treaty are “3 % for the ratio of the planned or actual 
government deficit to gross domestic product at market prices” and “60 
% for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market 
prices.”
It seems, therefore, that it might have been possible to simply change 
the reference values of Protocol n° 12 and the definitions included in 
it in order to arrive at the same result – in substance – as sought with 
Art. 3 TSCG. A reform of Protocol n° 12 would not have needed the 
usual treaty amendment procedure to be used – and it would have 
been more difficult for the British Prime Minister to demand that 
treaty reform include changing the existing legal bases for the regula-
tion of financial services in order to replace QMV by unanimity of 
the Council, as David Cameron did on 9 December 2012.
Once the reference values would have been changed in the provisions 
replacing Protocol n° 12, it would have been possible to adopt a di-
rective – based upon the said provisions or, alternatively, a directive 
adopted under the procedure of “enhanced cooperation,”10 which 
is available if 9 Member states want to do so and the Commission 
agrees – that would have imposed the same obligations upon Euro-
zone member states as those imposed by Art. 3 Fiscal compact. 
Second, according to Art. 126 (10) TFEU, “The rights to bring ac-
tions provided for in articles 258 and 259 may not be exercised within 
the framework of paragraphs 1 to 9 of this article.” What this techni-
cal jargon means is that neither the Commission nor member states 
may bring to the ECJ an action for infringement against any mem-
ber state that does not comply with its duties under the “excessive 
deficit procedure.” Art. 126 (10) does not exclude a review by the 
ECJ in matters of excessive deficits: it remains possible for a mem-
ber state’s court to make a referral for preliminary ruling to the ECJ 
in order to obtain an authoritative interpretation of the EU treaties 
and the acts adopted by EU institutions, amongst others, Art. 126 
TFEU, Protocol n° 12 and the measures adopted upon basis of the 
cited provisions, such as the relevant Six-Pack regulations. Until now, 
however, there has been no situation where a member state’s Court 
10 The procedural conditions for establishing such an “enhanced cooperation” 
between at least 9 member states are set up in Art. 20 TEU and 326 to 334 TFEU. 
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was in the position of making such a referral. In the same way, if a 
measure adopted upon the basis of the cited provisions were to be 
relevant in order to solve a dispute by member states’ courts, those 
courts could also make a referral in order to ask the ECJ whether the 
relevant measure is in line with treaty provisions. More important 
than the Court’s competence is the fact that where the Commission 
may exercise the action for infringement (Art. 258 TFEU), it has 
a far more salient power to put pressure upon member states than 
where it can only make recommendations to the Council – as is the 
case under Art. 126 (1) to (9), which establish the principles of the 
excessive deficit procedure. 
Comparing the Eurozone’s governance design to the internal mar-
ket’s governance design, it is clear that the main weakness of the 
first is the fact that final decisions upon a member state’s compli-
ance with its duties is being taken by the government of the member 
states in the Eurozone, instead of being taken by institutions that are 
independent from the member states. What is at stake is neither the 
degree of expertise available to the Commission, to the Council or to 
member states’ governments, nor the individual quality of Commis-
sioners, judges or member states’ ministers, it is the fact that when 
examining their fellow governments’ performance, member states’ 
governments have to face a conflict of interest between their short 
term electoral interests at home and their medium term interests as 
members of the EMU. Both the shift of the burden of qualified ma-
jority voting in the functioning of the Stability and Growth Pact 
that has been introduced by the “Six-Pack” (see below), and Art. 8 
TSCG, have to be understood in the perspective of that main weak-
ness of the Eurozone’s governance design.
According to Art. 8 TSCG, the European Commission will present 
a report on the provisions adopted by each Eurozone member state 
that has ratified the TSCG in order to introduce the “golden rule” 
and accompanying mechanism in its legal system. If the Commis-
sion finds that a member state has failed to comply, “the matter will 
be brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union by one 
or more Contracting Parties.” The reason why the TSCG does not 
stipulate a power for the Commission to bring the matter to the ECJ 
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is that it would be in contradiction with Art. 126 (10) TFEU; such a 
change could only have been introduced by way of EU treaty amend-
ment, with unanimous agreement of all EU member states and rati-
fication by all of them. Art. 8 TSCG further provides that where a 
member state would not adopt the measures to redress its failure to 
comply as declared by a judgement of the ECJ, “it may impose on it 
a lump sum or a penalty payment appropriate in the circumstances and 
that shall not exceed 0.1 % of its gross domestic product. The amounts 
imposed on a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro shall be pay-
able to the European Stability Mechanism. In other cases, payments shall 
be made to the general budget of the European Union.” Too much at-
tention has been given to this latter provision in the media – and to a 
large extent by politicians – with statements according to which the 
ECJ would decide on Eurozone member states’ budgetary deficits. 
What matters is neither the amount nor nature of the lump sum or 
penalty payment, but the fact that such a mechanism further rein-
forces the power of the Commission as an independent institution 
to put pressure on member states’ governments that do not comply 
with their obligations, in the same way as with the internal market’s 
governance design.
The “Six-Pack”11 contains – amongst other provisions – the first seri-
ous attempt to remedy the fundamental weakness of the Eurozone’s 
governance design that has been indicated above. To cut a long story 
short, instead of needing a qualified majority of Eurozone’s member 
states to endorse a Commission’s proposal of sanction on the basis 
of Art. 126 – as was the rule in the past – since 1 January 2012 the 
burden is reversed: it is not any more the Commission’s responsi-
bility to find the necessary number of governments to support its 
proposal of sanction, it is the responsibility of a government that 
disagrees with the Commission proposal to find a qualified majority 
of governments to oppose the proposed sanction; if no such qualified 
majority is found, the Commission’s proposal enters into force.
In contrast to Art. 3 and 8 TSCG, the other clauses of Title III of 
TSCG do not introduce legal innovations with regard to existing 
Eurozone governance rules. Art. 4 TSCG makes an express refer-
11 See references in footnote 2, above. 
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ence to the “Six-Pack” and to the TFEU. Art. 5 TSCG foresees that 
a member State “that is subject to an excessive deficit procedure [...] 
shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme,” 
making however an express statement to the fact that “the content 
and format of such programmes shall be defined in European Union 
law” and that its implementation “will take place within the context 
of the existing surveillance procedures under the Stability and Growth 
Pact.” Last but not least, there is a further attempt to correct the fun-
damental weakness of governance design which has previously been 
described, in Art. 7 TSCG. According to that provision, the Euro-
zone’s member states “commit to supporting the proposals or recommen-
dations submitted by the European Commission.” Such a commitment 
might seem new with respect to the relevant treaty provisions, but 
it is immediately blunted by the following sentence, according to 
which “[t]his obligation shall not apply where it is established [...] that 
a qualified majority of [the relevant governments] [...] is opposed to the 
decision proposed or recommended.”
The new treaty’s provisions on economic policy coordination and 
convergence and on governance of the Euro area do not intro-
duce any significant novelty with respect to existing EU law and 
practice. 
Without going into detail of the provisions of Title IV “Economic 
Policy Coordination and Convergence” TSCG, it may be stated that 
the provisions contained in Arts. 9 to 11 are not contrary to Art. 121 
TFEU, which establishes the procedure for ex-ante coordination of 
the Eurozone’s member states’ economic policies. Art. 9 is anything 
but a precise set of objectives and procedures: it only states that the 
relevant member states “shall take the necessary actions and measures 
in all the areas which are essential to the proper functioning of the euro 
area in pursuit of the objectives of fostering competitiveness, promoting 
employment, contributing further to the sustainability of public finances 
and reinforcing financial stability”; the same may be said from Art. 10, 
according to which the relevant member states will “stand ready to 
make active use, whenever appropriate and necessary, of measures specific 
to those member states whose currency is the euro, as provided for [by the 
TFEU.]” The wording of Art. 11 might seem somewhat more precise 
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in that it says that the relevant member states “ensure that all major 
economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed 
ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. Such 
coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as re-
quired by European Union law”; it is far less detailed, however, than 
the content of the “Six-Pack.” Amongst other innovations, the “Six-
Pack” has introduced a series of new obligations for member states 
to coordinate their economic policy by reviewing their draft budgets 
before submitting the relevant bills to their Parliaments, during the 
“European semester.” One might say that the content of Title IV of 
the TSCG is more like a “press statement” than a legally binding 
instrument.
Title V “Governance of the Euro Area”’ contains the provisions of the 
TSCG which have most necessitated negotiations at the political lev-
el, with some rude battles between Heads of State or Governments 
of Eurozone and non-Eurozone member states. Reading its content 
in the light of previous practice of European Council and Eurogroup 
meetings and of Protocol n° 14 on the Eurogroup, it appears clearly 
that the battle was about prestige, not about substance or procedure. 
Art. 12 goes into the details of how the relevant Heads of State or 
Government of Eurozone member states shall “meet informally in 
Euro Summit meetings” and how those of non-Eurozone member 
states will be from time to time invited to attend such “informal 
meetings.” Obligations relative to “informal” meetings are nothing 
but a legal oxymoron, and at any rate it was by no means necessary 
to adopt a separate treaty in order to set them down; if wanted, a 
regulation adopted under enhanced cooperation procedures would 
have had the same result in legal terms.
Summing up
To sum up: an appropriate legal basis is always needed for EU ac-
tions. The only provisions of the TSCG of 1 March 2012 which 
needed treaty EU reform in order to be introduced are those giving 
the member states power to refer to the ECJ in Art. 8 TSCG. The 
changes introduced by the “Six-Pack” (especially when it comes to 
shifting the burden of QVM) are far more important from an insti-
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tutional point of view than the “Fiscal Compact” Treaty.
3. The Remaining Constraints of EU Primary Law for the Euro-
zone’s Governance.
A quick oversight of the remaining constraints of EU primary law for 
the Eurozone’s governance is indispensable in order to underline the 
boundaries within which further reforms of the governance architec-
ture and procedures could be undertaken without EU treaty change. 
It has to be stressed that a treaty between member states – such as the 
TSCG of 1 March 2012 – cannot set aside the said boundaries. Only 
amendments according to Art. 48 TEU can achieve such a result. In 
other words, qualitative changes in the Eurozone’s governance that 
would go beyond the said boundaries need either full consensus of all 
the governments of EU member states and support by their Parlia-
ments and electorates – even formally speaking, in the case of Den-
mark, Ireland and the UK – or a strong political commitment by 
those governments who would wish to go further, to start anew with 
the EU integration scheme, accepting the risks of implosion of the 
EU as it is now that such a move would imply.
Taking into account that the well known “reference values” of 3% 
and 60% GDP may be changed by an EU regulation or equivalent 
instrument that only necessitates unanimous agreement of govern-
ments at a Council meeting, the remaining constraints on the Eu-
rozone’s governance are mainly those of Art. 122 to 125 and 127 
TFEU, complemented by Protocol n° 4 on the statute of the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
First, Art. 122 TFEU only permits temporary safeguarding measures 
to be taken by the EU institutions and/or member states in cases of 
overwhelming financial or economic crises. The amendment to Art. 
136 TFEU that has been adopted by the European Council on the 
basis of Art. 48 (6) TEU in May 201112 should establish a permanent 
legal basis for member states’ actions such as setting up the “Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism”; this will only happen if all EU member 
12 European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability 
mechanism for Member States whose currency is the Euro, Official Journal of the 
European Union of 6/4/2011 n° L 91, p. 1. 
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states ratify the amendment, which is foreseen to enter into force on 
1 January 2013 at the earliest. 
Second, Art. 125 TFEU establishes the famous “no bail-out” clause, 
which is complemented by a prohibition of direct banking facilities 
to governments (Art. 123 TFEU) and a prohibition of privileged 
access to banking institutions (Art. 123 TFEU). Similar provisions 
are laid down in Protocol n° 4 on the ESCB and ECB. To cut a long 
story short, there are at least three possible interpretations of the “no 
bail out” clause of Art. 125 TFEU, according to which the Union 
and member states “shall not be liable for or assume the commitments 
of [member states governments] without prejudice to mutual financial 
guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.” According to a 
strict interpretation, Art. 125 establishes a prohibition for EU insti-
tutions and member states to guarantee directly or indirectly for the 
consolidated sovereign debt13 of a member state; such an interpreta-
tion would not leave room for the actions that have been hitherto 
undertaken in order to help Greece, Ireland and Portugal during the 
financial crisis; such an interpretation is supported by an important 
part of German legal doctrine. According to a less strict interpre-
tation, Art. 125 only establishes a prohibition against EU institu-
tions and member states guaranteeing directly for the consolidated 
sovereign debt of a member state; it does not prohibit EU institu-
tions or member states from lending money to a member state in 
order to help it finance its consolidated sovereign debt. Such an in-
terpretation is implicitly supported by the Eurozone’s member state 
governments and EU institutions. According to an even less strict 
interpretation, the purpose and scope of Art. 125 TFEU is only to 
protect EU institutions and member states against claims of creditors 
of sovereign debt of another member state; such an interpretation is 
only rarely put forward openly, but was clearly the major reason why 
Germany insisted so much upon a “no-bail out” clause being part of 
the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992. 
13 The words “consolidated sovereign debt” are used for “the commitments of cen-
tral governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed 
by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State” as indicated precisely 
in Art. 125 TFEU and comparable clauses. 
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In theory, only the ECJ, if asked to do so, could choose which inter-
pretation has to prevail. There are two ways according to which the 
Court could be asked such a question. First, one of the EU Institu-
tions or any member state (whether a member of the Eurozone or 
not) could challenge a decision of an EU institution that it would 
deem contrary to the no-bail out clause; any possible body with le-
gal personality that could demonstrate a direct interest in doing so 
could also challenge such a decision. Nothing of the kind has hap-
pened until now, and it has to be borne in mind that an action in 
annulment can only be brought to the court within two months of 
the adoption of the challenged act. Second, a member state’s action 
deemed to be contrary to the no bail-out clause could be challenged 
in two ways: i) the Commission or another member state could start 
an infringement procedure; ii) a national Court could decide upon 
a court procedure against one of its government’s actions deemed to 
be contrary to the no bail-out clause, and the relevant court might 
refer the question of interpretation of Art. 126 to the ECJ. The latter 
type of challenge to a national court has already been triggered in 
Germany, where the Federal Constitutional Court has had to decide 
upon the German participation in the financial stability funds estab-
lished by Eurozone governments in 2010. The German Constitu-
tional Court has, however, been able to avoid referring the question 
of interpretation of Art. 1269 to the ECJ, and will probably do its 
best in the future to find ways and means of avoiding such a referral.
Third, Art. 127 TFEU and Protocol n° 4 are setting up the objec-
tives and tasks of the ECB. Any change in these objectives and tasks 
would need a treaty reform according to Art. 48 TEU. The major 
point for legal discussion is the balance to be observed between the 
first primary objective – “maintain price stability” – and secondary 
objectives – “support the general economic policies in the Union with 
a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union 
as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.” Suffice 
it to say that, whereas there are discussions about the substance of 
these objectives and their balance not only between politicians, be-
tween economists, but also between legal scholars, one may easily 
bet that Courts, and especially the ECJ, would not enter into such 
a debate and would most probably state that the choices to be made 
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are within the boundaries of discretion of the relevant institutions 
and authorities.
Summing up.
The only provisions of TSCG of 1 March 2012 which needed treaty 
EU reform are those giving the Commission (and member states) 
power to refer to the ECJ in Art. 8 TSCG.
The changes introduced by the “Six-Pack” (including shifting the 
burden of QVM) are far more important from an institutional point 
of view than the “Fiscal compact” Treaty; these have been made us-
ing EU secondary legislation based upon the existing clauses of the 
treaties.
The remaining constraints of EU primary law for the Eurozone’s gov-
ernance have as consequences that further significant steps towards a 
federal economic policy would need further Treaty reform.
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Treaty Games - Law as 
Instrument and as Constraint in 
the Euro Crisis Policy
Bruno De Witte
1. Introduction
This paper deals with the role of law, and in particular the role of 
treaties, in the attempts made by EU institutions and governments 
of the EU member states to deal with the sovereign debt crisis during 
the past two years (April 2010-April 2012).1 Once it was decided, 
under the pressure of events, that common policy responses were 
needed, the use of legal instruments came fairly naturally, as most 
public policies require legal change for their implementation.2 In this 
particular case, though, questions arose again and again as to which 
kind of legal instruments should be chosen: soft law instruments 
(such as the Euro Plus Pact), EU legislation (such as the five Regula-
tions and one Directive collectively known as the ‘Six Pack’), or the 
conclusion of international treaties. 
1 This text was completed on 2 May 2012 and does not reflect later developments. 
2 This does not exclude, of course, the use of other policy instruments that do not 
involve legal change. To give one prominent example from the sovereign debt crisis, 
the policy decision of the European Central Bank to create massive lending facilities 
for private banks was adopted and implemented in the framework of its existing 
powers and did not require legal change. 
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The particular theme of this paper is why and how the treaty instru-
ment (including the amendment of the existing Treaties) was chosen 
on four different occasions in the course of the past two years. The 
choice of that instrument has particular advantages and drawbacks, 
compared to other legal instruments, and that choice can therefore 
be interpreted as a policy game involving the interaction of strategic 
actors, principally – in this case – the governments of the EU mem-
ber states. Like all games, treaty games are subject to a number of 
rules of the game: there are conditions to be fulfilled for states to be 
allowed to conclude treaties on certain subjects (in view of the con-
straints of their EU membership), and there are consequences that 
derive from opting for the conclusion of a treaty. In that respect, law 
has not only acted as an instrument of Euro crisis policy, pliant to 
the wishes and often irrational hopes of governments and EU insti-
tutions, but it has also acted, and continues to act, as a constraint for 
that Euro crisis policy.   
The four treaties that were concluded in the context of the sovereign 
debt crisis are the following:
(1) A Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Euro Area countries of 10 May 2010 by which they agreed to set 
up a provisional European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 
Although this document is not called ‘treaty,’ it is in fact a bind-
ing international agreement and was treated as such by the na-
tional governments and parliaments.3 This agreement immedi-
ately entered into force. The EFSF, which was based on it, took 
the unusual form of a company of private law based in Luxem-
bourg, of which the 17 Euro states are the shareholders, and the 
company then concluded a ‘framework agreement’ with its 17 
shareholders, defining its mandate. 
(2)  An amendment of Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) to allow Euro area countries 
3 The term ‘international treaty’ is, in fact, a shorthand denomination for all writ-
ten agreements whereby the participating states (or international organisations)  
lay down legally binding obligations, whatever the actual name of the instrument. 
Thus, treaties can be called ‘convention,’ ‘agreement,’ ‘pact,’ ‘charter,’ or – as here 
– ‘decision of the representatives of governments,’ but they all share the same basic 
legal regime laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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to set up a permanent financial stability mechanism, which was 
adopted on 25 March 2011. This amendment is formally speak-
ing not an international treaty but a unanimous decision of the 
European Council; but since its intended effect is to modify an 
existing provision of the TFEU, and since that modification will 
itself have the force of a Treaty norm, we can include it in our 
examination. This Treaty amendment has not yet entered into 
force, because it must first be approved by all 27 EU member 
states according to their own constitutional requirements.
(3) A Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM 
Treaty), concluded on 1 February 2012 between the 17 Euro 
area countries, which uses the ‘permission’ granted by the TFEU 
amendment mentioned above.  The ESM is intended to replace 
the EFSF but the ESM Treaty had not yet entered into force at 
the time of writing.
(4) A Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (often called ‘Fiscal Compact’), 
concluded on 2 March 2012 between the 17 Euro area countries 
and 8 further EU member states. This Treaty has not yet entered 
into force either.
Two characteristics of the ‘treaty games’ appear already from this list-
ing.
The first characteristic is that treaties are, normally speaking, two-
step legal processes: they are first negotiated and signed by the state 
parties when they have agreed on the content, but they must after-
wards be ratified by each state in order for that state to be formally 
bound by the treaty. This requirement allows for the text, which was 
negotiated by the government, to be approved by the national par-
liament or to be submitted to other legal checks (for example, by a 
constitutional court) before it becomes binding on the participating 
countries. The entry into force of the treaty is often made dependent 
on ratification by all states, but not necessarily so (numbers 3 and 4 
are both exceptions to that rule, as we shall see). Also, it is occasion-
ally possible for international treaties to enter into force immediately, 
without the need for prior approval by national parliaments, as was 
the case with number 1. 
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The second characteristic is the difference in the number and identity 
of the state parties to those treaties. Indeed, whereas the amendment 
of Article 136 TFEU was agreed to necessarily by all 27 member 
states, the Fiscal Compact was concluded between 25 EU states, and 
the other two agreements were concluded among the 17 Euro states 
only. Thus, one of the games consisted in using treaties to organise 
the differentiation between the Euro area states and the rest of the 
EU countries.
This chapter will proceed as follows. In Section 2, I will briefly recall 
the general role played by treaties in the European integration pro-
cess, as a background to the discussion of their use in the context of 
the sovereign debt crisis. In Section 3, I will examine the reasons why 
the ‘choice for a treaty’ was made, on four different occasions, during 
the unfolding of the Euro crisis; in this context, I will also highlight 
the legal constraints that determine or preclude the use of the treaty 
instrument. In Section 4, I will examine the legal consequences that 
derive from the choice, in those four cases, of the treaty instrument. 
In Section 5, I will conclude with a general discussion of the role 
played by the ‘treaty games’ in the crisis responses of the past two 
years.   
2. The Role of Treaties in the European Integration Process
International treaties form, on the one hand, the very basis of the 
European Union’s integration process; and, on the other hand, they 
have occasionally been used as ancillary instruments of European 
integration, in the margin of the European Union’s central institu-
tional framework.
The basis for the EU’s institutional system is formed by the so-called 
founding Treaties, currently named the TEU and TFEU. In that 
sense, the European Union remains, formally speaking, an interna-
tional organisation. Although those Treaties have been frequently 
and profoundly modified since they were first concluded (the TEU 
finds its origins in the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, and the TFEU 
in the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community of 
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1957, but both of them have been modified beyond recognition), 
those revisions have been marked by the rigidity of the Treaty amend-
ment process, which requires the agreement of all the member state 
governments followed by the individual ratification by each of them. 
The failure of one or more states to ratify a treaty revision may lead to 
the postponement of its entry into force, as happened with the Treaty 
of Lisbon after the first Irish referendum in 2008, or to its complete 
demise, as happened after the negative referenda on the Constitu-
tional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, in 2005. The Treaties 
continue to be particularly rigid instruments. They contain a wealth 
of fairly detailed rules constraining the day-to-day operation of the 
EU institutions and of the member states, and therefore the need 
or will to modify those detailed rules is bound to arise frequently 
with evolving political circumstances. And yet, such modifications 
are made very difficult by the unanimity rule which implies that all 
Treaty amendments must be agreed to unanimously by all 27 gov-
ernments, and must then be approved, in one way or the other, by 
the domestic institutions (including, in any case, the national parlia-
ment) of each country. Therefore, the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in December 2009, after a cumbersome ratification process of 
more than two years, was marked by a huge sense of relief from the 
side of the EU governments, and they expressed a strong preference 
for not opening up new treaty negotiations in the foreseeable future. 
In addition to forming the legal backbone of the European Union’s 
operation, international treaties have also been used as ancillary legal 
instruments, giving legal support to the cooperation of some or all 
of the member states in the margins of the EU institutional frame-
work. At the time the European Communities were created, one 
such agreement entered into force almost simultaneously, namely the 
Treaty establishing the Benelux Economic Union (1958). The EEC 
Treaty contained an express reference to it that basically authorized 
this partial agreement, whose content overlapped considerably with 
the EEC Treaty, as long as it went further than EEC law and none 
of its legal rules conflicted with EEC law. This explicit authorization 
is still in the Treaties today, namely in Article 350 TFEU. Later on, 
there were other examples, of which the most well-known were the 
Schengen Agreement and Schengen Convention that were initially 
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concluded between a limited number of member states, but whose 
membership later expanded without ever including all the EU coun-
tries. 
If one looks more closely at these partial international agreements 
(that is, agreements concluded between less than all the EU member 
states), two categories can be distinguished:
1. Special interest agreements, when some member states have a 
special interest in something which the others do not share. Take, 
for example, the protection of the environment of the Alps: only 
the member states whose territory is part of the Alps have an 
interest in concluding such an agreement, but the others do not.
2. ‘Move forward’ agreements that try to push forward the agenda 
of European integration when not all member states are ready to 
do so; this was the case with the Schengen treaties and this is the 
case now again with the Fiscal Compact. Not all countries are 
prepared to take this (alleged) step forward in integration, and 
the conclusion of a separate international agreement allows the 
others to circumvent this opposition.
Partial international agreements between member states of the EU 
are allowed, but only within the limits set by EU law obligations.4 
Briefly said, this means that such agreements may not be concluded 
in areas of exclusive EU competence (e.g., in the field of external 
trade, or of monetary policy as far as the Euro area countries are 
concerned), that they may not affect the normal operation of the EU 
institutions (this is the so-called duty of sincere cooperation) and 
that they may not include any provisions that conflict with EU law.
3. The Unfolding of the Treaty Games
In this section, I will examine, case by case, how each of the four 
international agreements came into being, and in particular how the 
4 For a discussion of those limits, see B. De Witte, ‘Old-fashioned Flexibility: 
International Agreements between Member States of the European Union,’ in G. 
de Búrca and J. Scott (eds), Constitutional Change in the EU – From Uniformity 
to Flexibility? (2000) 31. See also the study by L.S. Rossi, Le convenzioni fra gli 
Stati membri dell’Unione europea (2000). 
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choice for an international agreement came to prevail over alterna-
tive legal instruments.
The Creation of the EFSF
When the Greek sovereign debt crisis erupted for the first time, in 
the spring of 2010, it triggered a twofold policy response at the Euro-
pean level. On the one hand, the Council of the EU adopted a Reg-
ulation establishing a European financial stabilization mechanism 
(EFSM) based on Article 122(2) TFEU.5 Article 122(2), whose text 
dates from the Maastricht Treaty, allows the Union to grant finan-
cial assistance to a Member State that ‘is in difficulties or seriously 
threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or ex-
ceptional occurrences beyond its control.’ At the same Council ses-
sion of 9 May, the ministers of the Euro area countries, wearing their 
intergovernmental hats, adopted a Decision in which they commit-
ted themselves to support a separate and additional loan and credit 
mechanism.6 That mechanism, called the European Financial Stabil-
ity Facility (EFSF), was established soon after as a so-called Special 
Purpose Vehicle – in legal terms, a private company established in 
Luxembourg but jointly controlled by the Euro area states. In terms 
of its lending and guarantee capacity, the EFSF, with a total amount 
of 440 billion Euro, far outstripped the EFSM which has an EU 
budget guarantee amounting to only 60 billion Euro. The operation 
of the EFSF was limited by the founders to a period of three years. 
 
Why was this two-pronged approach chosen in May 2010? The main 
reason seems to have been that the EU-law instrument (the EFSM) 
was insufficiently powerful to deal with the crisis. In view of its limit-
ed and strongly earmarked budgetary resources, the European Union 
5 Council Regulation 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial 
stabilization mechanism, OJ 2010, L 118/1. 
6 The Decision has the following baroque denomination: Decision of the Repre-
sentatives of the Governments of the Euro Area Member States Meeting Within 
the Council of the European Union. See Council document 9614/10 of 10 May 
2010, accessible on the public register of Council documents. There is a long-
standing practice of government representatives ‘switching hats’ during a Council 
meeting and adopting decisions qua states rather than qua Council members, but 
this phenomenon is quite unusual in a context of enhanced cooperation such as 
this one, namely limited to the Euro area countries. 
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itself does not possess sufficient ‘firepower’ to deal with a massive 
sovereign debt crisis. Also, by having recourse to the EU budget, the 
non-Euro countries are indirectly called to fund an operation which 
aims at ensuring the stability of the Euro area. The United Kingdom, 
in particular, was less than keen to spend large amounts of EU money 
to support Greece; hence, the decision to ‘go outside’ the institution-
al framework of the European Union, and to build a more power-
ful financial guarantee instrument by means of a separate agreement 
between the Euro area countries themselves. However, negotiating a 
fully-fledged international treaty would not have been practical, in 
view of the urgency of the required policy response. Therefore, rather 
than concluding a formal treaty, the Euro states concluded what is 
known in the jargon of international law as an executive agreement, 
that is an agreement that is immediately operational upon signature 
by the (governmental) representatives of the states without the need 
to go through ratification by their national parliaments. Of course, 
this mechanism cannot be used to circumvent the domestic separa-
tion of powers. Therefore, it is only permissible – under the constitu-
tional law of most European states – to the extent that no important 
new legal obligations or limitations of sovereignty are incurred by 
the agreement. In the particular case, the argument could be made 
that setting up the EFSF, by itself, did not create commitments for 
the participating states but only the actual loans made by the EFSF 
which could form the object of separate ex ante authorizations or ex 
post approvals by the parliaments, depending on the applicable rules 
in each state.
The Amendment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
On 25 March 2011, the European Council adopted a decision aim-
ing at the amendment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union by the addition of a new paragraph to Article 136 of that 
Treaty. The additional paragraph, consisting of two short sentences, 
runs as follows:
“3. The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a 
stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the 
stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required 
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financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict 
conditionality.”7
Since this is an amendment of the TFEU, it can – according to Ar-
ticle 48 TEU – enter into force only if approved by the 27 member 
states of the EU according to their own constitutional requirements 
and procedures. The European Council, in Article 2 of its decision of 
25 March, indicated that it shall enter into force on 1 January 2013, 
provided that all the national approval procedures have successfully 
been accomplished by that time. This amendment constitutes the 
first use of one of the two so-called simplified revision procedures 
that were introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.
The simplified revision procedure used on this occasion, that of Arti-
cle 48 paragraph 6, has a rather broad scope. It applies to all amend-
ments of ‘Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union relating to the internal policies and action of the Union,’ 
which means altogether some 171 treaty articles – but subject to one 
major exception: if the proposed amendment of an internal policy 
provision leads to an increase in the European Union’s competences, 
then the ordinary revision procedure will have to be used instead. 
It might not always be clear, though, whether a proposed amend-
ment will increase the Union’s competences, so there might be some 
contestation in the future on whether the use of this procedure is 
appropriate. Upon closer examination of the procedure prescribed 
by paragraph 6, it soon appears that this is not really a simplified pro-
cedure at all. It is true that there is no need for a Convention or an 
Intergovernmental Conference to negotiate the treaty amendment; 
the amendment will rather be adopted directly by the European 
Council acting by unanimity of its members. But that decision is 
still subject to ‘approval’ by each member state under its own consti-
tutional requirements. One may expect these constitutional require-
ments to involve, in most if not all member states, a consultation of 
the national parliament and probably also a positive vote of approval 
by the parliament, and nothing prevents the states from also calling a 
7 European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability 
mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro, OJ 2011, L 91/1 of 6 
April 2011. 
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referendum on the proposed treaty change. Therefore, this procedure 
has the appearance of simplicity (since it does not involve the formal 
conclusion of a revision treaty), but in political terms it is almost as 
complex an enterprise as the ‘ordinary’ revision procedure.   
Why was this Treaty amendment deemed to be a necessary instru-
ment of the European response to the sovereign debt crisis? From 
a legal point of view, there were ‘constitutional’ problems with the 
package that had been adopted previously, in May 2010. On the 
one hand, it was not entirely certain whether the intergovernmental 
measures taken by the euro countries (namely, the creation of the 
EFSF) complied with the TFEU rule that prohibits EU states from 
giving financial support to each other (the so-called ‘no-bailout’ rule 
of Article 125 TFEU). It could be argued that a mechanism of lend-
ing money subject to severe conditionality, as was put in place for 
Greece and through the EFSF, is not caught by this prohibition of 
giving direct financial support, but there were some lingering doubts 
about that interpretation. Moreover, the creation of the EFSF on the 
basis of an executive agreement, rather than a formal treaty subject 
to parliamentary ratification, could seem dubious from a national 
constitutional law perspective. As for the EU Regulation creating 
the EFSM, there were doubts as to its legality under Article 122(2) 
TFEU. In particular, it might be argued that Greece and Ireland 
were not facing exceptional occurrences beyond their control (as the 
text of Art 122 requires), since their governments had contributed to 
creating the sovereign debt crises which they were facing. 
Those legal controversies worried the German government, since 
complaints had been lodged before the German Constitutional 
Court challenging the existing arrangements. Given the erratic re-
cord of the court of Karlsruhe, the government did not feel entirely 
confident about the outcome of those complaints.8 So, it is because 
of the legally controversial and shaky basis of the financial stability 
regime created in May 2010, that the member states, later in 2010, 
came to envisage a TFEU amendment that would provide a firm 
basis for a permanent crisis mechanism replacing the exceptional and 
8 For a discussion of the German constitutional law perspective, see D. Thym, 
‘Euro-Rettungsschirm: zwischenstaatliche Rechtskonstruktion und verfassungsgeri-
chtliche Kontrolle,’ Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2011) 167-171. 
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legally uncertain EFSM and EFSF. Indeed, that treaty amendment 
could seem to solve both legal problems mentioned above. By insert-
ing an explicit provision in the TFEU which authorizes the Euro 
area member states to put in place a financial support mechanism 
for countries in budgetary and financial trouble, the effect of the 
bail-out prohibition of Article 125 TFEU would be neutralized by a 
complementary norm with the same treaty rank. At the same time, 
the intergovernmental nature of the future mechanism means that 
the legally ‘risky’ EU Regulation could be discontinued after 2013, 
thus cutting short the possible constitutional challenges before the 
German Constitutional Court or elsewhere in Europe.
The hypothesis of a limited treaty amendment had first been mooted 
by German chancellor Merkel in March 2010 but had been greeted 
with much skepticism by the other EU governments who were rather 
horrified by the prospect of engaging in a new Treaty revision process 
only a few months after the Lisbon Treaty had finally come into op-
eration. However, in the autumn of 2010, the German government 
managed to convince the French government, as emerged from a 
joint Franco-German declaration made in Deauville, on 18 October 
2010, in which the two countries considered ‘that an amendment of 
the treaties is needed and that the President of the European Council 
should be asked to present (...) concrete options allowing the estab-
lishment of a robust crisis resolution framework before (...) March 
2011.’ 9
Ten days later, at the European Council meeting of 28-29 Octo-
ber 2010, general agreement was found among all the 27 on ‘the 
need for Member States to establish a permanent crisis mechanism 
to safeguard the financial stability of the Euro area as a whole’ and 
the President of the European Council was invited ‘to undertake 
consultations with the members of the European Council on a lim-
ited treaty change required to that effect, not modifying Article 125 
TFEU (‘no bail-out’ clause).’10 The last part of the sentence resulted 
from the discussions among the EU governments, and meant that 
9 See P.M. Kaczynski and P. ó Broin, From Lisbon to Deauville: Practicalities of 
the Lisbon Treaty Revision(s), CEPS Policy Brief No. 216, October 2010. 
10 Conclusions of the European Council of 28-29 October 2010, EUCO 25/10, 
p. 2. 
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the treaty amendment, rather than deleting the no-bail out clause, 
would take the form of a separate rule to be put alongside that clause. 
Most importantly, the formulation adopted by the European Coun-
cil expressed a preference for a crisis mechanism to be established 
by the member states of the Euro area rather than by the European 
Union itself. This choice paved the way for the use of the simplified 
revision procedure of Art 48(6). Since the amendment would relate 
to the ‘internal policies’ part of the TFEU and since it would not 
increase the competences of the Union, the conditions for the use of 
the simplified procedure of Article 48(6) TEU were met. 
Following the political agreement of 28-29 October, a draft text of the 
amending Decision was prepared for adoption by the next European 
Council meeting on 16-17 December.11 This draft Decision then 
formed the basis for the consultation of the European Parliament, 
the Commission and the European Central Bank, as prescribed by 
the text of Article 48(6) TEU.12 When examining the draft European 
Council decision, the European Parliament proposed some changes 
which aimed at inscribing a complementary role for the European 
Union institutions in the text of the new Article 136, in particular 
by stating that the principles and rules for the conditionality of fi-
nancial assistance under the mechanism should be determined by an 
EU regulation adopted under co-decision.13 This, however, would 
have implied that the Treaty amendment would have conferred new 
competences on the European Union and, hence, the simplified revi-
sion procedure would no longer have been available. The European 
Council, at its March 2011 meeting, decided not to modify a word 
of the draft decision which it had adopted in December 2010 and 
not to mention the EU institutions at all, but instead the European 
11 Conclusions of the European Council of 16-17 December 2010, EUCO 
30/10, Annex 1. 
12 Consultation of the Commission and the EP is required in all cases of recourse 
to the simplified revision procedure of Art 48(6). Consultation of the ECB is re-
quired by Art 48(6) only ‘in the case of institutional changes in the monetary area.’ 
13 For the text of the amendments proposed by the EP, see the annex to the Reso-
lution of the European Parliament of 23 March 2011, Amendment of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for 
Member States whose currency is the euro. 
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Council adopted ‘further particulars’ relating to the future ESM14 
which provide for a close involvement of the Commission in the 
ESM’s eventual operation. The Commission would be called to act 
as an ‘agent’ of an intergovernmental cooperation system.
The ESM Treaty
The choice of establishing the permanent stability mechanism by 
means of an international treaty followed logically from the TFEU 
amendment discussed above. The fact that the amendment indicated 
that the mechanism would be established by the Euro states (and not 
by the EU itself ) left no other choice than the use of an international 
treaty. To that extent, the choice for the international treaty instru-
ment needs no further explanation. What is surprising, however, is 
the sequencing between the two operations. Since, at least for the 
German government, the TFEU amendment was to be a precondi-
tion for the lawful creation of the permanent mechanism, one could 
have expected that the treaty establishing that mechanism would be 
adopted only after the TFEU amendment would have safely passed 
the national approval hurdles and been ready to enter into force. 
But this is not what happened. On the contrary, the adoption and 
ratification of the ESM Treaty have taken place in parallel with the 
ratification of the TFEU amendment.  
The very same European Council meeting of March 2011 at which 
the TFEU amendment was adopted also saw the adoption of the 
main lines of the future mechanism. It was confirmed, in the Con-
clusions of that European Council meeting, that the ESM would be 
established by means of a treaty among the Euro-area Member States 
as an intergovernmental organization under public international 
law with its seat in Luxembourg.15 Shortly afterwards, negotiations 
started on the text of the treaty setting up the ESM. A first text was 
agreed to in June 2011, and was subsequently twice revised due to 
the unfolding of the crisis. Eventually, the latest version signed in 
March 2012 by the 17 governments of the Euro area,16 was opened 
14 Those further particulars are called the ‘Term sheet on the ESM’ and are pub-
lished in Annex II of the European Council Conclusions of 24-25 March 2011. 
15 Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2011, p. 22. 
16 For the text of this treaty, see www.european-council.europa.eu/
media/582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf 
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up for ratification by each country according to its internal arrange-
ments, and this process is now in full swing. Given the proximity in 
time and subject matter with the Fiscal Compact, most of the Euro 
countries’ parliaments decided to examine the two international trea-
ties as a single political package.
The Fiscal Compact
This treaty intends to reinforce the financial stability of the Euro 
area through a stricter coordination of the national budget policies, 
including the definition of benchmarks for structural deficit and 
debt-to-GDP ratio, and a judicial enforcement mechanism for non-
compliance with such benchmarks. The Fiscal Compact requires a 
legal commitment by each State Party to a balanced budget and the 
provision, in the event of significant deviations, of an automatic cor-
rection mechanism to be implemented at the national level.17 
There was, arguably, no strict need to adopt a new treaty to imple-
ment what is contained in the text of the Fiscal Compact. Most of 
what it contains in terms of economic governance at the European 
level could have been adopted through enhanced cooperation within 
the EU or by means of a modification of Protocol No. 12 on the ex-
cessive deficit procedure. The treaty confirms the creation of the Euro 
Summit and also provides for a new body, the Meeting of the Heads 
of State or Government of the Contracting Parties, whose member-
ship will reflect the number of states that will eventually ratify the 
Fiscal Compact, but whose role is limited to loosely monitoring the 
implementation of the Fiscal Compact. Those bodies will operate in 
an informal manner. No new hard governance mechanisms are intro-
duced at the European level. The core of the new treaty and its real 
novelty, also in terms of democratic practice, lies elsewhere, namely 
in the introduction of the ‘golden rule’: the obligation to introduce 
into national law (preferably constitutional) the new budgetary lim-
its defined in Article 3, para. 1, in particular a ‘structural’ deficit not 
exceeding 0.5% of the GDP. Again, this could have been achieved 
legally speaking by means of EU legislation, if necessary adopted 
by means of the ‘enhanced cooperation’ mode of decision-making 
17 The text of this treaty can be found on www.european-council.europa.eu/
eurozone-governance/treaty-on-stability 
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in which not all EU states must participate. However, it was made 
very clear by the German government (that acted once more as the 
agenda-setter for this treaty), in the course of the autumn of 2011, 
that the circumstances required nothing less than a treaty. Compared 
to EU legislation, a treaty could seem to have two advantages: first, 
it could be adopted more quickly, since it only requires an agree-
ment between the member state governments without the need to 
involve the Commission and European Parliament as the EU leg-
islative procedure does. And secondly, a commitment to budgetary 
stability seemed more solemn and more permanent if contained in 
a treaty which cannot be ‘bent’ later on, whereas EU legislation was 
more liable to be ‘softened.’ Therefore, making a treaty seemed to be 
the appropriate symbolic message of strong resolve which the unruly 
financial markets required in the autumn of 2011.
The kind of treaty norm that the German government, and later also 
the French government, had in mind was a formal amendment of the 
TFEU like the one adopted in March 2011 (on which, see above). 
But this would have required the unanimous agreement of all EU 
member states.  At the December 2011 summit, as is well known, 
the UK government refused to agree on such a TFEU amendment 
given that the (unrelated) conditions which it had put forward had 
not been accepted by the other governments. During the European 
Council meeting itself, the other governments, led by the French-
German tandem, decided instantaneously to ‘exit’ from the EU insti-
tutional framework, and to go for a separate international agreement 
instead, so as to circumvent the British veto. They did not take time 
to consider whether, given the impossibility of a TFEU amendment, 
the wisest course might have been to adopt EU legislation through 
enhanced cooperation, rather than take the risk of engaging in this 
new and unpredictable treaty game.18 Indeed, negotiating an inter-
national treaty may be a quick process (25 EU states did rapidly 
agree on the text of this Fiscal Compact in the following month), but 
it does not benefit from the special qualities of EU law and its entry 
18 Various legal and policy options had been put on the table of the European 
Council by its President in his note of 6 December 2011, Towards a Stronger 
Economic Union – Interim Report, but the one option he did not mention was 
the conclusion of a separate international agreement outside the EU framework! 
For an evocation of the political circumstances of the December meeting of the 
European Council that eventually led to the choice for a separate treaty, see ‘The 
European Union and the euro – Game, set and mismatch’, The Economist 17 
December 2011, 43-46.  
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into force is fraught with difficulties. This leads us to the question of 
the legal consequences following from the choice for an international 
treaty, which we will consider in the next section.
4. Legal Consequences of Treaty-Making
Inside or Outside the EU Legal Order
The EU legal order is formed by the basic treaties (the TEU and 
TFEU), and by the so-called secondary law adopted by the EU in-
stitutions, that is all the legal acts (whether they are called directives, 
regulations, decisions, guidelines, recommendations, etc…) that are 
adopted by the institutions of the EU in accordance with the Trea-
ties and that embody the European Union’s policies.  Those legal acts 
are adopted in accordance with the procedures fixed by the Treaties, 
and their legal effects are determined by those same Treaties as inter-
preted by the Court of Justice.  
The advantages of ‘stepping outside’ the EU legal framework, and 
concluding a separate international agreement (as has happened 
three times in the context of the euro crisis), are readily apparent. By 
concluding a separate agreement, its signatories can bypass veto posi-
tions for single countries that may exist under EU law. Thus, the de-
cision – taken at the European Council meeting of December 2011 
– to abandon the plan to negotiate an amendment of the TFEU 
and instead conclude a separate international agreement, offered the 
immediate benefit of circumventing the veto expressed by the UK 
government. The main disadvantage of the non-EU treaty route is, 
of course, that the special qualities of EU law are lost, namely the 
relatively democratic and transparent mode of decision-making (at 
least if compared to purely intergovernmental decision-making), and 
the capacity to make the rules ‘stick’ by means of a relatively efficient 
judicial enforcement system.
The main legal condition for the conclusion of such separate agree-
ments is that their content should be compatible with EU law. The 
Fiscal Compact offers such a conflict rule in its Article 2(2): ‘The 
provisions of this Treaty shall apply insofar as they are compatible 
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with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European 
Union law.’ This is a mobile conflict rule: it recognizes not only the 
primacy of EU law as it stands today but also as it might become in 
the future: if, for example, new provisions of secondary EU law will 
be enacted that conflict with the Fiscal Compact, they will prevail. 
There is much controversy about the possibility to ‘borrow’ the EU 
institutions under an international agreement. There is a major dif-
ference to be made, in this respect, between the Court of Justice and 
the other institutions. Article 273 TFEU allows the member states to 
submit to the Court of Justice, “under a special agreement between 
the parties,” “any dispute between Member States which relates to 
the subject matter of the Treaties.” The subject matter of the Fiscal 
Compact is indeed closely connected to the TEU and TFEU, and 
Article 8(3) of the FCT is expressly declared to be a ‘special agree-
ment’ in the sense of Article 273 TFEU, so that the ‘use’ of the Court 
of Justice to enforce the international law obligations contained in 
the Fiscal Compact is justified. Similarly, in Article 37(3) of the ESM 
Treaty, it is stated that disputes between ESM member states about 
the application of the Treaty shall be submitted to the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union.
But how to justify the involvement of other EU institutions than 
the Court, which occurs to a limited extent in both the ESM Treaty 
and the Fiscal Compact? According to Article 13(2) TEU, the EU 
institutions shall act within the limits of the powers given to them 
under ‘the Treaties’ (meaning the TEU and the TFEU, and no other 
treaties). This would be a strong textual argument for the view that it 
is not possible to give any new competences to the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Council under separate international agreements. 
One way, though, to make sense of this is to distinguish between 
‘competences’ and ‘tasks.’ What Article 13 TEU seeks to convey is 
that the competences of the institutions are fixed by the treaties; it 
does not exclude that extra tasks may be given to the institutions 
as long as those tasks fit within their competences. To explain this 
difference, a parallel can be made with secondary EU legislation, by 
which new tasks are often given to the Commission and the Council, 
e.g., to further implement a piece of legislation. Those tasks fit within 
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the general constitutional mandate of those institutions but they are 
extra tasks, in the sense that they are not specified in so many words 
in the Treaties but are being gradually defined as EU law develops. In 
the present case, this gradual development occurs not through sec-
ondary legislation but through a separate international agreement. 
Now, do those extra tasks defined by the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal 
Compact fit within their constitutional competences, as defined by 
the TEU and TFEU? This would indeed seem to be the case: within 
the context of their competences in the field of Economic Union, as 
recently fleshed out by the ‘six-pack’ legislation, the institutions will 
also perform the tasks which are attributed to them under the ESM 
Treaty and the Fiscal Compact.19
The Ratification Requirement
Most treaties must, after their signature, be separately ratified by 
each participating state. This is not a whimsical complication, but 
a consequence mandated by the national constitutional law of most 
states. Indeed, most European constitutions nowadays require that 
international treaties of some importance must be approved by the 
national parliament before the government can actually declare that 
the state will be bound by the treaty; this is to avoid the govern-
ment undermining the parliament’s legislative powers ‘through the 
backdoor’ by agreeing to legal obligations or transfers of sovereignty 
through the negotiation of an international treaty. 
 
This requirement weakens the effectiveness of the treaty instrument, 
since its effects are delayed in time. Also, it remains uncertain wheth-
er the original agreement that led to the signature of the treaty will 
stick, or whether one or more of the signatories will be unable to 
honour their pledge through their failure to ratify the treaty. The rea-
son for the failure to ratify might be the refusal by the national par-
liament to approve the treaty, but there can be other reasons as well. 
The content of the treaty may require a constitutional amendment in 
one or other countries, which may entail the mandatory organisation 
of a popular referendum; this is happening in Ireland with the Fiscal 
19 For further discussion of those legal issues, see ‘Editorial comments – some 
thoughts concerning the Draft Treaty on a Reinforced Economic Union,’ Com-
mon Market Law Review (2012) 1-14. 
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Compact: its ratification is considered to require an amendment of 
the Irish constitution and hence the organisation of a referendum 
which will take place on 31 May 2012. Or ratification of the treaty 
may be stopped by a decision of the national constitutional court, as 
was attempted in Germany. Or there may be a change of government 
after signature, and the new government may be unwilling to pro-
ceed with ratification of the treaty text as it stands; this could happen 
with the Fiscal Compact in France where presidential candidate Hol-
lande has announced that he would request une renégociation, which 
he could try to force upon the other signatory states by refusing to 
ratify the current text.
We find ourselves now in the middle of the ratification process for 
three of the four instruments: the amendment of article 136 TFEU, 
to be approved by all 27 member states; the ESM treaty, to be rati-
fied by the 17 euro states; and the Fiscal Compact, to be ratified by 
25 states. Given the proximity of their subject matter, it is likely that 
parliamentary debates and votes will run in parallel. For example, 
the Slovenian parliament ratified the Fiscal Compact and the ESM 
Treaty on the same day of 19 April 2012.20 
The hazardous nature of the national ratification process is well 
known from earlier revisions of the EU Treaties. The ratification of 
the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Nice, the Constitutional Trea-
ty and the Lisbon Treaty were all very laborious; three of them re-
quired a repetition of a popular referendum in one country, and the 
Constitutional Treaty never came into being because of ratification 
problems. As regards revisions of the founding Treaties (TEU and 
TFEU), the ratification by every single member state is a precondi-
tion for their entry into force, which gives each country a veto right, 
although the effectiveness of that veto depends also on political fac-
tors such as the size of the country: when France and the Netherlands 
proved unable to ratify the Constitutional Treaty, that treaty was 
abandoned; but when Denmark proved unable to ratify the Maas-
tricht Treaty, and Ireland unable to ratify the Nice Treaty and Lisbon 
Treaty, in each case those countries were ‘invited’ to try again after 
20 See www.sloveniatimes.com/parliament-ratifies-fiscal-compact, consulted on 24 
April 2012. 
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having obtained some limited political concessions.21 The same dif-
ficulty applies to the current amendment of Article 136 TFEU. Even 
though it took place by means of the so-called simplified revision 
procedure – that is, by means of a European Council decision rather 
than a formal treaty – the separate approval by each of the 27 mem-
ber states is still required, so that this Treaty change is at the mercy of 
an incident in one or other member states. The United Kingdom has 
made European Treaty revisions even more fragile than before after 
the adoption of the European Union Act 2011, which makes any 
Treaty revision subject to a popular referendum except if that revi-
sion has no major consequences for the country. But the amendment 
of Article 136 TFEU, since it refers to future action undertaken by 
the Euro area countries alone, has no immediate consequences for 
the UK, and therefore the UK government decided that it could be 
ratified without the organisation of a referendum.
Separate international agreements, which do not involve an amend-
ment of the TEU and TFEU, can define alternative requirements for 
their entry into force. Not only can such agreements be concluded 
among fewer than all the EU states, but they can also provide for 
their entry into force even if not all the signatories are able to ratify. 
The Fiscal Compact offers a spectacular example of this flexibility 
in that it provides that the treaty will enter into force if ratified by 
merely 12 of the 25 signatory states, provided that those 12 are all 
part of the Euro area. The fact that the authors of the Fiscal Compact 
moved decidedly away from the condition of universal ratification 
for its entry into force has created a ‘ratification game’ which is very 
different from that applying to amendment of the European treaties, 
where the rule of unanimous ratification gives a strong veto position 
to each individual country.22 Here, instead, the cost of a negative 
decision cannot be ‘externalized’ to the other countries, and would 
moreover mean that the country cannot benefit from the potential 
21 See G. de Búrca, ‘If at First You Don’t Succeed: Vote, Vote Again. Analysing the 
Second Referendum Phenomenon in EU Treaty Change,’ Fordham International 
Law Journal (2010) 1472-1489. 
22 For a discussion of those differences, see C. Closa, ‘Moving Away from Una-
nimity. Ratification of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union’, RECON Online Working Paper 2011/38. 
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support of the European Stability Mechanism.23 The ESM Treaty, as 
well, has removed the veto power at least of the smaller Euro states 
by providing that it will enter into force if ratified by states that, 
together, contribute 90% of the funds for the Mechanism. In this 
way, the larger countries (who contribute more than 10% each) still 
have a ‘ratification veto,’ but the smaller Euro states, such as Estonia, 
Slovenia, Greece or Portugal, do not. 
Conclusion
The ‘treaty games’ examined in this paper describe the strategic in-
teractions between the national governments of the EU states (with 
other actors, such as the EU institutions, playing interesting minor 
roles) that have led them – in the course of their responses to the 
Euro crisis – to resort to the conclusion of international treaties as an 
appropriate response. They did so on four occasions, each of which 
must be understood in its particular political and legal context. Still, 
some general conclusions can be drawn from the observation of 
those treaty games.
The first observation is that treaties appear to provide flexibility in 
crisis response. They allow the governments to act quickly by decid-
ing on the adoption of new binding rules without being ‘hindered’ 
by the supranational institutions of the EU or by the cumbersome 
decision-making procedures that apply for the adoption of EU law. 
That flexibility may seem so tempting that governments may fail to 
give sufficient weight to the risks and costs involved in using the 
treaty instrument, namely the danger of introducing rules that are 
inconsistent with EU law (which would be unlawful), the risk that 
entry into force may be delayed or derailed by the failure of one or 
more states to ratify, and the cost of setting aside the democratic 
qualities of EU law-making and the judicial control powers provided 
by EU law. In adopting the four international agreements, the gov-
ernments have tried to use that flexibility and to avoid those risks 
and costs as best they could. As a result, though, the international 
treaties which they have made are much less ambitious, in their con-
23 The linkage between ratification of the Fiscal Compact and benefiting from 
ESM support is expressly made in both the preambles of the ESM treaty and of 
the Fiscal Compact. 
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tent, than what was trumpeted to the public. The Fiscal Compact, in 
particular, is likely to be more important in symbolic political terms 
than as an efficient legal instrument of economic governance. The 
main game of economic governance will – most likely – continue to 
be played, despite those international treaty diversions, within the 
European Union’s institutional framework.   
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The United Kingdom and the 
Eurozone: How to Co-exist
Charles Goodhart
The Eurozone will need major reform and reinvention if it is to sur-
vive. The present crisis has revealed all too clearly both the political 
and the economic flaws of the original Maastricht Treaty. On the 
political front, decisions remain in the hands of the national po-
litical leaders, especially those from the largest countries. They are 
constrained by local political pressures to view the issues through na-
tional, rather than European, viewpoints. Meanwhile the European 
leaders, Barroso and van Rompuy, have no power, no democratic 
mandate, and little influence.  I attach, as Appendix 1, a long passage 
from a recent paper by George Soros on this subject.
On the economic front, austerity without growth is a recipe for de-
pression, despair and growing social and political dissonance.  Some-
thing will crack, probably first in Greece.  The proposals for achiev-
ing faster growth, e.g., structural reform, would help in the longer 
run, but would do little, if anything, to restart growth in the short 
run.
Under these circumstances, there are probably three possible medium/
longer term outcomes. The first (A) is that, with or without a crisis, 
162 The United Kingdom and the Eurozone: How to Co-exist
the Eurozone reinvents itself as a viable currency union.  This re-
quires a major move towards political, fiscal and financial centrali-
sation. The second (B) is that the Eurozone breaks up, but the Eu-
ropean Union maintains the single market and free movement of 
capital and labour. The third (C) is that both the Eurozone and the 
EU collapse in a welter of recrimination and a recrudescence of pro-
tective nationalism.
I shall discuss the role of the UK in each case, taking these three op-
tions in reverse order.
But, first, it may be helpful to record the historical roles of England 
and Scotland separately.  England (and Wales) are, of course, an inte-
gral part of Europe. But the English have never seen their destiny as 
solely a European country; rather they have always seen themselves as 
an Atlantic power, with interlocking circles of interest, involving the 
north Atlantic on one hand and the Commonwealth on the other, 
as well as Europe.  A figurative illustration of how the English tend 
to see their position in the world is shown in Figure 1. As such, it 
has always been the historical objective of the English leadership to 
prevent a dominant power taking root on the Continent.  Often they 
have been successful in this; sometimes they have failed.  Since we are 
meeting in Italy, I could mention the failure of the British, notably 
Queen Boadicea, to stop the Roman legions; Mrs Thatcher may even 
have seen herself as a reincarnation of Boadicea. It is in accord with 
its historical role that the English are averse to a federal state develop-
ing on the Continent.  
In contrast, the Scots have always been much closer to the Conti-
nental powers, notably France, seeing in Brussels or Paris a useful 
counterweight to domination from London.  If it had not been for 
the collapse of RBS and HBOS, with these two banks becoming 
wards of the British taxpayer, an independent Scotland would prob-
ably have sought to join the Euro immediately, should independence 
be achieved.  [Incidentally, the Shetland Islands see domination from 
Edinburgh as unfavourably as the Scots see domination from Lon-
don.  Some of the oil is not Scottish, but Shetland’s.  The Shetland’s 
allegiance could go to Norway, or London, rather than Scotland; 
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whether the Scottish regiments would invade Shetland with kilts fl y-
ing to enforce their subjugation would have to be seen.]
Anyhow, this historical background may help to explain the position 
which the English have traditionally adopted in their relationship 
with the Continent. Let me now revert to the three options for the 
future of the Eurozone that I have set out, and how the English (but 
not the Scots) might react.
Figure 1
C.  Complete Collapse and Break-up
Th is would, of course, be a disaster, and would be seen as such by 
most people in the UK, if only because the immediate economic 
implications would be so dire. But since the UK has integrated less 
than the Continental countries, the adjustments – social, institu-
tional, political and economic – would be less wrenching for the UK 
than for the Continental countries. Moreover, the UK would cease 
to be an outsider, and would become a major player in a devastated 
scenario. Th is would be a total disaster, but one that would be less 
horrifi c for the UK than for its neighbours.
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B.  Collapse of Euro-zone but Retention of Single Market
In many respects this would be the outcome that the UK wanted, and 
expected to happen, so long as the EU remained a confederation of 
separate sovereign states, rather than becoming a single Federal state. 
The problem with this is, not the British, but the French position. 
The French tend to argue that a single market, without tariffs, etc., 
is inconsistent with the members of that market having flexible ex-
change rates, which they can influence, e.g., by intervention or mon-
etary policies (e.g., QE), to gain an ‘unfair’ advantage in trade.  Thus 
they believe that a single market, (at least among equals, since they 
explain away the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
as a function of the overwhelming relative size of the USA), requires 
a single currency.
Thus the continuation of a single market, in a context where many, 
or most, of the members of that market did not operate a single 
currency would seem to require some centralised oversight, and a 
degree of control, over policies, especially monetary policies that 
could directly influence relative exchange rates. This would presum-
ably include rules to prevent direct intervention on foreign exchange 
markets and rules requiring monetary policy measures to be only 
used for internal price stability. All this could be monitored by the 
European Commission and breaches could be punished by allowing 
other countries to impose countervailing tariffs.
As noted earlier, the UK would have no particular problem with such 
a system; indeed, it would welcome it.
A.  The Eurozone Transforms into a Federal Country
What the minimum conditions – political, social and economic – 
that are necessary for a viable single currency area are remains a sub-
ject of dispute and discussion, (n.b., the optimum currency area lit-
erature was really an unhelpful distraction). On the political front, I 
would argue that a single currency area requires central political lead-
ership, with elections to such positions giving a democratic mandate. 
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This immediately raises a large question. If the political leadership is 
primarily for the members of the single currency union, it cannot be 
elected by non-members, e.g., the UK. The European Union institu-
tions are currently European-wide. The political requirements of a 
currency union imply institutions coterminous with the boundaries 
of that union. So, almost all the EU institutions would have to bi-
furcate, with a tight effective, currency-zone core, and a much looser 
relationship between the single currency core (Federal) states and a 
penumbra of separate currency countries.
The UK would strongly dislike this outcome since it would entrench 
and emphasize the insider/outsider split. The UK would probably do 
what it could to sabotage such an outcome despite it being the logi-
cal implication of a successful transition to a single currency, more 
centralised Eurozone system.
The economic requirements of moving towards a more centralised 
Euro-state include shifting more fiscal powers to the Federal centre. 
An earlier outline of what this might entail was set out in the EC Com-
mission paper, ‘Stable Money, Sound Finances,’ European Economy 
(1993), on which I served as an external expert. This included a 
semi-automatic fiscal stabilisation mechanism to support regions 
badly hit by an asymmetric shock.  This should also give the federal 
centre power to tax and power to borrow. And supervision, resolu-
tion and bail-out funding arrangements for cross-border Eurozone 
financial institutions, above a certain size, would probably need to 
be centralised.
Again, the UK would want to distance itself from a system in which 
fiscal and financial control powers could be imposed on the UK from 
a more powerful Euro-centre. But it would also be hesitant about 
encouraging and allowing a more completely unified and integrated 
Euro-system to spring up on the Continent from which it was ex-
cluded. So UK public opinion and politics would continue to be 
split and divided. Assuming that a much more unified European 
system could be established and did appear successful, a sizeable pro-
portion of people in the UK would want to join for all the standard 
well-known reasons. But, equally a sizeable proportion of UK Euro-
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sceptics would fight to the bitter end to prevent the, by now much 
greater, transfer of sovereignty to the federal European centre.
The thesis here is that a successful single currency area in Europe 
would require a much greater centralisation of powers in a federal 
centre – political, fiscal and regulatory – than heretofore.  If this were 
to be achieved, it would leave the UK both marginalised and divided. 
The UK hopes that the continuing strength of nationalism in conti-
nental countries, plus UK opposition, will stymie any such effective 
shift of powers. If so, the fall-back position would be a single market, 
but without a single currency, except perhaps for a greater D-mark 
area, comprising perhaps Austria, Denmark, Finland and the Neth-
erlands, as well as Germany.
We shall see.
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Appendix1
The euro crisis is particularly instructive in this regard. It shows that 
policies that could have worked at one point of time are no longer 
sufficient at the next one. It also demonstrates the role of imperfect 
understanding and misconceptions in shaping the course of history. 
Since the euro crisis is currently exerting an overwhelming influence 
on the global economy I shall devote the rest of my talk to it. I must 
start with a warning: the discussion will take us beyond the con-
fines of economic theory into politics and social philosophy. It will 
provide an excellent illustration of the reflexive interaction between 
imperfect markets and imperfect regulators. That is an interaction 
that goes on all the time while bubbles occur only infrequently. This 
is a rare occasion when the interaction exerts such a large influence 
that it casts its shadow on the global economy. How could this hap-
pen? My explanation is that there is a bubble involved but it is not 
a financial but a political one. It relates to the political evolution of 
the European Union and it has lead me to the conclusion that the 
euro crisis threatens to destroy the European Union. Let me explain. 
In my theory a boom bust process or bubble has two components: 
a trend that occurs in reality and a misconception relating to that 
trend. In the boom phase the European Union was what the psy-
choanalyst David Tuckett calls a “fantastic object” – unreal but im-
mensely attractive. It was the embodiment of the open society – an 
association of nations founded on the principles of democracy, hu-
man rights, and rule of law in which no nation or nationality would 
have a dominant position.
The process of integration was spearheaded by a small group of far 
sighted statesmen who practiced what Karl Popper called piecemeal 
social engineering. They recognized that perfection is unattainable; 
so they set limited objectives and firm timelines and then mobilized 
the political will for a small step forward, knowing full well that 
when they achieved it, its inadequacy would become apparent and 
require a further step. The process fed on its own success, very much 
1 George Soros, ”Remarks at the Institute for New Economic Thinking Annual 
Plenary Conference,” Berlin, Germany, 12 April 2012. 
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like a financial bubble. That is how the Coal and Steel Community 
was gradually transformed into the European Union, step by step.
Germany used to be in the forefront of the effort. When the Soviet 
empire started to disintegrate, Germany’s leaders realized that reuni-
fication was possible only in the context of a more united Europe 
and they were willing to make considerable sacrifices to achieve it. 
When it came to bargaining they were willing to contribute a little 
more and take a little less than the others, thereby facilitating agree-
ment. At that time, German statesmen used to assert that Germany 
has no independent foreign policy, only a European one.
The process culminated with the Maastricht Treaty and the introduc-
tion of the euro. It was followed by a period of stagnation which after 
the crash of 2008 turned into a process of disintegration. The first 
step was taken by Germany when, after the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, Angela Merkel declared that the virtual guarantee extended 
to other financial institutions should come from each country acting 
separately, not by Europe acting jointly. It took financial markets 
more than a year to realize the implication of that declaration.
The Maastricht Treaty was fundamentally flawed, demonstrating the 
fallibility of the authorities. Its main weakness was well known to its 
architects: it established a monetary union without a political union. 
The architects believed however, that when the need arose the po-
litical will could be generated to take the necessary steps towards a 
political union.
But the euro also had some other defects of which the architects 
were unaware and which are not fully understood even today. First 
of all it failed to take into account the fallibility of the architects: 
there is neither an enforcement mechanism nor an exit mechanism 
and member countries cannot resort to printing money. This put 
the weaker members into the position of a third world country that 
became over-indebted in a hard currency.
The Maastricht Treaty also assumed that only the public sector is 
capable of producing unacceptable imbalances; the market was ex-
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pected to correct its own excesses. And the Maastricht Treaty was 
supposed to have established adequate safeguards against public sec-
tor imbalances. Consequently, when the European Central Bank 
started operated it treated government bonds as riskless assets that 
banks could hold without allocating any capital reserves against 
them. This encouraged commercial banks to accumulate the bonds 
of the weaker countries in order to earn a few extra basis points. This 
caused interest rates to converge which, contrary to expectations, led 
to divergences in economic performance. Germany, struggling with 
the burdens of reunification, undertook structural reforms and be-
came more competitive. Other countries enjoyed a housing boom 
that made them less competitive. Yet others had to bail out their 
banks after the crash of 2008. This created conditions that were far 
removed from those prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty with totally 
unexpected consequences. Government bonds which had been con-
sidered riskless turned out to carry significant credit risks.
Unfortunately the European authorities had little understanding of 
what hit them. They were prepared to deal with fiscal problems but 
only Greece qualified as a fiscal crisis; the rest of Europe suffered 
from a banking crisis and the divergence in competitiveness also gave 
rise to a balance of payments crisis. The authorities did not even un-
derstand the nature of the problem, let alone see a solution. So they 
tried to buy time.
Usually that works. Financial panics subside and the authorities re-
alize a profit on their intervention. But not this time because the 
financial problems were reinforced by a process of political and so-
cial disintegration. While the European Union was being created, 
the leadership was in the forefront of further integration; but after 
the outbreak of the financial crisis the authorities became wedded to 
preserving the status quo. This has forced all those who consider the 
status quo unsustainable or intolerable into an anti-European pos-
ture. That is the political dynamic that makes the disintegration of 
the European Union just as self-reinforcing as its creation has been.
At the onset of the crisis a breakup of the euro was inconceivable: 
the assets and liabilities denominated in a common currency were 
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so intermingled that a breakup would have led to an uncontrollable 
meltdown. But as the crisis progressed the financial system has been 
progressively reoriented along national lines. This trend gathered 
momentum in recent months. The LTRO enabled Spanish and Ital-
ian banks to engage in a very profitable and low risk arbitrage in 
the bonds of their own countries. And the preferential treatment re-
ceived by the ECB on its Greek bonds will discourage other investors 
from holding sovereign debt. If this continued for a few more years 
a break-up of the euro would become possible without a meltdown 
– the omelet could be unscrambled – but it would leave the central 
banks of the creditor countries with large claims against the central 
banks of the debtor countries which would be difficult to collect.
The Bundesbank has become aware of the danger. It is now engaged 
in a campaign against the indefinite expansion of the money supply 
and it has started taking measures to limit the losses it would sustain 
in case of a breakup. This is creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Once 
the Bundesbank starts guarding against a breakup everybody will 
have to do the same. Markets are beginning to reflect this.
Without it, the Eurozone’s “fiscal compact,” agreed last December, 
cannot possibly work. The heavily indebted countries will either fail 
to implement the necessary measures, or, if they do, they will fail to 
meet their targets because of collapsing demand. Either way, debt ra-
tios will rise, and the competitiveness gap with Germany will widen.
Whether or not the euro endures, Europe is facing a long period of 
economic stagnation or worse. Other countries have gone through 
similar experiences. Latin American countries suffered a lost decade 
after 1982, and Japan has been stagnating for a quarter-century; both 
have survived. But the European Union is not a country, and it is un-
likely to survive. The deflationary debt trap is threatening to destroy 
a still-incomplete political union.
This is a dismal prospect. There must be a way to avoid it – after all, 
history is not predetermined. Right now Europe hangs together out 
of grim necessity. That is not conducive to a harmonious partnership. 
The European Union had been a “fantastic object”, a desirable goal, 
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when it was only an idea, but it turned into an objectionable imposi-
tion when it became a reality. The only way to reverse this seemingly 
inexorable fate is to recreate the European Union as a fantastic object 
worth striving for. The European Union has the makings of an open 
society that could be a model for the rest of the world. All it needs 
to do is to recommit itself to the principles of open society and that 
requires the authorities to recognize their mistakes and correct them. 
Angela Merkel has shown some signs of doing so but the German 
authorities, notably the Bundesbank and the constitutional court are 
dead set on enforcing laws that have proved to be unworkable. This 
has turned statutes that were meant to be stepping stones into im-
movable rocks that stand in the way of finding a solution. I believe 
a solution can be found even at this late stage but it will require a 
change of heart by the German public.
I cannot propose a cut-and-dried plan, only some guidelines. First, 
the rules governing the Eurozone have failed and need to be radically 
revised. Defending a status quo that is unworkable only makes mat-
ters worse. Second, the current situation is highly anomalous, and 
exceptional measures are needed to restore normalcy. Finally, new 
rules must allow for financial markets’ inherent instability.
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European Union and Eurozone: 
How to Co-exist?
Brigid Laffan
Introduction
The global financial crisis and the manner in which it manifested 
itself in the Euro area from autumn 2009 onwards is in the process 
of transforming the European Union. This crisis, like all crises, will 
leave a distinctive political, institutional and governance legacy. The 
contours of that legacy are evident in broad outline.  A new EU is 
being formed with the Euro area at its core. This has implications 
for the dynamic of European integration and for the 27 member 
states that make up the Union. Differentiated or flexible integration, 
a feature of the EU from the 1970s onwards, is and will be a more 
pronounced feature of the EU that is emerging. An avant garde or 
kerneuropa may consolidate within the EU. An avant garde implies 
that there are countries left behind, a rear guard. The rear guard may 
catch up (multi-speed flexibility) or the Union may consolidate into 
two or more tiers (vertical) or a hard inner core with outer circles 
(concentric circles). It is as yet unclear if the Euro area will become 
the ‘hardest of hard cores.’ The aim of this chapter is to (a) pro-
vide an overview of the evolution of differentiated integration in the 
EU, (b) analyse developments within the Euro area in the context 
of differentiated integration, and (c) address the impact of develop-
ments in the Euro area for the co-existence of those both inside and 
outside the single currency. 
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Section I: Differentiated Integration
The European Union is characterised by deep diversity. Although 
the EU was confronted with managing diversity from the outset, 
successive enlargements and an ambitious widening of the scope of 
integration have undoubtedly brought the dynamics of difference 
sharply into focus. A bewildering array of terms – two-speed Eu-
rope, multi-speed Europe, two-tier, à la carte, variable geometry, 
flexible integration, graduated integration, core Europe, avant garde 
Europe, concentric circles, and hub and spoke integration – have 
been deployed as metaphors for differentiated integration both by 
academics and practitioners at different times in the evolution of the 
Union1  (Stubb 1996, 1997; Holzinger and  Schimmelfennig 2012). 
The terminological debate and the battle of ideas about concepts of 
differentiated integration reflected real concerns and dilemmas con-
fronting the EU and its member states (Andersen and Sitter 2006). 
The multiplicity of terms and the underlying concepts highlight the 
challenge of responding to diversity in the Union on terms condu-
cive to all. Behind the Euro-jargon were varying conceptions of the 
future of the Union and different responses to the challenge of di-
versity (De Neve 2007, Emmanouilidis 2007). A discussion of flex-
ibility and differentiation emerged for the first time in the 1970s but 
became and remained a key issue on the European agenda from the 
end of the 1990s onwards. Attention to differentiation sought to 
respond to three interrelated dilemmas. First, how to structure the 
Union to achieve a balance between the unity of the system and the 
assurance of sufficient flexibility to allow for varied levels of engage-
ment. Second, how to deepen the level of integration in the face 
of opposition from some member states who were unwilling to go 
further.  Third, how to address the problem of the unable, due to the 
different capacities of the member states. Addressing the challenge 
of the unwilling and unable lay behind much of the debate on dif-
ferentiated integration. The political discussion of differentiation in-
tensified during periods of treaty change and in anticipation of or in 
response to enlargement. Provisions for enhanced co-operation were 
formally inserted in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and altered in 
1 Stubb (1996) lists 30 different terms that are broadly covered by the concept of 
differentiated integration.
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the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) to make it less demanding to use these 
treaty provisions.  The Amsterdam provisions were never used but 
the Lisbon provisions were deployed for the first time in 2011. 
A distillation of the various concepts of differentiated integration 
suggests that they vary across a number of significant dimensions. 
Stubb classified the concepts on the basis of  three dimensions; time 
(two-speed, multi-speed), space (two tier, hub and spoke, concentric 
circles) and matter (different policy areas) (Stubb 1996, 1997). Holz-
inger and Schimmelfennig (2012) identified six dimensions; namely, 
permanent versus temporary differentiation, territorial versus purely 
functional differentiation, differentiation across member states or 
multi-level differentiation, differentiation within or outside the EU 
treaties, decision-making at EU level or regime level, EU member 
states exclusively or the involvement also of non-member states or ar-
eas (Holzinger and  Schimmelfennig 2012, 297). A combination of 
two of the dimensions identified by Stubb (1996) – time and space 
– combined with two of the dimensions identified by Holzinger and 
Schimmelfennig (2012) enables us to capture the character of dif-
ferentiation within the EMU. (See Figure 1.) 
EMU represents one of the most important policy areas not shared by 
all member states and the Euro crisis has accentuated the importance 
of the Euro club. The significance of membership, non-membership, 
pre-ins and opt-outs has been highlighted by the crisis because the 
Euro states have had to deepen the level of integration within the 
Euro area, add new institutions and additional policy instruments.
Section II: Developments within the Euro area
The duration and intensity of the crisis within the Euro area resulted 
in a sustained focus by the European Council, the Eurogroup, the 
ECB, the Eco-Fin Council and the Commission on Crisis Manage-
ment since 11 February 2010. Since then, regular and emergency 
European Council and Eurogroup meetings have been almost en-
tirely devoted to the crisis. A marked feature of the crisis was the 
importance of bilateral meetings between the German Chancellor 
and French President in preparation for meetings of the 17 or 27. 
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Figure 1: EMU-Differentiated Integration
Captured by the term Merkozy, the leaders of the two largest Euro 
area economies worked closely together to manage the crisis. Ad-
dressing the interrelated problems of the loss of market access for 
three Euro states (Greece, Ireland and Portugal), contagion to other 
states and problems in the European banking system have stretched 
the EU’s political capacity to its limits. Since Spring 2010, the Euro 
states and the ECB operated under constant pressure from the finan-
cial markets and rating agencies. The latter sent strong signals to the 
Euro area and in turn wanted a convincing narrative from the HoSG 
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(Heads of State/Government) and the ECB that they were capable of 
responding to the problems. 
Policy responses in the Euro area were designed both to address the 
immediate crisis (crisis management) and ensure that the Euro area 
was not confronted with a crisis of this severity again (crisis pre-
vention). Key actors in the Euro area engaged in a combination of 
‘puzzling,’  ‘powering,’ ‘persuading,’ and ‘masking,’ as they sought to 
address the crisis. The ‘puzzling’ involved the definition of the crisis, 
its attendant problems and potential policy solutions and ‘powering’ 
related to the mobilisation of resources and support for policy action. 
‘Persuasion’ was required to convince key Euro states that action was 
needed in the first place and was later evident throughout the crisis 
given the political constraints on key actors. ‘Masking’ the hidden 
face of power was evident in the manner in which the crisis was iden-
tified as a sovereign debt crisis and not also a banking crisis. Crises 
accentuate power differentials within a consensus system such as the 
EU and Euro area. The ECB and the Euro HoSG were the domi-
nant institutions in the policy process. Neither the Commission nor 
European Parliament played a central role. The responsibilities of 
the Commission were widened during the crisis but not its agenda 
setting role.  
Within the Euro HoSG, Germany was the swing state. No action 
could be taken without its agreement and it had veto power over the 
deployment of policy instruments.  As the largest economy in the 
Euro area, its influence was decisive. Germany’s dominance in the 
management of the crisis stemmed both from its economic weight 
and performance and its embedded preferences on monetary policy 
and the role of the central bank. Moreover, the German Chancellor 
faced a number of domestic constraints that influenced the timing 
and content of policy responses. Chancellor Merkel was concerned 
from the outset that any rescue or new policy instrument within 
the Euro area might face a challenge at the German Constitutional 
Court. Hence legal cover was a major concern. The federal character 
of the German state meant that elections were a perennial feature of 
the political system; the calendar of state elections played into federal 
politics in Berlin. As the EU has become more politicised, elections 
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in Germany matter more than they did in the past. Once Germany 
conceded that there would have to be intervention in Greece, it was 
determined to mould the crisis response in a manner that was aligned 
to its preferences. France found itself in a subordinate role within the 
Franco-German tandem. 
The second consequence of the crisis was to emphasize the difference 
between Euro members and non-members. The ‘ties that bind’ will 
bind more tightly and there will be considerably more intrusion into 
the budgetary affairs of the Euro states. Fear of being left behind 
and left outside led six non-Euro states to join the Competitiveness 
Pact and eight states to sign the Fiscal Compact. Non-Euro states 
anticipate joining the Euro at some future date or at least do not 
want to be sidelined. Regardless of when a state joins the single cur-
rency, future membership bids will receive serious scrutiny prior to 
membership. The experience of the crisis has underlined the damage 
that a weak link within the Euro area may cause. The standing of the 
United Kingdom was altered by the actions of David Cameron at the 
December European Council. His refusal to agree to treaty reform 
under the auspices of the existing treaties forced the other member 
states to negotiate a treaty outside the EU’s legal framework.  The 
Fiscal Compact is a classical international treaty that does not rest on 
the existing European treaties although it is designed as a bridging 
treaty. One significant feature of the treaty is that it will come into 
operation once ratified by twelve states. This would not have been 
possible within the treaty framework as unanimity is the decision 
rule on treaty change within the EU. 
A third consequence of the crisis was the further deepening of the link 
between European integration and the single currency. Throughout 
the crisis, the HoSG reiterated their determination to do whatever 
was necessary to protect the Euro and the financial stability of the 
Euro area. This was not mere rhetoric but a determined commitment 
to protect the single currency as the core of European integration. 
The 2010 December European Council emphasized that ‘The euro 
is and will remain a central part of European Integration.’ This then 
leads to the issue of what else the Euro states will have to do to ad-
dress the design faults in the Euro and resolve the crisis. The range of 
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potential policy options includes the partial mutualisation of debt, 
fiscal transfers, a bank resolution mechanism, a financial transac-
tion tax and further policy coordination in the budgetary and fiscal 
spheres. If the Euro area evolves into a transfer union, however dis-
guised, there will be pressure for further political integration.   The 
relative stabilisation following the LTROs in January 2012 did not 
address the underlying problems in the Euro area as the crisis reig-
nited in April 2012 with Spain under particular pressure in the bond 
markets. This suggests that further integration including the use of 
enhanced cooperation is likely. 
Section III: Co-existence within the Euro area and between the 
Euro area and the 27
On the face of it, it could be argued that the Euro area is just one 
example of differentiation in the EU, not unlike Justice and Home 
Affairs or defence policy. In other words, the Euro area is just another 
club in a club of clubs. This however is to underestimate the manner 
in which the crisis has already transformed the dynamic of the EU 
and the Euro area. All of the Euro states, including Germany, have 
learnt that the Euro created a very high level of interdependence 
and vulnerability among sovereigns and banks across the Eurozone. 
The experience of contagion and the potential for further contagion 
has stoked fears that the exit of any one state or the abandonment 
of the Euro may lead to a systemic implosion of the European and 
global financial system. The sheer uncertainty of what might happen 
pressurises Euro area states to continue muddling through the crisis 
in an effort to prevent an implosion at all costs. Fear of the likely 
impact on European integration of a Euro break-up makes the EMU 
club the pre-eminent club or core of the EU. But it is a club that is 
deeply fractured. The nature and depth of the crisis has generated 
profound tensions and conflict within the Euro area between credi-
tor and debtor states. Trust has weakened and resentment has built 
up on both sides. The stakes are high as the central issues turn on the 
question of who bears the losses for the public and private excesses of 
the 2000s and who carries the cost of adjustment.  Notwithstanding 
agreement on the Fiscal Compact, the politics of the Euro area have 
become more strident.  The framing of the crisis as a sovereign debt 
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crisis has imposed the largest adjustment costs on the debtor states; 
however, the creditor states have exposed themselves to potential fu-
ture losses depending on the outcome of the crisis. Policy making 
on the Euro crisis has been characterised by a high level of informal 
politics, led by the Franco-German tandem. 
Informal bilateral politics have been a pronounced feature of the 
dynamic of integration from the outset. States, large and small, en-
gaged in multiple bilateralism to collect intelligence about the pref-
erences of partners, to influence positions and to prepare for formal 
negotiations. The Franco-German couple has been a feature of Eu-
ropean integration from the outset. As the two largest states, they 
have considerable structural power within the system and their ties 
were formalised in the 1963 Elysée Treaty. France and German of-
ficials maintained very close working ties regardless of the relation-
ship between the two senior office holders. In this crisis, bilateral 
meetings between Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy were a 
pronounced feature of the informal politics of the crisis. Joint meet-
ings, photo opportunities and press conferences were central to the 
script of crisis management.  Their meetings set the agenda and de-
termined the available policy options. The role of their joint meet-
ings was to ensure that both states ‘sang from the same hymn sheet’ 
as any policy response at a minimum required their agreement and 
they had different preferences about how to address the crisis and the 
timing of intervention. France supported more active intervention 
in the crisis from the outset and was prepared to support a Greek 
bailout at a much earlier stage than Germany. France saw the crisis 
as an opportunity to revive its long held preference for enhanced 
‘economic governance’ within the Euro area whereas Germany was 
committed to the independence of the ECB. Germany had a prefer-
ence for the highest level of automaticity in sanctioning countries 
that breached agreed fiscal targets whereas France fought for more 
time before sanctions were adopted. Germany wanted the IMF as 
an integral part of any rescue; France wanted the EU to handle the 
crisis on its own.
 
As the crisis persisted, a shift in the balance of power occurred. The 
bilateral meeting, the walk on the beach, held at Deauville on the 
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18th of October 2010, was a turning point in the response to the 
crisis. While the two leaders were meeting in Deauville, the Finance 
ministers were meeting in Luxembourg to work out what would 
happen to the bail-out fund (EFSF) once it had run its course. An 
email was received from Deauville outlining agreement between the 
two principals.  This was done without consulting the other member 
states or the ECB. The content and the way the deal was struck was a 
strong signal of how the Euro crisis would be handled thereafter and 
the growing ascendency of Germany. The Deauville deal consisted 
of three elements. First, Germany agreed that the sanctions regime 
in the budgetary sphere would be less automatic than it had wanted. 
This represented its last major concession to France in the crisis. Sec-
ond, a permanent bail-out mechanism would be established follow-
ing treaty change. France did not at this stage wish to reopen the trea-
ties but Chancellor Merkel wanted to put a future bail-out fund on 
a sound legal footing. Third, France agreed to Germany’s preference 
for private sector involvement in any future bailouts. Private sector 
bondholders would have to accept a reduction in the money they 
were owed. The latter decision had a profound impact on the crisis 
by further undermining investor confidence in the risks attached to 
government bonds in the Euro area. This had an immediate impact 
on the markets and the loss of confidence in the bonds of peripheral 
Euro area states has continued. Euro area sovereign bonds, once con-
sidered a very safe asset, were further undermined by the decisions 
taken in Deauville. The Deauville agreement was watered down by 
the December 2010 summit and later abandoned, but serious dam-
age was done to the Euro area’s sovereign bond markets from which 
they have not recovered. The decision by the two HoSG trumped 
the formal decisionmaking processes of the EU and caused consider-
able anger at the Eco-Fin meeting in Luxembourg when the Finance 
Ministers and the President of the ECB heard of the Deauville agree-
ment. President Trichet accurately predicted the market response.
 
Following Deauville, the agenda and policy responses in the ‘E’ pillar 
were driven by Germany. This alteration in the power dynamic with-
in the EU will have lasting effects. Regardless of who wins the French 
presidential election, the French President is weaker than at any time 
since the foundation of the EU. Germany has become the foremost 
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leader of the Union and the Euro area. This is not a comfortable po-
sition for Germany but one that the German state elite must grapple 
with. France has to accept that its relative power position and stand-
ing is weakened. Italy and Spain face difficult years of fiscal consoli-
dation but can play a role in reframing the agenda in Europe. The 
UK has placed itself in a position of limited influence, particularly 
on economic governance and future developments within the Euro 
area.  Poland as a non-Euro state will strive to ensure that there is no 
rift between the ins and the outs and that there are no further barri-
ers to membership of the Euro. The voice and presence of small and 
medium sized states is undermined when informal politics assume 
centre stage and when solutions are pre-cooked prior to full meetings 
of the European Council without the involvement of the Commis-
sion. The small states must ensure that they do not become the silent 
parties at the table and must insist on procedures and transparency at 
meetings of the European Council or Eurogroup. Small states have a 
shared interest in ensuring that they have adequate voice and repre-
sentation in the Union and Euro area. 
The institutional and legal legacy of the crisis is a further enhance-
ment of the HoSG, Eurogroup and ECB, on the one hand, and a 
Fiscal Compact that lies outside the formal treaties, on the other. 
The Fiscal Compact makes provision for enhanced governance in the 
Euro area. It institutionalises the Euro Summit and the election of 
a President of the Euro Summit at the same time as the election of 
the President of the European Council. This implies that it is likely 
that both offices will be held by the same person which, in-turn, 
implies that the President of the European Council will be drawn 
from Euro area states. The treaty specifies that at least once a year, 
the HoSG of states not in the Euro will be invited to attend the Euro 
Summit if they have ratified the Fiscal Compact.  The treaty makes 
provision for the development of budgetary committees of national 
parliaments, and, under Article 10 of the Fiscal treaty, envisages the 
greater use of enhanced cooperation. Under the current provisions, a 
minimum of nine states may use the EU institutions to engage in en-
hanced co-operation applying only to the participating states. Given 
the inclusion of a reference to enhanced cooperation in the Fiscal 
Compact, the clear intention is to use these provisions for the Euro 
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area.  A hardening of the boundaries between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’ 
makes co-existence more challenging between those in the Euro and 
outside given the pressure on the Euro area to deepen integration. 
 
The emergence of an avant garde with the Euro as the core of Euro-
pean integration has the potential to solidify into a two-tier and not 
just a multi-speed EU. The pressure to maintain the Euro with all 
of its 17 members implies a further deepening of integration among 
the Euro states. Deepening may manifest itself in debt mutualisation 
(Eurobonds) and fiscal transfers to those states, particularly Greece, 
that are experiencing a prolonged recession. Greece, and perhaps one 
or two other states in the Euro, is not solvent and will have difficulty 
returning to the financial markets. Any deepening of integration in 
this direction would have to be accompanied by greater political in-
tegration and further surveillance across the member states. Deepen-
ing would serve to further harden the boundary between the Euro 
area and the other member states.  If, however, the Euro manages to 
weather the storm, it will be possible to enlarge its membership when 
the outs have achieved the Maastricht criteria. Scrutiny of prospec-
tive members will be far more stringent than in the past. An avant 
garde Europe is one in which those outside the Euro may be mar-
ginalised and experience a weakening of influence.  The fact that 25 
states signed the fiscal compact underlines the fear of those outside 
concerning their influence in the system. The new member states 
in East Central Europe see Euro membership as part of their future 
within the Union.  The UK appears particularly isolated, which is 
not good for those states wishing to see some balance to the Franco-
German motor.
Co-existence between the Euro area and the EU 27 may depend on 
the development of a shared policy platform and a reassertion of 
the underlying norms of EU membership. The EU works best when 
it has a practical policy programme to address. The single market 
provides the glue that holds the EU together. All member states are 
committed to the internal market and all are involved. It is the one 
club that all member states partake in. Those outside the Euro area, 
particularly the UK, have always stressed that the single market is 
sacrosanct and that developments within the Euro area cannot be 
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allowed to undermine the internal market. A growth strategy for the 
27 is the most likely candidate for the development of a shared policy 
platform. The EU 27 faces challenges of competitiveness given global 
developments. The Euro area and the remaining member states need 
growth to ensure that the strains that have been experienced over the 
last three years are overcome. Austerity policies without growth are 
self-defeating for the Euro area and the EU 27. Thus, the internal 
market and the search for growth offers the best platform policy for 
co-existence between the Euro area and the EU. The Europe 2020 
Strategy with its focus on structural reform is not a growth strategy 
for the next five years. Europe is falling behind in the digital market 
and faces considerable barriers to achieving a Digital Single Market 
by 2015.
 
Prior to the March 2012 European Council, the HoSG of twelve 
member states sent a letter entitled ‘A Plan for Growth in Europe’ 
to the President of the European Council. It was noteworthy for its 
content but also the fact that it was sent by a group of states that 
were members and non-members of the Euro. The two large states 
represented on the list, Italy and the UK, were joined by the Neth-
erlands, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia, Spain, Sweden and Poland. This was a deliberate coordinated 
attempt to shift the EU agenda from austerity to growth and from 
the Euro area exclusively to the EU 27. For Italy, it served the Monti 
strategy of reframing the EU agenda to focus on growth and for 
the UK it represented an effort to regain some leverage at the table 
following the December European Council meeting. The letter was 
also a reminder to the Franco-German core that there were limits to 
its domination of the agenda and to the presence of a de facto if not 
de jure directoire in the Union. The combination of two large states 
and a number of medium and small states underlined the impor-
tance of alternative coalitions within the EU. That said, the policies 
and approaches of the ‘big three’ will have a major impact on the 
evolving dynamics in the Union. 
The French preference is one that favours a ‘hard core’ Euro area 
driven by the Franco-German motor based on intensive intergov-
ernmental and trans-governmental cooperation with the weak in-
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volvement of EU institutions. This is designed to enable France to 
disguise its weakness within the Euro area. In other words, France 
has invested heavily in the Franco-German relationship. It does not 
appear to have considered a counter-strategy of leading a coalition of 
Mediterranean states as a means of rebalancing the Euro area agenda 
away from coordinated austerity towards slower fiscal adjustment 
and growth. Would a Hollande Presidency consider such a strategy 
or is the institutionalised coordination reflex with Germany so em-
bedded that it precludes such a strategy? The UK on the other hand 
finds itself outside the 17 and the 25 in a more isolated position 
than it would wish within the EU. It has a profound interest in get-
ting the internal market on the agenda both for reasons of growth 
and presence. Paradoxically, this means that the UK should actively 
champion the role of the supranational institutions as the Commis-
sion is central to progress in the internal market. Germany does not 
wish to see a closed hard core EMU and has begun to acknowledge 
that growth is vital to the Euro and EU. It is also committed to the 
maintenance of the Euro area but not as a closed system. Tradition-
ally a supporter of the supranational institutions, Germany has over 
the last ten years displayed a weaker commitment to the role of the 
Commission. In her speech at the opening of the Academic Year 
2010 in Brugge, Chancellor Merkel distinguished between the ‘com-
munity method’ with the Commission at its core and the ‘Union 
method’ for those areas that involve member state coordination. A 
commitment to the ‘community method’ would have to underpin 
progress on the single market agenda. A platform including a serious 
focus on the internal market and growth would serve to bring the 
EU 27 together in a shared project. In addition, mutual co-existence 
within the EU would benefit from a reassertion of the fundamental 
norms of membership. The core norms are:
•	 Open rather than closed differentiation: this means that 
when non-members are ready to become members of the 
Euro area, the system remains open; 
•	 Equality of access to the institutions and involvement of the 
core institutions in all areas of differentiated integration;
•	 Access for all member states to information and knowledge 
of what is happening in all policy fields (Gillespie 2012).
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Unless the EU 27 agree to a policy platform that all member states 
engage with and there is constant vigilance concerning the underly-
ing norms of EU membership, an avant garde Euro area may solidify 
into a tiered rather than a multi-speed EU. There remains consider-
able uncertainty about the future trajectory because of the continu-
ing strains within the Euro area. 
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The Euro Area Crisis and 
Implications for the Relation 
Between The EU and The Euro 
Area
Guntram B. Wolff
This chapter reviews major challenges for the Euro area, discusses recent 
initiatives and the way forward in particular as regards Euro area vs 
non-Euro area EU member relations. The Eurozone faces three major 
challenges: (1) high private and/or public debt in some of its parts to-
gether with competitiveness adjustment needs that in some countries have 
barely started, (2) a weak growth outlook, and (3) continued banking 
sector fragility that together with sovereign stress feeds a negative feedback 
loop. The Euro area has taken many significant measures to overcome 
these problems including the six-pack, the fiscal compact, the EFSF and 
the ESM, which are discussed briefly. Significant risks remain. The slow 
real economic adjustment and the largely unaddressed banking-sovereign 
fragility are the largest concerns. Solving the banking-sovereign fragility 
will involve more Euro area integration. This will pose challenges to the 
relationship with non-Euro area countries. EU countries outside of the 
Euro area will either want to (1) leave or join the Euro, (2) get protec-
tion clauses to safeguard their vital economic interests, or (3) insist on 
regulatory flexibility. 
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Th e Euro area faces severe challenges. Th e ongoing crisis clearly ex-
poses the failure of the Maastricht architecture for Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). Central to this failure is the lack of any 
fi scal capacity for the Euro area and the strong intervention rights in 
national policy-making that go along with central authority. Bank-
ing resolution and supervision remain largely national and need to 
be integrated at a Euro area level to ensure stability. More specifi cally, 
the Euro area faces three major challenges.
First, it is confronted with very high private and public debt levels in 
some of its parts, and a formidable adjustment challenge. Th e debt 
is not only domestically held. In Spain, Portugal and Greece, debt 
owed to creditors outside of the country is above 80 percent of GDP 
(see Ahearne and Wolff , 2012). Repaying external debt while at the 
same time being obliged to reduce prices to become competitive and 
export more to repay for the external debt is extremely diffi  cult. In 
fact, historical lessons show that even the external interest burden 
can become diffi  cult to shoulder.1 Figure 1 summarises the diffi  culty 
of internal devaluation in the Euro area. 
Figure 1: Changes in Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) (Intra*) in Terms 
of Unit Labour Cost (ULC) and Consumer Price Index (CPI) 2007-2011
1 John Maynard Keynes wrote extensively about the problem of external debt pay-
ments at a diff erent time and in a diff erent context, but his lessons remain valid 
today. 
Source: EUROSTAT, * Intra refers to the REER relative to 16 euro zone trading partners.
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Broadly speaking, since the onset of the crisis, price adjustment has 
been modest or absent in most Euro-area countries.  Greece contin-
ued to lose price competitiveness, as did Italy, even though in the 
last 6-12 months some adjustment is visible. Germany, in turn, did 
not change its relative position and its competitiveness remains un-
changed. Spain, and in particular, Ireland, have become more com-
petitive. Similarly, current-account divergence has reverted since the 
beginning of the crisis, but significant differences in deficits and sur-
pluses remain, with Greece still running a current account deficit of 
10 percent and Germany continuing to have a surplus of 5 percent.
Real macroeconomic adjustment in EMU is proving very difficult. 
In fact, comparing the adjustment with the adjustment of countries 
outside the Euro area shows that adjustment is much slower than in 
the Euro area (Darvas and Pisani-Ferry, 2011). The question is why 
this is the case. The most plausible explanation is that ECB financ-
ing and financial support in the form of financial assistance pro-
grammes is given. This sustains domestic demand and reduces price 
adjustment needs. In fact, one of the striking features of the Greek 
economy is that, despite all the fiscal austerity enacted, Greece is still 
running a current account deficit of almost 10 percent (in 2011). 
Second, economic growth in the Euro area as a whole, and in par-
ticular in the so-called periphery, is very weak. Growth forecasts have 
been revised downwards. None of the four big Euro-area economies, 
i.e., Germany, France, Italy and Spain, are projected to grow more 
than 1 percent in 2012, according to European Commission fore-
casts. Periphery growth is particularly low and in some cases even 
negative.
Third, European Banking Authority stress tests have not restored 
trust in the Euro area banking system. We have seen the build-up of 
such negative feedback loops from an increasingly fragile sovereign 
to an increasingly fragile banking system and this is illustrated in the 
Figure below. Purely national strategies will fail to stop this banking 
fragility. Angeloni and Wolff (2012) discuss the fragility of the bank-
ing sector in more detail. National finance ministries in the periph-
ery, in particular, cannot credibly prevent deposit runs or withdraw-
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als of funds from banks located in their countries by themselves, as 
they are too small and may lack access to markets to borrow at good 
rates.
Figure 2: Correlation between sovereign and banking credit default swaps
During 2011, Euro area leaders took a number of signifi cant steps 
to overcome these problems. At the last summit, leaders agreed on 
tougher and more biting fi scal rules, which are to be mostly imple-
mented at a national level. Th is will help to increase fi scal discipline 
and thereby help to prevent problems of the kind currently seen in 
Greece from happening again. Such measures will also, to some ex-
tent, be helpful in increasing investors’ trust in a country’s political 
ability to repay debt. At the same time, the new fi scal rules are felt 
to be too restrictive in many countries, thereby undermining their 
credibility.
In exchange for more commitments to fi scal discipline, signifi cant 
rescue funds have been put in place, including the EFSF, ESM and 
more resources for the IMF.
But major challenges for the Euro area remain, in particular as re-
gards the real economic adjustment, the growth agenda and the right 
Source Bruegel calculations with data from Datastream and Macrobond.
Note: Weekly averages from January 2011 to February 2012. Banking CDS by country are calculated as 
weighted averages of CDS of the individual banks considered for each country. The graph for Greece is 
not displayed since it is characterised by hyperbolic pattern. The same graphical result holds not only for 
periphery countries but also for stronger EU economies such as Germany and France
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institutions to deal with the fragility of the EMU banking sector. 
Stepping up the Euro area’s institutional framework also means that 
a serious debate about the democratic foundations of the new frame-
work will be needed. 
First, a Euro-area growth strategy is missing but is urgently needed. 
Without significantly higher economic growth in southern Europe, 
debt dynamics in combination with price adjustment needs will 
jeopardise sustainability. At the regional and national levels, reforms 
need to focus on improving supply-side conditions for business, in-
cluding better administration, governance and rule of law, as well 
as significantly better education and innovation systems. The key 
reform needed is one that improves the conditions for exports. An 
economy with an external debt overhang needs to export to generate 
growth and to adjust. Price and wage adjustments are necessary in 
that regard. 
At a Euro area level, the macroeconomic policy mix needs to be ap-
propriate. Monetary policy alone may prove insufficient to boost de-
mand in the face of a severe downturn. Therefore, a Euro area level 
tool to boost demand may become necessary. After all, it should be 
remembered that federal states such as the US have strong anticycli-
cal fiscal policy at the federal level, while, at the state level, balanced 
budget rules render public budgets pro-cyclical. In the Euro area, the 
new fiscal rules – if successful – will reduce anti-cyclical fiscal policy 
action, which is currently already limited due to market pressure.2 
Currently, the Euro area is not equipped with an appropriate tool for 
exercising anti-cyclical fiscal policy beyond the automatic stabilizers. 
It is advisable to think about putting in place a strong Euro area tool 
for such purposes, for example, in the form of a means for a Euro 
area investment project financed with project bonds.
Second, the integrated Euro area banking system needs an integrated 
and powerful banking supervision and resolution authority backed 
by sufficient means to prevent bank runs (see also Marzinotto, Sa-
pir and Wolff, 2011). The current system centered on national su-
2 Henning and Kessler (2012) make this point as regards the building of the US 
federation in the last 200 years. Bruegel fellows have repeatedly made this point in 
the Euro area context. 
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pervisors and national fiscal resources is clearly fragile. A true Euro 
area deposit insurance corporation (EDIC) that would ultimately be 
backed by the Euro area taxpayer may become necessary and would 
increase stability. This EDIC would have the power to supervise, 
control and if necessary resolve all systemically important banks in 
the Euro area. 
Third, a solution for dealing with debt overhang is needed. Ulti-
mately, if debt levels are too large to be repaid from purely national 
resources, financial assistance is needed and a framework for orderly 
restructuring needs to be in place. The current structure around the 
ESM may prove insufficient in terms of size, decision-making mech-
anism and set-up for dealing with a crisis in one of the larger Euro 
area countries. It may therefore become necessary to pool all Euro 
area public debt. To issue such common debt, a common treasury 
with tax-raising powers appears necessary.3 
 
The ECB has strongly intervened recently and has prevented sudden 
stops by replacing private with ECB funding of banks (Merler and 
Pisani-Ferry, 2012). However, a lot of liquidity is hoarded in the 
deposit facility of the ECB, in particular from banks in the north 
(Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2012) (see Figure 3). The ECB thereby has 
become a financial intermediary between the north and the south 
of Europe. Part of the additional liquidity was used by banks to buy 
government bonds, and this has led to a reduction in the interest rate 
of government bonds of the South. So far, however, there is relatively 
little evidence of a turnaround in credit conditions.
 
The ECB faces a dilemma. It needs to increasingly ask whether its 
financing of current account deficits is justified. This essentially de-
pends on an assessment of the solvency of the economy and the bor-
rowers of ECB liquidity. If the ECB were to lend to insolvent banks 
against insufficient-quality collateral, it would take risks on board 
that could possibly lead to a fiscal transfer from some countries to 
3 Currently, the interest cost of all Euro-area debt is 3.7 percent of Euro-area GDP. 
The Euro-area finance ministry would thus need tax-raising power of at least 4 per-
cent of Euro-area GDP to credibly take on all debt. National taxes could be reduced 
by a similar amount so that the overall tax burden for the average Euro-area citizen 
would not change. 
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others. As long as there is no political support for it, the ECB cannot 
step into the role of a common treasury that would usually be tasked 
to provide such fi scal transfers if needed. Th e absence of a common 
treasury renders ECB action less eff ective as investors understand 
that fi scal support is missing. In that sense, ECB policy cannot solve 
and has not solved some of the underlying problems. 
Figure 3: Use of ECB Deposit Facility - EU Rmm 
(June 2007 - 16th February 2011)
Th is brings me to my last point: the question of EU vs Euro area, 
which is discussed in detail in Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, and Wolff  (2012). 
A robust new framework for banking supervision and resolution will 
require signifi cant integration steps. Th e economic logic suggests 
that this will mostly happen at the Euro area level. Th is will have sig-
nifi cant implications for non-Euro area member states. Th e more the 
Euro area integrates politically, the more it will be able to dominate 
decision making in the EU. Th is may render the EU less attractive 
to countries outside the Euro area, which may then quickly face the 
choice of joining the club or leaving. A third way would be to stay 
inside the EU but demand strong safeguard clauses to protect vital 
interests against the Euro area majority. Finally, EU members outside 
the Euro area may wish to negotiate in certain economic areas opt-
outs to be able to set rules and standards themselves. In the short 
run, the strong degree of fi nancial integration of Euro area members 
with non-Euro area members will require a high level of information 
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sharing, as is already done in the ESRB and the EBA.
In summary: solving the Euro area crisis will require more integra-
tion steps, in particular in the financial and banking field. This is 
likely to prove a significant challenge for the Euro area-EU relation-
ship.
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About Hollande and Holland
Wolfgang Münchau
Today, I would like to offer some thoughts on France and the Neth-
erlands – Hollande and Holland. As far as Hollande goes, I am, per-
haps uncharacteristically, optimistic. I consider his likely impact on 
France as relatively neutral, but on the Eurozone as very positive. I 
am also encouraged by the protest in the Netherlands against what 
I can consider a seriously misguided fiscal adjustment programme. 
Hollande 
The financial markets have reacted negatively to Francois Hollande’s 
first round victory because they did not see it coming. I recall a fund 
managers’ poll a couple of weeks ago, according to which a major-
ity believed Sarkozy would win. They clearly have been reading the 
wrong newspapers, or the wrong commentators. Sarkozy’s loss has 
been well flagged for anyone who has bothered to look. 
It is governments that lose election, not oppositions that win it. And 
this old adage holds true here. The French despise Sarkozy. He is 
simply not presidential. Hollande is the anti-Sarkozy, a little dull, 
but honest. An intensely political man, for sure, but not somebody 
who makes cynical short-sighted policy proposals. 
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No dullness though, when it comes to the Eurozone. Hollande is 
the best hope we have to challenge the toxic consensus that lies at 
the root of the persistent failure of crisis resolution. As a journalist, I 
like to think in terms of narratives, and especially self-perpetuating 
narratives. The German narrative, which is also the narrative of the 
Eurozone dominant centre-right political class, is that the way to 
fight the crisis is through a combination of fiscal discipline and struc-
tural reforms. I think this narrative is flawed because it does not take 
into account the interaction between austerity and growth, and the 
interaction of simultaneous public sector deleveraging and private 
sector deleveraging.
The centre right is firmly in power almost everywhere. All the large 
and many of the smaller Eurozone countries have governments led 
by centre-right political parties. Angela Merkel is without a doubt 
the leader of the centre-right. The centre-right has always expressed a 
preference for inflexible fiscal rules, despite the experiences we have 
had with such rules, and the experience we are going to have with the 
rules this year and next.
The main reason why I am positive about the likely electoral success 
of Francois Hollande is not because I think his policies will work. It 
is because he is a narrative-buster. He will challenge Merkel because 
he will tell a different story. It is no accident that Mario Draghi pro-
poses a growth compact at exactly this time. That initiative is not 
going to make much real-world difference. But Europe’s elite are be-
ginning to recognise that they need another story. And Hollande will 
be the main political narrator of that story. 
As for the fiscal pact, I don’t think Hollande is going to veto it, or 
seek changes to its mechanisms. This is a shame because I believe the 
fiscal pact needs such changes, especially to the rule that member 
states are almost certainly not able to fulfill: the 1/20 debt reduction 
rule, which requires that a country cut 1/20 of its excess debt over 
the 60% rule each year. In Italy’s case, that’s 3%, plus whatever it 
takes to stabilise the debt levels at current levels, and an additional 
3 to 4%, depending on your assumptions about growth and interest 
rates. That means Italy would need to run a primary surplus of 7-8% 
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for about a generation. I think that Mario Monti was totally irre-
sponsible when he signed the pact, and failed to point out this little 
detail to his countrymen. 
There is no way that the EU is going to meet the 2013 deficit target. 
Italy and Spain, but also the Netherlands, and many other coun-
tries, are on a trajectory for a big overshoot of their respective deficit 
targets. The conservative narrative of the crisis is about to meet its 
nemesis, and for that reason a change in narrative is timely. 
Unfortunately, Hollande’s position is not quite as radical as it ap-
pears. He is not going to stop this insanity. All he will do is add 
some growth components to the pact – a redefinition of structural 
funds, a long overdue rebooting of the European Investment Bank, 
but nothing that stops the austerity madness, which itself will be the 
biggest impediment to growth. At best, he might get some flexibility 
clauses. But it is the whole point of the pact to deny such flexibility. 
The Eurozone is thus setting itself up for another treaty that is not 
going to work. After two stability pacts, the so-called “six pack,” this 
will be pact number four that is destined to fail, and this will be quite 
soon. It will cause further damage to the credibility of the Eurozone.
What about Hollande’s likely management of the French economy, 
which is not a first order issue of the Eurozone crisis right now, but 
has the potential to become one if things go wrong? I think his pro-
posal to raise the income tax rate to 75% is as politically smart as it 
is economically irrelevant. It is surely better to tax excessively high 
incomes than to tax financial transactions. But hardly anybody will 
end up paying this, so there is a lot of political symbolism involved. 
This is a tax applied mostly to employed bankers and CEOs, as en-
trepreneurs will find ways to circumvent it easily and legally. There 
will be quite a bit of tax avoidance through emigration. We are al-
ready seeing an increase in property prices in Brussels – at least in the 
very high end of the market – which is directly related to Hollande’s 
threat. The economic impact of this measure will be too small to 
register. 
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Holland
The impact of a Hollande presidency will probably be felt outside 
France more than inside France. The first country that may catch the 
Hollande virus is Holland. The most self-righteous of the Eurozone 
member states was last week on course to miss the 3% deficit target, 
after the populist Geert Wilders withdrew his support for the budget 
measures. The government of Liberals and Christian Democrats had 
until last week relied on the eccentric Wilders for their majority. He 
withdrew his support, which triggered the collapse of the govern-
ment, and with it new elections in September. In the meantime, the 
government managed to agree to an austerity budget with some of 
the centrist opposition parties.
Wilders has his own reasons for his decision. He is not known for 
his astute understanding of economic issues. But as much as I hate 
to say it, he is right on the substance. There is absolutely no need for 
the Netherlands to pursue a policy of austerity at a time of economic 
weakness, given the room for manoeuvre the country still has due to 
a relative low debt-to-GDP ratio, and absurdly high current account 
surplus. Economically, I would welcome a more moderate form of 
budgetary adjustment. The opposition Labour Party agrees, and has 
called for a trajectory towards a 3.6% target for 2013. 
Meanwhile, Geert Wilders has now discovered the Eurozone as his 
favourite campaign issue (ahead of immigration), which will invari-
ably push the rest of the centrist parties into a difficult super-Grand 
Coalition in favour of austerity, with the extremist parties favouring 
a more gentle fiscal approach. This is politics gone crazy – and it may 
bring some nasty surprises. We have learnt from the Dutch referen-
dum on the Constitutional Treaty that one should not underestimate 
the Dutch popular resistance against what is perceived to be Euro-
pean authoritarianism. Furthermore, if Wilders goes anti-European, 
and seems to succeed, it is possible that the governing parties will 
promise a referendum on the fiscal pact simply to take the wind out 
of his sails. The message would be: you can still vote for a nice and 
normal democratic party, and still have the chance to vote against the 
pact. If this is the case, I would predict a solid No majority against 
the fiscal pact. So this is one to watch out for.
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Hollande, Holland and the future of the Eurozone
The diffuse message we are getting from voters is that they are not 
happy with the political management of the crisis. The voters are not 
experts, and why should they be? Steve Jobs once said it is not the 
job of the consumer to know what he wants to consume. This is the 
same in crisis resolution. The people want the crisis solved. It is the 
job of politicians to solve it. And they throw out the ones who don’t.
We already have enough fallen political victims to consider the set-
up of a large memorial in Brussels in their memory. I count nine 
heads of state and government who have lost their jobs – Sarkozy 
included. And I think our ability to solve the crisis will depend on 
whether Angela Merkel will join him on our hypothetical memorial. 
Hollande alone is not going to provide a sufficiently strong (though 
still welcome) corrective. A change of leadership in Germany and 
France within a year of each other would be a different matter al-
together. Before I get carried away, let me say that at this stage this 
looks unlikely, because Merkel’s ratings, unlike Sarkozy’s, have been 
consistently high. I am clearly not a fan, but she is not a monster. But 
I believe that despite her current popularity, her political fortunes 
may change as the crisis gets worse, which will expose her piecemeal 
style of leadership for what it is.
 
Even if Germany were to change in lockstep with France, we will 
still not get an immediate crisis resolution. But the narratives will 
change, and that impact cannot be overestimated. It means, for ex-
ample, that eurobonds or bank resolution regimes may no longer be 
a taboo subject. 
My reading of what happens in France and the Netherlands is very 
different from that of the financial markets. I welcome Hollande, 
and I welcome the likely insurrection that awaits in the Netherlands, 
though clearly I would prefer if it did not come in the form of a 
repugnant populist. Derailing the official crisis resolution strategy 
is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for success. We have 
to stop blind austerity, we need a functioning resolution system for 
the banks, and we will ultimately also need eurobonds. That’s sim-
ply not possible to do with the centre right. Forget the Nixon in 
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China effect. The centre-right cannot deliver this. They have been in 
power for too long, and have wasted time on economically illiterate 
pacts, on insufficiently flexible firewalls, and the micromanagement 
of the “voluntary” private sector participation in Greece, which will 
almost certainly turn into a near-complete default at one point. 
I have a final concluding thought. Hollande and Holland are both 
a reminder that we should not take things for granted. The crisis is 
truly dynamic. Macroeconomists are right when they point out that 
the current level of interest rates, private sector deleveraging, pub-
lic sector austerity, and crisis resolution constitute an inconsistent 
set. “What is unsustainable, will stop,” Herb Stein once said. While 
this statement is plausible, even true, it is entirely useless in our case 
because it does not tell us what to do. I cannot rule out a break-up 
– though I think this would be a cataclysmic event nobody in their 
right mind would wish for. I remain convinced that this is highly 
unlikely. Before it will come to this, the politics is likely to shift, and 
the election of Hollande, if indeed he is elected, will be a reminder 
that this story is more open-ended than some of the determinists 
may think.
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Europe’s Tragedy Nears the 
End of Act One, but the Drama 
Continues
Janet Kersnar
More, not less reform: That’s what Europe needs if the Euro stands 
a chance of survival, according to experts from a range of fields at a 
workshop held on April 26 in Fiesole, Italy. Titled, “Governance for 
the Eurozone: Integration or Disintegration?,” the workshop took 
place as Greece and a number of other European communities are at 
a breaking point, squeezed by austerity and an uncertain economic 
recovery. Against that backdrop, the workshop, which was co-orga-
nized by the Wharton Financial Institutions Center, among others, 
evaluated the steps that EU members are taking to combat a poten-
tial unraveling of the union.
What a difference a year can make. When a group of European 
Union experts met at a workshop in Italy’s Tuscan hills in the spring 
of 2011, the center of attention was Greece and its ever-growing sov-
ereign debt crisis. Could it, should it, default on debt repayments? 
And what would happen then? The delegates wondered whether the 
result might be a meltdown not just of the Greek economy but of 
Europe as a whole. 
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Flash forward a year, and Greece is still a hot topic. EU experts gath-
ering in Italy at this year’s workshop focused on the region’s other cri-
sis-ravaged economies: Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Belgium. 
‘New EU Emerging’
According to Brigid Laffan, a panelist, “a new EU is emerging from 
the crisis.” As the European politics professor at Ireland’s University 
College Dublin asked, “The question is how much more do the Eu-
rozone states have to do in order to save the Euro?”
Plenty, it seems. Against a backdrop of what Laffan called “the poli-
tics of austerity” -- in which German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
former French President Nicholas Sarkozy called the shots -- a num-
ber of experts at the workshop said they see a need for more, not 
less, integration across the EU. That integration, they noted, goes 
well beyond the EU-wide fiscal discipline debates taking place today, 
to address the region’s economic imbalances that are believed to be 
behind many of its current woes. 
Two things are increasingly clear, according to Franklin Allen, fi-
nance professor at Wharton, echoing the discussions he co-chaired at 
the workshop, which was held at the European University Institute 
(EUI). First, “that there is not nearly enough concern for the human 
cost of the policies that they are trying to pursue” -- unemployment 
in the Eurozone is now around 11%, with around 50% of people un-
der 25 in Spain and Greece jobless. Second, that there is “a low likeli-
hood that they will succeed in anything over the next several years.”
That may feel like an eternity for Europeans who have already en-
dured enough hardship -- and precipitous drops in their standards 
of living -- since the crisis began in 2007 and deep government 
spending cuts took hold. As Charles Goodhart, emeritus banking 
and finance professor at the London School of Economics, noted at 
the workshop, “Austerity without growth is a recipe for depression, 
despair and growing social and political dissonance.” Just ask the 
Greeks.
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Big Tradeoffs
One of the biggest events since last year has been that Greece has 
indeed defaulted -- albeit in a de facto way, with a so-called “public-
sector involvement” debt swap in which the creditors taking part 
faced losses of more than 50% of their principal. 
It was, perhaps, not a bad thing. “It showed you could have a default 
without Armageddon,” said Allen. “The official [European Central 
Bank] view, and that of many people, argued that if Greece default-
ed, it would be like the world ending. But that wasn’t true.... That 
was a big positive.”
Even so, Greece continues to muddle through the crisis under the 
130 billion-Euro rescue package put together by the the Europe-
an Central Bank (ECB), the EU and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Greeks have had to undergo a series of adjustments in 
order to receive that bailout while its economy languishes. Indeed, 
Bloomberg reported May 15 that Greece’s economy contracted 7% 
in the fourth quarter of 2011, compared with a year earlier, “when 
the country was already deep into recession.” Overall unemployment 
is three times higher than it was before the crisis at 20.9%, homeless-
ness is on the rise and almost half of all homeowners say they will 
not be able to make their mortgage payments this year, Bloomberg 
also reported.
Following what turned out to be a chaotic, anti-austerity national 
election on May 6, leaving an indecisive victory, the Greeks continue 
to struggle with a troubled economy. The new interim government 
in place until June elections did not immediately rule out a second 
-- and this time, a hard -- default, reneging on agreements to pay 
436 million Euros to bondholders who shunned the first debt swap 
earlier this spring. The payment, however, was made, thus avoiding 
the possibility that Greece would be cast out of the Eurozone.
Greece is hardly alone. With the help of new mechanisms, including 
the European Financial Stability Fund (or the EFSF, set up last year 
by Eurozone countries to provide loans to cash-strapped members) 
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and an array of social and economic reform measures, policymakers 
in Spain and the Eurozone’s other “periphery” countries, too, have 
spent the past year trying to fix their broken economies -- amid lots 
of controversy.
The question policymakers should be asking, but too often aren’t, is, 
“Are there financial backstops that provide enough time and incen-
tives that will allow structural reform?” noted Pier Paolo Padoan, 
deputy secretary-general of the Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development, during a presentation at the workshop. “If 
there’s a negative answer to that question, you’re in trouble.”
Determining how fiscal austerity -- requiring national governments 
to keep budgets under control and maintain tax revenues -- can go 
hand in hand with growth is a tall order. The fear in some circles is 
that the impact of austerity may, in fact, be worse than that of any 
current or future economic downturn. What national policymakers 
need to question is whether fiscal consolidation will lead to “a good 
equilibrium between public debt and growth,” Padoan said.
French President-elect François Hollande believes it cannot; Merkel 
does. “We in Germany are of the opinion, and so am I personally, 
that the fiscal pact is not negotiable. It has been negotiated and has 
been signed by 25 countries,” Reuters quoted Merkel as saying fol-
lowing Hollande’s election. “We are in the middle of a debate to 
which France, of course, under its new president will bring its own 
emphasis. But we are talking about two sides of the same coin -- 
progress is only achievable via solid finances plus growth.”
Is this impasse cause for despair? Not according to Padoan. Timing 
-- in terms of when such reforms take place during an economic 
cycle -- is important, as is market confidence that the reforms make 
sense, even if the full impact is not realized for the next 10 to 25 
years. Padoan pointed out that the pace of reform -- “has been ac-
celerating. Why is this good news? Not because it generates pain, but 
because the time when we will start to see the benefits is closer than 
you think,” he said. 
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The hope is that the Eurozone’s so-called periphery countries will 
regain the competitiveness they lost in recent years. In his presenta-
tion, Frank Smets, research director general at the ECB, explored the 
damaging effect that the rise of unit labor costs has had on countries 
such as Ireland. “On average, it was [in these countries] 1% to 2% 
higher than the market over this period, much higher than Germany, 
for example, which had one of the lowest increases in unit labor 
costs,” he said.
One Bank, Many Mandates?
Another striking aspect in the debates about the Eurozone crisis has 
to do with the many institutions involved and which of those has the 
responsibility, and credibility, to knock the crisis on its head. Argu-
ably the most intriguing institution in that regard is the ECB.
Just what is the ECB’s role in this crisis? According to workshop 
participants, its role in the banking sector is more straightforward. 
Since the crisis began, the ECB has opened a spigot of lending to 
support banks in Greece and other nations. Europe’s banks -- even 
those with relatively healthy balance sheets -- have helped themselves 
to the ECB’s cheap money (three-year bank refinancing known as 
the Long-Term Refinancing Operation). Sometimes they have been 
tapping the ECB to rekindle their own lending in the hope that their 
loans to retail and wholesale customers will help local economies, 
or purchase sovereign debt. But more often, banks are using those 
loans to prop up their own businesses as new, more stringent regula-
tions kick in, requiring them to keep higher amounts of capital in 
reserve for a rainy day. Meanwhile, consumer demand and produc-
tive capacity are so slack that it is questionable whether there would 
be much demand for loans by businesses even if the funds were fully 
available.
But does the ECB have a responsibility to go further by remaining as 
it has been recently -- a lender of last resort to provide financial sta-
bility and prevent countries like Greece from going bankrupt? It’s a 
different matter with countries, participants at the workshop noted. 
For one thing, countries have a wider range of levers to pull, includ-
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ing raising taxes, than banks do if their coffers run low. For another, 
the EFSF, and the future European Stability Mechanism slated to 
succeed the EFSF, can play that role. “The ECB cannot solve sol-
vency issues [of countries],” stated Guntram Wolff, deputy director 
of Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank. 
But the argument is far from straightforward. In a paper presented 
at the workshop titled, “The European Central Bank: Lender of Last 
Resort in the Government Bond Markets?,” Paul De Grauwe of the 
London School of Economics, noted, “Failure to provide lending of 
last resort in the government bond markets of the monetary union 
carries the risk of forcing the central bank into providing lending of 
last resort to the banks of the countries hit by a sovereign debt crisis. 
And this lending of last resort is almost certainly more expensive.” 
Indeed, his research found that bank liabilities in the Eurozone were 
about 250% of GDP in 2008, while the Eurozone’s government 
debt-to-GDP ratio was about 80%.
As he put it, the ECB is like “a fireman who has the means to catch 
the arsonist before the fire.” The ECB is the only institution capable 
of stopping the Eurozone implosion but it doesn’t want to do it. 
Until this changes, he stated, “the Eurozone will walk from one crisis 
to another.”
Much Talk, Little Action
It is not only the institutions, but also the leaders behind the cri-
sis that are cause for concern. Assessing the political landscape of 
the Eurozone, Russell Cooper, economics professor at the European 
University Institute, said Merkel and the other crisis kingpins, “talk 
and they talk and they talk. That’s not the issue. The issue is cred-
ibility.”
The truth is that’s there is a woeful lack of solidarity among leaders 
in the EU, as the workshop’s panelists and delegates pointed out. 
National interests have and will get in the way, noted Goodhart of 
the London School of Economics during his discussion about the 
U.K.’s role in the EU. 
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“My country will try to prevent centralizing rules,” he said. “It may 
well be that any move to a central currency will be stymied. Anyone 
wanting one will have to assume that the U.K. government will nix 
it.”
Could this now change? With Germany dominating crisis negotia-
tions -- with France in tow -- other countries have been marginal-
ized, Laffan observed. For now, “nothing can happen unless Ger-
many wants it to happen. It can determine the pace of response, and 
which policy solutions are used. That is why we can see no transfer 
union [allowing governments to move payments among themselves] 
and, to date, no eurobonds [which proponents say would allow Eu-
rozone governments to issue jointly guaranteed bonds that do not 
differentiate between the creditworthiness of the issuers].”
Now that France has seen a change in leadership, “might it not be a 
good time for the country to look at the reflex action that it has had 
toward that relationship? Could France, post-Sarkozy, with Italy and 
the U.K., create not an alternate coalition, but at least another coali-
tion?” Laffan asked. “France has a really serious decision to make as 
to how it projects itself and positions itself.”
Summing up a widespread view at the workshop, Laffan noted that 
the tragedy that is unfolding across Europe is “probably only looking 
at the end of the first act. The drama is going to continue.”
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Appendix
Introduction to the Stability and 
Growth Pact*
Victor Ngai
One commonly cited cause for the crisis in the Eurozone is high lev-
els of deficit and debt in numerous European countries following the 
creation of the single currency. The global financial crisis exacerbated 
the problem, with debt loads soaring in the “peripheral” countries 
and their effect spreading across the Eurozone. 
The question arises as to whether there was a failure in Eurozone 
governance and in the implementation of fiscal limits in European 
Union (EU). The problem of high deficits and debt was in fact fore-
seen by the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty, who sought to create a 
common currency that was as stable as the Deutsche Mark.  So the 
foundations for the establishment of the Euro were laid out in the 
Treaty, where certain convergence criteria were defined, most nota-
bly limits on government finances, which had to be satisfied by a 
member state before it was to be  admitted to the third stage of the 
monetary union. To this end, all EU countries worked for several 
years to stabilize inflation, lower government spending, reduce debt 
and avoid devaluation of the currency, in order to achieve the con-
vergence criteria. By 1999, deficit and debt levels declined in most 
EU countries, and eleven countries qualified for the Euro. 
*The full version of this paper can be found as part of the Working Paper Series on 
the Wharton Financial Institutions Center web site: http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/
fic/papers/12/12-10.pdf  
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As the launch of the new currency neared, there were discussions 
to implement a formal framework to maintain fiscal discipline once 
countries adopted the Euro, as they were no longer bound by the 
convergence criteria in the Maastricht Treaty.  Under the Treaty, all 
member states of the EU were required to “avoid excessive deficits” 
but with few specific stipulations for its enforcement.1 The Treaty 
also grants power to the European Commission, the EU’s executive 
body, and to the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECO-
FIN), made up of economic and finance ministers from member 
states, to monitor deficit and debt levels and to issue warnings and 
impose fines as necessary. 
The idea of a more detailed set of procedures to handle excessive 
debts, or a “Stability Pact,” was proposed by German finance minis-
ter Theo Waigel in the mid-1990s. Germany had long maintained a 
policy that emphasized price stability, which had been an important 
part of the German economy’s strong performance. The German 
government hoped to ensure the continuation of that policy, which 
would limit the ability of governments to exert inflationary pressures 
on the European economy.
The intent of putting in place the Maastricht convergence criteria 
and a Pact to enforce fiscal discipline was to maintain economic sta-
bility within the EU and avoid large divergences across countries 
that would disadvantage fiscally prudent countries such as Germany. 
Given the variability of national budgets and the lack of formal bud-
get limits on member states after the adoption of the single currency, 
and in order to reassure critics of the Euro and financial markets, 
regulations on public finances became indispensable to the func-
tioning and stability of the Euro, so as to avoid spillover effects on 
all Eurozone countries. Since countries needed to forego control of 
monetary and exchange rate policies, countries were presumed to 
gravitate towards the use of fiscal policy and fiscal deficits to man-
age macroeconomic shocks. Financial mismanagement in a country 
could reduce market confidence and lead to higher borrowing rates 
for all countries. Or worse, debt-ridden countries could overspend 
1 Article 104c, Maastricht Treaty; renumbered Article 126 of Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
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to a point where they could demand support from other countries. 
Excessive debt cannot be financed in public markets and can lead to 
monetary financings by central banks.
 
The resulting agreement, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), was 
introduced in 1997 as Council regulations,2 and was designed to 
strengthen fiscal discipline on deficits and debt levels of member 
states. Rather than as part of a formal treaty, the SGP was EU sec-
ondary law and thus part of a set of European regulations and direc-
tives that applied to all member states and was set up to complement 
the creation of the single currency.  Elaborating and supplementing 
the general provisions in the Maastricht Treaty, the SGP had the pur-
pose of maintaining and enforcing low budgetary deficits in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU). The SGP was thus intended to 
safeguard “sound public finances”3 and ensure that Member states 
having adopted the Euro and met the Maastricht convergence crite-
ria would continue to observe them.
The Stability and Growth Pact
As in the Maastricht Treaty, the two major criteria that member 
states must respect under the SGP are:
1. Annual government deficit not exceeding 3 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) 
2. Government debt not exceeding 60 percent of GDP, or di-
minishing and approaching that value.
The SGP became the rule-based framework to coordinate national 
fiscal policies in the EMU. The Pact has two components: a preven-
tive arm and a corrective (dissuasive) arm. 
Based on the concept of “multilateral surveillance” as established in 
the Maastricht Treaty,4 the preventive arm requires member states to 
submit annual stability programs (for Eurozone countries) or con-
vergence programs (for countries outside the Eurozone) to the Com-
2 Council Regulations 1466/97 and 1476/97, Council Resolution 97/C236/0-02. 
3 Article 3a [TFEU Article 119]. 
4 Article 103 [TFEU Article 121]. 
216 Introduction to the Stability and Growth Pact
mission and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECO-
FIN), showing how they plan to achieve or safeguard sound fiscal 
positions to meet their budgetary objectives. The Commission then 
assesses these programs and ECOFIN gives an opinion on them and 
may make its recommendations public.
The preventive arm includes two policy instruments:
First, in addition to the existing GDP deficit limit of 3 percent, the 
preventive arm also requires countries to strive for a medium-term 
objective (MTO). In the original agreement from 1997, countries 
were urged to attain a common “close-to-balance or in surplus” posi-
tion to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations, with deficit no larger 
than half a percent of GDP over the cycle to remain in compliance. 
This allowed member states a sufficient cyclical safety margin when 
automatic stabilizers are operated in an economic downturn.
Second, ECOFIN can issue an early warning to prevent the occur-
rence of an excessive deficit. With the use of official policy advice, the 
Commission, through ECOFIN, can directly address policy recom-
mendations to a member state with regards to the broad implica-
tions of its fiscal policies. ECOFIN can make a recommendation to 
a member state to take prompt corrective measures if the excessive 
deficit persists or worsens.  The preventive arm had little prominence 
and did not gain much attention in public debates. 
The dissuasive or “corrective” part of the Pact governs the Exces-
sive Deficit Procedure (EDP) created by the Maastricht Treaty.5 The 
SGP specifies triggers to the EDP and if it is decided that the deficit 
is excessive in the meaning of the Treaty, ECOFIN issues recom-
mendations to the relevant member state, providing guidance and 
a timeline to correct the excessive deficit. ECOFIN abrogates the 
EDP decision when the excessive deficit is corrected by the member 
state. If ECOFIN believes that the member state has failed to comply 
with the recommendations, it can trigger further steps in the pro-
cedures such as requiring publication of information, demanding a 
non-interest bearing deposit with the EU, or imposing a fine on the 
5 Article 104c [TFEU Article 126]. 
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country. However, since ECOFIN is composed of ministers from 
member states, the credibility of the framework is reduced since they 
are reluctant to impose serious sanctions on other member states.
The 2005 Reform
Germany, which was much more insistent on maintaining fiscal dis-
cipline than other countries, turned out to be one of the first coun-
tries to violate the SGP.  In 2002, Germany avoided an early warning 
from the Commission for failing to adhere to the deficit criterion in 
the SGP and approaching the 3 percent limit for its deficit by strik-
ing a deal with ECOFIN. In January 2003, ECOFIN issued an early 
warning to France to urge it to balance its budget. In November 
2003, the Commission presented its findings to ECOFIN, stating 
that both Germany and France had not taken adequate steps to re-
duce excessive deficits.  
ECOFIN decided not to proceed with action against France and 
Germany by holding the EDP in abeyance.6 Political pressure from 
these two countries led to the effective suspension of the Pact and the 
EDP was formally suspended in December 2004.  
Romano Prodi, then President of the European Commission, called 
the SGP rules “stupid” for being too rigid at a time of economic 
downturn.7  
The reform of the fiscal regime was subsequently announced in 
March 2005, with more “flexibility” for countries to account for run-
ning large deficits but the form of the original SGP remained mostly 
unaltered. Reference values were left untouched since they were part 
of the Treaties and discretionary powers were extended. The most 
important changes include revised medium-term objectives (MTOs) 
that account for national differences, as well as clarification of “ex-
ceptional and temporary” excesses and “other relevant factors.” 
6 This decision was later declared by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in July 
2004 to be an inadmissible decision since it was not preceded by a Commission 
proposal. 
7 Le Monde, October 18, 2002. 
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Compared to the original SGP that purported to enable the Com-
mission and ECOFIN to react quickly to deteriorations in fi scal 
policies and to impose sanctions within a year, the 2005 “reformed” 
SGP loosened the escape clauses, lengthened deadlines for taking 
action, and expanded the circumstances under which longer adjust-
ment periods are permitted. Th ese parameters include the behavior 
of the cyclically adjusted budget, the level of debt, the duration of 
the slow growth period and the possibility that the defi cit is related 
to productivity-enhancing procedures. No EDP procedure will be 
launched if the excess of the government defi cit over the 3% of GDP 
reference value is considered temporary and exceptional and the defi -
cit remains close to the threshold.
Defi cit and Debt Levels, 1995-2007
Figure 1.1: Eurozone government surplus/defi cit as percentage of GDP 
(1995-2007)
Source: Eurostat
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From 1995 to 2007, only Luxembourg and Ireland managed not to 
exceed the 3% of GDP deficit threshold throughout the entire pe-
riod. Nonetheless, before the creation of the Euro in 1999, with the 
exception of Greece, eleven countries sufficiently brought down their 
levels of deficits below the 3% reference value to meet the conver-
gence criteria. Notably, Finland made substantial efforts to improve 
its deficit levels. Ireland, which was a country later hit severely by the 
sovereign debt crisis, held surpluses for almost the entirety of this pe-
riod and fully complied with the deficit rule. Meanwhile, Germany 
and Spain made substantial efforts to have fiscal surpluses but several 
countries, including Greece, Italy, France and Portugal, maintained 
high deficit levels, especially after their admission to the Eurozone.
 
By the end of 2004, only half of the Euro area countries had fiscal 
positions that could be deemed as “close-to-balance or in surplus,” 
defined as a minimum one-half percent cyclically adjusted deficit. 
These countries included Belgium, Finland, Netherlands, and Spain. 
Countries such as France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Portugal re-
mained far off from their objectives. As a result, these countries end-
ed up posting deficits in excess of 3 percent that pushed them close 
to triggering the Excessive Deficit Procedure.
Enforcement of the SGP was made more difficult by the fact that 
several countries, including Greece, Italy, and Portugal underreport-
ed their deficit numbers to the European Commission. When the 
numbers were later revised by Eurostat, the problem was revealed to 
be more serious, and could possibly have disqualified some countries 
from joining the Euro because of the high level of deficits. 
With respect to debt levels, Belgium, Italy, and Greece had the high-
est debt loads. Belgium and Italy showed substantial improvement 
over the period from 1995 to 2007, justifying their claims that they 
were actively reducing their debt to fulfill the Maastricht conver-
gence criteria and SGP limits. However, Greek debt levels did not 
seem to decline and increased by about 10 percentage points over the 
period. Ireland, Spain, Netherlands, and Finland had declining levels 
of debt since the introduction of the single currency and consistently 
kept it below 60% of GDP until 2007. On the other hand, countries 
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such as Germany, France, Austria, and Portugal maintained debt lev-
els around the 60% of GDP specifi ed by the Maastricht Treaty. Por-
tugal, although having fulfi lled the criterion before its admission, 
had its debt levels climb steadily, with 60% surpassed in 2004 and 
further increases following.
Figure 1.2: Eurozone government gross debt as percentage of GDP 
(1995-2007)
Overall, the Maastricht convergence criteria had a positive infl uence 
for many countries such as Italy, which attempted to bring down its 
debt and defi cit levels prior to joining the Euro, and have maintained 
consistent levels after adoption. However, with the diff erent set of 
incentives under the Stability and Growth Pact, there was no signifi -
cant improvement in defi cit and debt levels in many countries. Even 
though there was a rebound in defi cits and debt levels after the 2005 
reform of the SGP, most countries’ fi nances did not diverge widely. 
Countries like France and Germany did not improve their debt levels 
to bring them into line with the SGP, while countries such as Ireland 
actively brought them down to healthy levels. Comparing budgetary 
stabilization eff orts before and after the Euro, and comparing the 
change between the Eurozone and the rest of the OECD, the Euro-
zone countries did not perform better, suggesting that the SGP has 
had a limited eff ect.8 
8 Wyplosz, C. (2006). European Monetary Union: Th e dark sides of a major suc-
cess. Economic Policy, 21(46), 207-261. 
Source: Eurostat
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Why the SGP was ineffective
The enforcement mechanisms that support the SGP can help explain 
why adherence to the Pact was limited in many countries. The re-
sponsibility for enforcing fiscal limits in the SGP fell on two players. 
The first was the European Commission and ECOFIN. The second 
was the financial markets, which had the power to affect interest rates 
on government bonds, thereby signaling its level of confidence with 
a country’s public finances. 
In the years following the enactment of the SGP, enforcement was lax 
due to the lack of financial sanctions imposed on countries despite 
the inability of many countries to comply with targets, most nota-
bly France and Germany. Imposition of sanctions required consent 
of ECOFIN, composed of national ministers of finance and where 
France and Germany held a large portion of votes. In other words, 
member states could easily overturn mechanisms that they devised 
when their deficit and debt levels did not fall under the previously 
agreed levels. 
When France and Germany decided to impose a looser interpreta-
tion of the SGP in 2003 to avoid sanctions, the SGP was no longer 
fully operative, this being only four years after the establishment of 
the single currency. Many warnings and reports were issued by the 
European Commission on countries’ fiscal policies but no action was 
taken by ECOFIN. Prior to the crisis, an official early warning was 
issued to France in 2003 only after the 3% of GDP deficit threshold 
was breached, but not to Germany, Portugal, and Italy, for which the 
Commission recommended early warnings. Since European institu-
tions were not directly elected, it was also difficult to impose sanc-
tions on national governments that were popularly elected. No fines 
have ever been imposed on a member state, despite the power of 
ECOFIN to do so under the dissuasive arm of the SGP.9  
By 2011, all Eurozone countries had been involved in the Exces-
sive Deficit Procedure (EDP). Although the Commission still argued 
9 In March 2012, ECOFIN threatened to suspend Hungary’s access to develop-
ment funds for 2013, which would be reversed if Hungary shows improvement in 
reducing its deficit level. 
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that the SGP was a framework by which member states could re-
turn to sound fi scal policies, few countries adhered to the Commis-
sion’s recommendations. In addition, since 23 of 27 EU countries 
were subject to the EDP and many of the EDPs were launched in 
2009, the likelihood of any sanctions imposed by ECOFIN on an 
individual member state was signifi cantly reduced. Th e inability to 
enforce automatic sanctions, as Germany had demanded before the 
introduction of the SGP, is a limit that renders enforcement against 
countries with excessive defi cits or debt diffi  cult.
Th e political architecture that underlies the SGP could provide an 
explanation as to why the fi scal rules were not fully enforced. An 
important factor was creative accounting, notably by Greece, to hide 
large defi cits, leaving the problem undetected for years. National 
leaders are accountable to their electorate, from whom they face pos-
sible political sanction, and this leads to a general bias towards defi -
cits and debts. Incentives for adherence are thus much weaker at the 
European level, especially for large countries that have substantial 
political infl uence in the EU. An additional factor is a moral hazard 
problem where the lack of a signifi cant interest rate risk premium 
meant that the costs of profl igacy were small and were shared with 
the rest of the Eurozone.
Defi cits and Debt Levels during Sovereign Debt Crisis
Figure 2.1: Eurozone government surplus/defi cit as percentage of GDP 
(2007-2011)
Source: Eurostat
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Traditionally fi scally conservative countries, such as Germany, Lux-
embourg, Austria, and Finland, managed mostly to avoid large fi scal 
defi cit until they faced the full brunt of the fi nancial crisis that started 
in 2007. By 2009, these countries had hit the defi cit range, but man-
aged to maintain near the 3% reference value for defi cit levels. In the 
rest of the Eurozone, with the exception of Greece, most countries 
managed to maintain their defi cit levels low in 2008. By 2009, only 
Belgium, Netherlands and Italy kept their defi cit levels under 5% 
of GDP, while the rest of the group fell into defi cits at or near 10% 
of GDP. Notably, due to the bailouts of fi nancial institutions by the 
government of Ireland, the defi cit there dipped to 31.3% of GDP.
Furthermore, the assessment of structural balance was often defi cient 
in the fi rst decade of the Euro, and in addition to the fact that the 
eff ect of changes in the output gap on tax revenues was often incor-
rectly estimated, there was little attention paid to changes in gov-
ernment revenues that were due to asset cycles in the fi nancial and 
housing markets, rather than to the general economic cycle. When 
the crisis hit, countries lost important sources of revenue from those 
markets and were left with a larger defi cit than they otherwise would 
have had.
Figure 2.2 Eurozone government debt as a percentage of GDP 
(2007-2011)
Source: Eurostat
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Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Portugal, which already had high debt-
to-GDP ratios before the crisis, had debt levels increase dramati-
cally during the period, with Greece ending up with a value greater 
than 160%. An interesting case, however, was that of Ireland. It 
performed relatively well with the SGP targets prior to the crisis, 
yet when under pressure to save failing financial institutions, it was 
forced to be indebted at much higher levels, reaching over 100% of 
GDP by 2011. The rest of the original monetary union members 
saw a steady climb in debt ratios and, with the exception of Finland, 
went above the targeted 60% of GDP reference value.
Given the economic downturn and the push for stimulus, countries 
in general ignored the limits set by the SGP as most believed that 
they were facing one of the worst economic recessions since the end 
of the Second World War, which would qualify as an “exceptional 
and temporary” situation. 
In the midst of a debt crisis, with bond yields increasing rapidly, the 
European Commission and ECOFIN did not make an attempt to 
sanction any country for ignoring the SGP targets, as most of them 
had breached them. As the debt level for countries such as Greece 
continued to climb, there were no significant institutional attempts 
to pressure the Greek government to reverse the change. As bond 
yields escalated in the market, countries continued to be hit hard 
with large borrowing costs, at the risk of defaulting. 
One of the original intentions of the SGP was to enforce strict fiscal 
rules and promote prudence in government finances during most of 
the economic cycle, so that in “exceptional” circumstances, countries 
would be able to run deficits without falling away from its Medium 
Term Objective (MTO). Indeed, the global financial crisis had se-
rious repercussions in Eurozone economies and it is questionable 
whether the SGP could have prevented the precipitous rise in debt 
levels in cases such as Ireland, a country that was in full compli-
ance with the rules prior to the crisis. However, the general lax en-
forcement of the SGP in the years before the sovereign debt crisis 
made any quick return to sustainable deficit and debt levels difficult. 
This major shortcoming of the SGP meant that its credibility was 
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questioned as countries grappled with the eff ects of the sovereign 
debt crisis, where Eurozone countries were widely criticized for their 
fi nances. 
Market enforcement
Figure 3.1 Ten-year Government Bond Yields for EU-12 (1992-1999)
Figure 3.2 Ten-year Government Bond Yields for EU-12 (1999-2011)10
10 Luxembourg was excluded since the country only began issuing ten-year 
government bonds in 2010. 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream
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As much as the Maastricht convergence and the subsequent Stability 
and Growth Pact were political agreements among member states, 
the success of the monetary union depended partly on acceptance in 
the financial markets. The EU needed to assure investors of the ben-
efits of a common currency and member states needed to convince 
markets that the default risk of their sovereign bonds declined as a 
result of joining the Euro.
After the formation of the single currency, interest rate spreads on 
long-term government bond yields between Germany and other Eu-
rozone countries were narrow and almost constant, reflecting confi-
dence in the market that participation in the Eurozone reduced the 
risk of default substantially even in countries that formerly had high 
levels of government debt and deficit. In addition, financial investors 
perceived the Commission to be a credible enforcer of SGP rules, 
which would assure the viability of the Euro.  Even when deficit 
levels diverged between countries before the sovereign debt crisis, 
bond yields demonstrated little movement away from the Eurozone 
average. The deficit and debt levels were effectively not enforced in 
any significant way in the financial markets, allowing countries such 
as Greece to borrow at substantially much lower rates than they oth-
erwise would have been able to. 
Market responses to changes in deficit and debt levels after 2008 
were much more pronounced, and many of the changes in bond 
yields were disproportionate to the relative changes in debt levels. In 
other words, markets treated the effectiveness of the SGP differently 
before and after the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis. Interest 
rates for Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland increased substantially 
with the sovereign debt crisis. Rapidly rising borrowing costs have in 
all likelihood made meeting the SGP thresholds even more difficult, 
as seen with the remarkable increases in debt for Ireland and Greece 
since the sovereign debt crisis. 
In fact, Eurozone countries faced less market discipline than those 
outside the Eurozone.11 While arguably beneficial to provide more 
flexibility during economic cycles, the relaxed enforcement of SGP 
11 Eichengreen, B. (2005). Europe, the euro and the ECB: Monetary success, fis-
cal failure. Journal of Policy Modeling, 27(4), 427-439. 
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rules undermined the effectiveness of the targets, and when an eco-
nomic recession hit, the countries had little room for maneuver to 
prevent falling into excessive deficit and debt levels. 
Lasting reform to the SGP?
As the sovereign debt crisis heightened after 2009 and bond yields 
rose to substantial levels for several countries that were considered to 
have poor finances, European leaders sought to reassure the financial 
markets of their determination to maintain sound finances in the 
future and of their commitment to the continuity of the single cur-
rency. Given the limitations of the existing SGP, the EU attempted 
to reinforce it by launching the “Six-Pack,” which is a legislative 
package of six legal acts (five regulations and one directive) that en-
tered into force on December 13, 2011. 
On March 2, 2012, 25 EU countries agreed on an intergovernmen-
tal treaty, titled the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Gover-
nance in the Economic and Monetary Union, commonly referred to 
as the Fiscal Compact or the Fiscal Stability Treaty. When ratified, 
the Treaty would enshrine budget and debt limits into their respec-
tive constitutions, with legally enforceable penalties for violators. 
The Euro had symbolized a new stage in European integration and 
the monetary union was to be the demonstration of the success of EU 
cooperation. A thorough evaluation of the inefficacies of the current 
SGP would be helpful to bring about a response for a permanent, 
viable system that is effective at both political and market levels in 
committing Eurozone countries to enact fiscal policy that will bring 
stability to the Euro and bring growth to the European economies.
Note:  Color versions of all graphs in this publication are available for download at:
http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Carletti/
http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Economics/SeminarsEvents/Conferences/
GovernancefortheEurozoneIntegrationorDisintegration.aspx 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/FIC/FICPress/goveuro.pdf
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c) Role of countries outside the Eurozone and European institutions 
 
 Chair: Saverio Simonelli (European University Institute) 
 
Participants:    
Bruno De Witte (Maastricht University) 
Charles Goodhart (London School of Economics) 
  Brigid Laffan (UCD) 
  Guntram Wolff (Bruegel) 
   
   
18:30    Reception and Dinner at Villa Schifanoia 
 
Dinner speaker: Wolfgang Münchau (Eurointelligence) 
This conference is financed by the PEGGED Collaborative Project.
The PEGGED Collaborative Project is funded by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme for Research. Grant 
Agreement no. 217559.

